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<p>Forest,<br>
<br>
I'm glad you approve.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">So if a voter was giving out too much approval
by approving below one of the mandatory semi-finalists, the
method fixes that faux pas for free!</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
Also the voter might not be making the innocent "mistake" of
risking the IRV winner being defeated in the final by a candidate
they like less, but<br>
could be trying a relatively easy and tempting Push-over strategy.<br>
<br>
Chris<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 23/08/2023 8:54 am, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CANUDvfprvujHQv8VP++5Ggyz913LGGtBB_biCx8SZf8mc2X3BQ@mail.gmail.com">
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<div dir="auto">
<div><br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 21, 2023, 9:36
AM C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>
This is I think more appealing and streamlined than my
earlier version.<br>
<br>
*Voter strictly rank from the top however many candidates
they wish.<br>
<br>
Also they can mark one candidate as the highest ranked
candidate they <br>
approve.<br>
<br>
Default approval is only for the top-ranked candidate.<br>
<br>
Determine the IRV winner.<br>
<br>
On ballots that approve the IRV winner, approval for any
candidate or <br>
candidates<br>
ranked below the IRV winner is withdrawn.<br>
<br>
Elect the pairwise winner between the (thus modified)
approval winner <br>
and the IRV<br>
winner.*<br>
</blockquote>
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</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So if a voter was giving out too much approval
by approving below one of the mandatory semi-finalists, the
method fixes that faux pas for free!</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">What if the approval cutoff were simply moved
adjacent to the IRV winner?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">That would probably give the IRV winner's
strongest defeater too much help, and wrest too much control
of the approval lever from the sovereign voters.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"> It looks like you are treating the malady with
the minimal effective dose of the right medicine!</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Great! </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Who will spread the good news?</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
This works fine in the same way as the earlier version in
the example <br>
given to talk<br>
about Minimal Defense and Chicken Dilemma.<br>
<br>
It is more Condorcet efficient than normal IRV, and meets
(or comes <br>
close enough<br>
to meeting) appropriately modified versions of the LNHs
and Minimal Defense<br>
and Chicken Dilemma.<br>
<br>
49 A (sincere might be A>B)<br>
24 B (sincere might be B>C)<br>
27 C>B<br>
<br>
If the C voters B>A preference is strong they can by
approving B avoid <br>
regret for not Compromising.<br>
<br>
Then the final pairwise comparison will be between B and A
and B will win.<br>
<br>
But if they are more concerned about not letting the B
voters steal the <br>
election from them by possible Defection strategy then
they can do that by not <br>
approving B.<br>
<br>
49 A>C>>B<br>
48 B>>C>A<br>
03 C>A>>B<br>
<br>
Say this is for a seat in Parliament, and the voters have
been <br>
accustomed to using FPP,<br>
IRV or Top-Two Runoff. It would cross the mind of no-one
that the <br>
"Condorcet winner"<br>
C should defeat the IRV (and FPP and even Approval) winner
A.<br>
<br>
But according to Condorcet advocates the B voters should
or could be <br>
regretting no getting an outcome they somewhat prefer by
all top voting C.<br>
<br>
Well with this system the B and C voters together can
"fix" this without <br>
anyone betraying their favourites or reversing any sincere
preferences simply by all of <br>
them approving C and not A. Then the final pairwise
comparison will be between C and A <br>
with C winning.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
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