<div dir="auto"><div>Four years ago James Green-Armytage and Nicolaus Tideman published a paper (<a href="https://jamesgreenarmytage.com/runoff.pdf" style="font-family:sans-serif">https://jamesgreenarmytage.com/runoff.pdf</a>) that explored different ways of selecting the finalists for a two candidate runoff.</div><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">They point out that, although RCV ballots can enable instant versions where no second trip to the polls is necessary, (among other things) some voters might prefer to wait until they know who the finalists are before investing the time and energy that goes into that final decision.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The immediate relevance of this point is borne out by Richard The VoteFair Guy's recent message reminding us of the difficulty of getting Ranked Choice ballots on which the candidates can be fully ranked ... even where Ranked Choice Voting has already been approved.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">For example, after several elimination steps and vote transfers the remaining RCV ballot profile might be something like</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">4900 C</div><div dir="auto">2600 A>B</div><div dir="auto">2500 B</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The incomplete ballots might be because of lack of awareness that C and B had a chance of being finalists ... or because forced equal rankings at previous stages from lack of room on the ballot ... or from deliberate strategic truncations by manipulators.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If B or C gets eliminated, there is no way of knowing where to transfer their votes.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">For example, both IRV and BFD (Best Friend Deference) would eliminate B leaving 4900 C, 2600 A. The 2500 B voters' votes had no way of being transferred.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Do we just say, "tough luck, you should have voted B>A or B>C ..."?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Or would it be better to have a real two candidate runoff between A and C as suggested by Tideman and Green-Armytage?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Some of us have suggested allowing voters the option of including a separate sincere ballot that would cover the runoff between the two finalists, but that wouldn't address the lack of ballot space concern ... nor would it allow the additional focus on the finalists.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Finally it would exclude voters that would like to be part of the final decision without all of the hassle of filling out a long ballot.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">We might say, "Just vote your too two preference."</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But that would not help if their top two included neither of the finalists.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Is the voting system supposed to serve the people ... or are the people supposed to be cogs in a bureaucracy?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Back to our example:</div><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto" style="font-family:sans-serif">4900 C</div><div dir="auto" style="font-family:sans-serif">2600 A>B</div><div dir="auto" style="font-family:sans-serif">2500 B</div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">As already noted, If B is eliminated as in IRV or BFD, the finalists are A and C.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But it has been pointed out that no decent method based on this ballot profile aline can elect A, because A is ranked on fewer ballots than C's first place ballots.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So perhaps A should be eliminated instead of B. That judgment agrees with Classical Condorcet which eliminates the A>B defeat because it is the weakest link in the beat cycle ABCA N. Leaving the defeats B>C and C>A ... making B the winner.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But this choice rewards the manipulators that truncated the sincere 2500 B>A preferences, if indeed that was the cause of the cycle.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The manual final runoff between A and C cuts through all of the fog. The true preferences are revealed!</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">fws</div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">---------- Forwarded message ---------<br>From: <strong class="gmail_sendername" dir="auto">C.Benham</strong> <span dir="auto"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span><br>Date: Sat, Jun 24, 2023, 11:31 PM<br>Subject: Re: Elimination by MinPO to the MMPO candidate.<br>To: Forest Simmons <<a href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com">forest.simmons21@gmail.com</a>><br></div><br><br>
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<p>Forest,<br>
<br>
Something I just stumbled on that you might find interesting:<br>
<br>
<a href="https://jamesgreenarmytage.com/runoff.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">https://jamesgreenarmytage.com/runoff.pdf</a><br>
<br>
Chris<br>
</p>
<div>On 24/06/2023 6:34 am, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">It looks like the simplest procedure is to start
by eliminating all candidates outside of Smith.
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Then elect the sincere winner between the Smith
MMPO candidate K and the Smth candidate X with the MaxPO
against K.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I should have listened to Chris in the first
place!</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">To make this method Landau compliant, if K is
covered, repeatedly update the candidate variablenK as the
candidate that covers K with the least pairwise opposition
from the previous value of K. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Then initialize variable X as the candidate with
the greatest PO against this final value of K, and repeatedly
update it as the candidate that covers its previous value with
the greatest pairwise opposition to K.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The sincere runoff is between these two Landau
candidates.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">None of this changes the results of our
examples, because all candidates were members of the Landau
set ... which is the case whenever Smith has fewer than four
candidates.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">fws</div>
</div>
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