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<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">On second thoughts, would
this not lead to tactical voting? I imagine that a voter who both
approved and disapproved would have more influence than one who
only approved or only disapproved.<br>
CJC<br>
</font><br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 27/08/2023 09:52, Colin Champion
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:b319d5e7-c05b-8e7f-07a2-31f66712f90f@routemaster.app">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">I think I prefer
approval/disapproval to plain approval, since it elicits more
information from voters and they will be delighted to get their
antipathies off their chest. <br>
CJC<br>
</font><br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 26/08/2023 19:46, Ralph Suter
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:50a3eb4d-f04a-f004-945a-fb503012e631@aol.com">Disapproval
voting may seem functionally equivalent to approval voting.
However, disapproval voting would make it more difficult to
"bullet vote" because that would require disapproving every
candidate except one's favorite. It would also be more awkward
for candidates to urge their supporters to disapprove every
candidate but themselves. <br>
<br>
One promising way to narrow down large fields of candidates may
be to combine approval with disapproval. Voters could approve
any candidates they found at least somewhat acceptable and
disapprove candidates they found unacceptable. Many voters would
leave candidates they were uncertain about unmarked.
Furthermore, if voters were given short descriptions of all
candidates and their political views, most voters would likely
not have much trouble deciding which candidates were acceptable,
which ones were unacceptable, and which ones they were uncertain
about. If I were me, I would disapprove not only candidates I
found clearly unacceptable but also candidates who described
themselves so vaguely as to make it impossible to make a
reasonable guess as to how they would perform if elected. <br>
<br>
Any thoughts? <br>
<br>
-Ralph Suter <br>
<blockquote type="cite">Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2023 22:51:40 +0200 <br>
From: Colin Champion <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:colin.champion@routemaster.app"
moz-do-not-send="true"><colin.champion@routemaster.app></a>
<br>
To: EM <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
moz-do-not-send="true"><election-methods@lists.electorama.com></a>
<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] Condorcet meeting <br>
Message-ID: <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
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<br>
I?m not persuaded of approval voting. My guess is that voters
will <br>
bullet-vote for the candidate they like best among those they
know <br>
about; candidates will encourage bullet voting on their own
behalf; <br>
pundits will have nothing better to say, and voters will have
no motive <br>
to award more than the minimum number of approvals. <br>
?? A danger of quadratic and entropic measures is that they
don't <br>
impose the constraint that the number of survivors has to be
small <br>
enough to make ranked voting effective on the second round. <br>
?? CJC <br>
<br>
On 25/08/2023 15:05, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: <br>
<blockquote type="cite">On 2023-08-25 01:50, Forest Simmons
wrote: <br>
<blockquote type="cite">I agree with Kristofer that Approval
is plenty good for the narrowing <br>
down phase. <br>
<br>
Your favorite pundits and candidates will definitely make
known their <br>
recommendations.? Trust your own judgment and gut, as you
collate and <br>
cull out their llists of recommendations. <br>
<br>
If there are going to be only six finalists, that doesn't
mean you <br>
can only approve six or that you have to approve more than
one. <br>
<br>
My rule is to approve my favorite as well as everybody
else that I <br>
like almost as much. <br>
<br>
Here's an idea for deciding on n, the number of finalists
after the <br>
approval ballots have been tallied: <br>
<br>
For this purpose, temporarily count the ballots
fractionally, and let <br>
f(X) be the fraction of the total that X gets in this
tally ... so <br>
that the f(X) values sum to unity. <br>
<br>
The value of n should be the reciprocal of the sum of the
squares of <br>
the f(X) vslues... the standard formula for the minimum
number of <br>
seats that would be acceptable for proportional
representation of a <br>
diverse population. <br>
</blockquote>
Another option is to use the exponential of the Shannon
entropy: <br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties#Entropy_measure"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties#Entropy_measure</a>
<br>
<br>
-km <br>
</blockquote>
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Message: 2 <br>
Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2023 15:59:00 -0700 <br>
From: Forest Simmons <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com"
moz-do-not-send="true"><forest.simmons21@gmail.com></a>
<br>
To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" moz-do-not-send="true"><km_elmet@t-online.de></a>
<br>
Cc: EM <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
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moz-do-not-send="true"><election-methods@lists.electorama.com></a>
<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] Situations where IIA failure may be natural
<br>
Message-ID: <br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
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<br>
This line of thought reminds me of the kind of ballot used in
Jobst's <br>
MaxParC: <br>
<br>
Next to each candidate's name you specify the total approval
that candidate <br>
would have to have from the other voters before you would get
on board. <br>
<br>
Why should other vogers' support affect your support? <br>
<br>
That's also implicit in the Nash Lottery where the candidate
probabilites <br>
are adjusted to maximize the product of the (score) ballot
expectations. <br>
<br>
It turns out that this maximization rule requires that (1)
each voter's <br>
total contribution to the lottery probability be 1/n, where n
is the number <br>
of voters, and (2l that contribution be allocated to the
respective <br>
candidates' winning probabilities in joint proportion to the
ballot ratings <br>
and the (equilibrium) probabilities of the respective
candidates. <br>
<br>
Nash's "efficient" allocation of resources general rule
requires the <br>
allocations to be proportional to the respective (expected)
payoff shares <br>
... which is why we named this election method the "Nash
Lottery". <br>
<br>
Roughly speaking, the more popular something is, the more of
your capital <br>
(eg your vote) you should devote to it ... according to Nash's
general rule <br>
of efficient allocation. <br>
<br>
This rule is different from, but related to, the rational
strategy of <br>
maximizing the likelihood of your vote being pivotal. <br>
<br>
MaxParC's allocation is closer to optimal rational strategy
than is Nash's <br>
allocation. I can elaborate on this comment if there is
serious interest. <br>
<br>
fws <br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On Fri, Aug 25, 2023, 5:20 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <a
class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" moz-do-not-send="true"><km_elmet@t-online.de></a>
<br>
wrote: <br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">IIA failure is generally considered to
be a bad thing. But perhaps <br>
sometimes "all things equal" is not so! <br>
<br>
Consider the restaurant joke: Sidney is offered a choice of
apple pie <br>
and blueberry, and says "I'll have apple". Then the waitress
says "Oh, <br>
we also have cherry". "Well, in that case, I'll take
blueberry". This <br>
seems completely unreasonable. <br>
<br>
But here's a variant. Suppose I'm a fan of desserts that are
difficult <br>
to make, like (just picking something here) baked Alaska and
meringue <br>
pie. But I know that they're easy to get wrong and so I'll
settle with <br>
apple pie as a good dessert that's easy to make. <br>
<br>
I'm visiting a restaurant with generally good reviews and I
ask what <br>
desserts they have. They say "there's meringue pie and apple
pie". I'm <br>
not willing to risk, despite their good reviews, that they
can pull off <br>
the meringue properly, so I say "okay, I'll have apple pie".
Then the <br>
waiter says "Oh, hang on, we also have baked Alaska". <br>
<br>
Now I may reason: given the good reviews, and that they have
multiple <br>
difficult desserts, more people may have tried the difficult
ones; so if <br>
they weren't any good, it wouldn't have been reviewed so
well. So I say <br>
"well, in that case, I'll take the meringue". <br>
<br>
In a political context, the closest thing would be something
like: I've <br>
moved to a new town, and there are local elections with some
left and <br>
right parties. The parties' candidates seem sensible at
first glance, <br>
but they could just be tailoring their message to the
audience. Now if <br>
I'm a left-wing voter (say), and there are multiple
left-wing parties, <br>
this may indicate that there's a demand for left-of-center
policies, and <br>
thus that the left-wing candidates are more likely to mean
what they're <br>
saying, thus making it less risky to support one of them. <br>
<br>
It's kind of tenuous, but still I thought it's an
interesting example :-) <br>
<br>
If it's at least somewhat realistic, it could bring more
subtle dynamics <br>
into elections, no matter whether they pass IIA or not. For
instance, if <br>
voters are likely to consider a particular political
position more <br>
sincere if there are multiple parties based on it, then
that's an <br>
obvious (theoretical) clone failure. On the other hand,
maybe not so <br>
much: the inference works precisely because it's hard to set
up proxy <br>
parties that seem legitimate. If that becomes easy, then
there's little <br>
value in the observation, and the voters would stop judging
the number <br>
of parties as an indication of the strength of the position.
<br>
<br>
-km <br>
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Message: 3 <br>
Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2023 19:23:22 -0400 <br>
From: Michael Garman <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:michael.garman@rankthevote.us"
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To: Colin Champion <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
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<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] Condorcet meeting <br>
Message-ID: <br>
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<br>
Colin, <br>
<br>
Your concern about approval voting is corroborated, at least
anecdotally, <br>
by evidence from Fargo, ND -- the only US jurisdiction to use
approval in <br>
general elections. In 2022, 60% <br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="https://citizendata.com/tracking-voter-support-for-electoral-reforms/"
moz-do-not-send="true"><https://citizendata.com/tracking-voter-support-for-electoral-reforms/></a>
of <br>
voters reported voting for just one candidate in the field of
seven. At <br>
least two candidates (at least according to quotes in an
article <br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="https://democracysos.substack.com/p/what-fargo-reveals-about-approval"
moz-do-not-send="true"><https://democracysos.substack.com/p/what-fargo-reveals-about-approval></a>from
<br>
Rob Ritchie) encouraged their supporters to bullet vote for
them. <br>
<br>
MJG <br>
<br>
On Fri, Aug 25, 2023 at 4:52?PM Colin Champion < <br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:colin.champion@routemaster.app"
moz-do-not-send="true">colin.champion@routemaster.app</a>>
wrote: <br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">I?m not persuaded of approval voting.
My guess is that voters will <br>
bullet-vote for the candidate they like best among those
they know about; <br>
candidates will encourage bullet voting on their own behalf;
pundits will <br>
have nothing better to say, and voters will have no motive
to award more <br>
than the minimum number of approvals. <br>
A danger of quadratic and entropic measures is that they
don't impose <br>
the constraint that the number of survivors has to be small
enough to make <br>
ranked voting effective on the second round. <br>
CJC <br>
<br>
On 25/08/2023 15:05, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: <br>
<br>
On 2023-08-25 01:50, Forest Simmons wrote: <br>
<br>
I agree with Kristofer that Approval is plenty good for the
narrowing down <br>
phase. <br>
<br>
Your favorite pundits and candidates will definitely make
known their <br>
recommendations. Trust your own judgment and gut, as you
collate and cull <br>
out their llists of recommendations. <br>
<br>
If there are going to be only six finalists, that doesn't
mean you can <br>
only approve six or that you have to approve more than one.
<br>
<br>
My rule is to approve my favorite as well as everybody else
that I like <br>
almost as much. <br>
<br>
Here's an idea for deciding on n, the number of finalists
after the <br>
approval ballots have been tallied: <br>
<br>
For this purpose, temporarily count the ballots
fractionally, and let f(X) <br>
be the fraction of the total that X gets in this tally ...
so that the f(X) <br>
values sum to unity. <br>
<br>
The value of n should be the reciprocal of the sum of the
squares of the <br>
f(X) vslues... the standard formula for the minimum number
of seats that <br>
would be acceptable for proportional representation of a
diverse <br>
population. <br>
<br>
<br>
Another option is to use the exponential of the Shannon
entropy: <br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties#Entropy_measure"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties#Entropy_measure</a>
<br>
<br>
-km <br>
<br>
<br>
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