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<p>Jameson Quinn used to participate in discussion here. I am not a
fan of his or her ideas on voting methods.<br>
<br>
I am very sceptical about claims that some method is great despite
being crap on criterion compliances, based purely on computer
simulations.<br>
<br>
I refuse to believe that having fewer criterion compliances is
needed for the sake of "greater utility".<br>
<br>
"Condorcet at all cost" and then "ticking off a list of criteria"
seems like a fine approach (or at least start) to me. But some
criteria are more desirable than others (and opinions can vary<br>
on which) and some are incompatible with each other and we can
invent or suggest new ones.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">I do think failing clone independence is
quite a black mark against STAR in any case. One way to fix it
is to have the election method "clone" all the candidates
anyway.</blockquote>
<br>
How would it do that?<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 13/08/2023 12:17 am, Toby Pereira
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:1393365029.4089489.1691851669101@mail.yahoo.com">
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<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">I'm no advocate of STAR, but
interestingly it did come out well in Jameson Quinn's VSE
(Voter Satisfaction Efficiency - basically utility)
simulations. <a
href="https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSEbasic"
target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSEbasic</a> So
while it might not exactly pass a lot of criteria, it seems
that is does perform generally well overall, as long as you
accept that utility is a useful measure. Obviously all
simulations contain simplifications and assumptions and that
has to be taken into account as well. But then there is the
question of what exactly one is after in a voting method -
whether it's Condorcet at all cost and then whatever you can
get hold of after that, utility, ticking off a list of
criteria, or something else.</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">I do think failing clone
independence is quite a black mark against STAR in any case.
One way to fix it is to have the election method "clone" all
the candidates anyway. Then run a two-winner sequential
proportional election (take your pick of the methods) to find
the two candidates for the run-off. The two candidates could
just be a candidate and their clone, in which case that
candidate automatically wins without a run-off.</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Toby</div>
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<div id="ydp865180deyahoo_quoted_2667261278"
class="ydp865180deyahoo_quoted">
<div style="font-family:'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial,
sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#26282a;">
<div> On Saturday, 12 August 2023 at 03:45:25 BST, C.Benham
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a> wrote: </div>
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<p>I see from the "STAR Voting" advocates' website they
propose using 0-5 scoring ballots.<br>
<br>
STAR Voting it seems to me is just awful. It fails
almost every desirable criterion you can think of.<br>
<br>
It meets Condorcet Loser and Plurality and that's
about it. Their propaganda that it is somehow better<br>
than IRV is very very dumb and/or dishonest. <br>
</p>
<p>Forest wrote:<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="ydp865180deyiv6500640646moz-quote-pre">But Copeland suffers from two fatal defect that STAR does not have ... Copeland is neither Decisive nor Clone
Independent.</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
What gives you the idea that STAR is Clone
Independent? It obviously fails Clone-Loser. Say the
score winner pairwise loses to<br>
the score runner-up. If we add a clone of the
score-winner then the previous winner will be displaced
out of the run-off.<br>
<br>
One of the silly things about it is that all the major
factions will have incentive to field two candidates (in
the hope of capturing<br>
both run-off spots).<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<a href="https://www.starvoting.org/"
class="ydp865180deyiv6500640646moz-txt-link-freetext
moz-txt-link-freetext" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer
noopener" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.starvoting.org/</a><br>
<br>
<img style="display: block; margin-left: auto;
margin-right: auto; width: 100%; max-width: 800px;"
src="https://assets.nationbuilder.com/unifiedprimary/pages/1372/attachments/original/1668651575/Single-Winner_Scorecard_-_Choose-One__RCV__STAR.jpg?1668651575"
alt="" moz-do-not-send="true"><br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="ydp865180deyiv6500640646moz-quote-pre">Date: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 17:19:15 -0700
From: Forest Simmons <a href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com" class="ydp865180deyiv6500640646moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" moz-do-not-send="true"><forest.simmons21@gmail.com></a>
To: EM <a href="mailto:Election-methods@lists.electorama.com" class="ydp865180deyiv6500640646moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" moz-do-not-send="true"><Election-methods@lists.electorama.com></a>
Subject: [EM] STAR
Message-ID:
<a href="mailto:CANUDvfoOeBgZAgWiKPFG+UU0fcoDi771ZHHRTmkCEzVx-mLVyQ@mail.gmail.com" class="ydp865180deyiv6500640646moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" moz-do-not-send="true"><CANUDvfoOeBgZAgWiKPFG+UU0fcoDi771ZHHRTmkCEzVx-mLVyQ@mail.gmail.com></a>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Score Then Automatic Runoff (STAR) elects the pairwise winner between the
two candidates with the highest score totals.
One of the biggest problems with this method is that there is an
appreciable likelihood that the winner W will be a candidate that is
pairwise dominated by some other candidate C, which means that C not only
scores higher than W on more ballots than not, but if there even exists a
beatpath from W back to C, it will take at least three steps.
Most other extant methods have this same defect, but almost all of them are
hard to fix compared to STAR. This fact makes it easy for a tweaked version
of STAR to become arguably superior to any of these other methods.
1. Initialize a set S of candidates with the STAR winner.
2. If any candidate pairwise dominates the newest member of S, from among
such candidates add in to S the one with the highest score.
3. Repeat step 2 until the set S cannot be enlarged any further in this way.
4. Elect the last candidate to be added to the set.
Usually step 2 will be invoked only one or two times if at all ... so this
is not a big tweak.
With this tweak STAR becomes arguably superior to any method currently in
use.
The only other method currently in use that always elects pairwise
undominated candidates is Copeland. But Copeland suffers from two fatal
defect that STAR does not have ... Copeland is neither Decisive nor Clone
Independent.
Will STAR proponents take advantage of this opportunity? ... or will they
pass it up?
fws</pre>
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