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<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">But of course, as with STAR, any complex add-on to the method is unlikely to ever be adopted, regardless of how much better it is in theory...</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Toby</div><div><br></div>
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On Wednesday, 23 August 2023 at 06:59:06 BST, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> wrote:
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<p>Forest,<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
I'm glad you approve.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
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<div>So if a voter was giving out too much approval
by approving below one of the mandatory semi-finalists, the
method fixes that faux pas for free!</div>
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Also the voter might not be making the innocent "mistake" of
risking the IRV winner being defeated in the final by a candidate
they like less, but<br clear="none">
could be trying a relatively easy and tempting Push-over strategy.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Chris<br clear="none">
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<div class="ydp8e6af83byiv3464255226moz-cite-prefix">On 23/08/2023 8:54 am, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br clear="none">
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<div dir="ltr" class="ydp8e6af83byiv3464255226gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 21, 2023, 9:36
AM C.Benham <<a shape="rect" href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" class="ydp8e6af83byiv3464255226moz-txt-link-freetext" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br clear="none">
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<blockquote style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;" class="ydp8e6af83byiv3464255226gmail_quote"><br clear="none">
This is I think more appealing and streamlined than my
earlier version.<br clear="none">
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*Voter strictly rank from the top however many candidates
they wish.<br clear="none">
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Also they can mark one candidate as the highest ranked
candidate they <br clear="none">
approve.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Default approval is only for the top-ranked candidate.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Determine the IRV winner.<br clear="none">
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On ballots that approve the IRV winner, approval for any
candidate or <br clear="none">
candidates<br clear="none">
ranked below the IRV winner is withdrawn.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Elect the pairwise winner between the (thus modified)
approval winner <br clear="none">
and the IRV<br clear="none">
winner.*<br clear="none">
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<div>So if a voter was giving out too much approval
by approving below one of the mandatory semi-finalists, the
method fixes that faux pas for free!</div>
<div><br clear="none">
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<div>What if the approval cutoff were simply moved
adjacent to the IRV winner?</div>
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<div>That would probably give the IRV winner's
strongest defeater too much help, and wrest too much control
of the approval lever from the sovereign voters.</div>
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<div> It looks like you are treating the malady with
the minimal effective dose of the right medicine!</div>
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<div>Great! </div>
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<div>Who will spread the good news?</div>
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<blockquote style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;" class="ydp8e6af83byiv3464255226gmail_quote">
<br clear="none">
This works fine in the same way as the earlier version in
the example <br clear="none">
given to talk<br clear="none">
about Minimal Defense and Chicken Dilemma.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
It is more Condorcet efficient than normal IRV, and meets
(or comes <br clear="none">
close enough<br clear="none">
to meeting) appropriately modified versions of the LNHs
and Minimal Defense<br clear="none">
and Chicken Dilemma.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
49 A (sincere might be A>B)<br clear="none">
24 B (sincere might be B>C)<br clear="none">
27 C>B<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
If the C voters B>A preference is strong they can by
approving B avoid <br clear="none">
regret for not Compromising.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Then the final pairwise comparison will be between B and A
and B will win.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
But if they are more concerned about not letting the B
voters steal the <br clear="none">
election from them by possible Defection strategy then
they can do that by not <br clear="none">
approving B.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
49 A>C>>B<br clear="none">
48 B>>C>A<br clear="none">
03 C>A>>B<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Say this is for a seat in Parliament, and the voters have
been <br clear="none">
accustomed to using FPP,<br clear="none">
IRV or Top-Two Runoff. It would cross the mind of no-one
that the <br clear="none">
"Condorcet winner"<br clear="none">
C should defeat the IRV (and FPP and even Approval) winner
A.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
But according to Condorcet advocates the B voters should
or could be <br clear="none">
regretting no getting an outcome they somewhat prefer by
all top voting C.<div id="ydp8e6af83byiv3464255226yqtfd39229" class="ydp8e6af83byiv3464255226yqt5479037880"><br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Well with this system the B and C voters together can
"fix" this without <br clear="none">
anyone betraying their favourites or reversing any sincere
preferences simply by all of <br clear="none">
them approving C and not A. Then the final pairwise
comparison will be between C and A <br clear="none">
with C winning.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Chris Benham<br clear="none">
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