<div dir="auto"><div>If, at any elimination stage there remains a candidate X that is defeated pairwise by all of the other remaining candidates, this method eliminates it (as it should) at that stage ... even if X does not satisfy the user supplied definition of "worst", because whichever candidate is deemed worst will sweep X out before its own elimination ... "after every candidate it defeats (including X) is eliminated."<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Richard the VoteFair guy (among others) has proposed inserting this Condorcet Loser elimination step into IRV. This method does it seamlessly.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Some other comments in line below ...</div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Feb 21, 2023, 1:28 PM Forest Simmons <<a href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com">forest.simmons21@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto">Elimination methods generally proceed by eliminating the "worst" remaining candidate at each step.<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">"Worst" is defined in various ways ... the simpler the better, all else being equal.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">No gauge of "worst" is infallible ... especially when defined in one sound bite.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Robert's dictum, can be thought of as a corrective... all else being equal, do not elect a pairwise beaten candidate ... especially if she is considered to be "worse" than the other remaining candidates. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Think of BTR IRV. Here "worst" means fewest transferred top votes ... an appealing criterion ... but not infallible. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The tentative judgment based on "fewest top votes" is not a reliable standard of worst when center squeeze is a real possibility.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Here's a suggestion for incorporating Robert's dictum in conjunction with any notion of "worst" ... whether fewest top votes, most bottom, least pairwise support, most pairwise opposition, or any thing else:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">While there remains at least one un-eliminated candidate ...</div><div dir="auto">eliminate the "worst" remaining one ...</div><div dir="auto">AFTER</div><div dir="auto">eliminating any (and every) candidate pairwise defeated by it.</div><div dir="auto">EndWhile</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">[Then elect the last candidate to be eliminated.]</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Rationale: If there exists a candidate X pairwise defeated by the candidate Y considered to be "worst" by some tentative criterion, then evidently a majority of the participating voters consider X to be even worse than Y ... not withstanding the tentative judgment of Y being "worst."</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">In other words, whatever the criterion for "worst" may be ... that judgment is only tentative until confirmed by a democratic majority of the participating voters ... hence it can and should be overridden when the voters (according to their ranked preference ballots) prefer keeping Y over X.</div></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">They will always prefer keeping Y over X when X is a "Condorcet Loser", assuming sincere ballots.</div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Any elimination method following this template will be Condorcet efficient. Beyond that ... absent a Condorcet Winner, it will still elect an uncovered candidate ... important insurance against loser complaints ... insurance that no extant public methods offer.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">So fill in the template wih your favorite standard for "worst" ... least GPA, most disapproval, worst majority judgment, fewest total yards gained, fewest free throws completed, fewest technical errors, etc... use your imagination ... but remember, for public election proposals ... the simpler the better ..."defeat by the strongest majority of participating voters" might barely pass.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">In general, elimination methods (like IRV)</div></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"></div><div dir="auto">I should have included Baldwin, Nanson, Coombs, etc ... not just pick on IRV.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"> fail monotonicity ... except a few them when they are based on a fixed, monotonically generated agenda.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">For example, when "worse" means worst according to a monotonically generated agenda, this method (like Sequential Pairwise Elimination) is monotone ... otherwise probably not.</div></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Another case where this method is monotone is when "worst" means "most unranked."</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That is so simple that it really fits the bill as a simple Condorcet completion proposal:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Absent a Condorcet Winner ... eliminate the least democratically acceptable candidates in stages until there is an un-defeated candidate to be elected among those remaining. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">In this context "least democratically acceptable" refers to the candidates deemed worthy of ranking by the fewest voters, as well as any candidates too weak to defeat them (if there are any that weak).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">-Forest</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div></div>
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