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<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">"Politicians and the
voting public would not accept anything more complicated than X"
is my own favourite line of argument - but I substitute my own
value for X</font><font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif"><font
face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif"> (minimax)</font>. I know
that my judgement is coloured by my preferences. There's a
surprising degree of dissent over which methods are simpler than
which, and where the boundary should be drawn. People who deal
directly with politicians and the voting public can no doubt get
closer to the truth than people whose interest is predominantly
theoretical, but I wish there was an authoritative and objective
source of information. If only some behavioural psychologist was
funded to investigate the question...<br>
<br>
To be finicky, the issue isn't exactly one of simplicity but
rather one of psychological acceptability, which includes the
notions of whether a method "makes sense" to the average onlooker,
and whether it is seen as conferring legitimacy on its winner
rather than being an unmotivated piece of jiggery pokery. <br>
<br>
Notwithstanding all this... you and Robert may well be right. <br>
<br>
CJC<br>
<br>
</font><br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 18/02/2023 17:53, Bob Richard
(lists) wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:emc501c718-13b7-4dbf-8e91-26fe5701507f@a8e10e56.com">
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<div>Colin makes one argument for learning to live with the
plurality winner when there is no Condorcet winner. But it is
only part of the reason. Even if the social choice theorists
could agree among themselves on one best (or good enough)
solution to the riddle of cycles, politicians and the voting
public would still not accept anything more complicated than
Robert's draft bill, or -- possibly -- "choose the IRV winner
when there is no Condorcet winner." (The latter only because IRV
is already a somewhat familiar procedure.) The fact that the
theorists cancel each other out is only part of this situation.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Robert said earlier that there is a "political problem that <b><u>might</u></b>
eclipse the technical problem" (emphasis added). I would say
instead that the political problem absolutely eclipses the
technical problem.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><span>--Bob Richard</span></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div>------ Original Message ------</div>
<div>From "Colin Champion" <<a
href="mailto:colin.champion@routemaster.app"
moz-do-not-send="true">colin.champion@routemaster.app</a>></div>
<div>To <a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
moz-do-not-send="true">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a></div>
<div>Date 2/18/2023 1:42:36 AM</div>
<div>Subject Re: [EM] Hay guys, look at this...</div>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div id="x5dbd93ecadeb42b">
<blockquote
cite="dc96cd6c-c173-4a9e-dbf1-480a5337d53e@routemaster.app"
type="cite" class="cite2"> <font face="Helvetica, Arial,
sans-serif">I think Robert was wise to propse
Condorcet+FPTP. It's the Judgement of Solomon, allowing him
to step aside from endless debates about which Condorcet
method is best. <br>
I don't agree with his reasoning "If a simple majority of
voters mark their ballots preferring Candidate A over
Candidate B... Why should B be elected?" This is the
argument of the Condorcet Loser Criterion, which implicitly
assumes that a decision can be determined purely by the
signums of the margins, ignoring their amplitudes. Minimax
violates Condorcet Loser and I'm not the only person to
support it.
<br>
But then I don't favour Kristofer's proposal either. My
evaluation suggests that burial is a particular threat for
Condorcet methods, and that in its presence their accuracies
are: minimax 64%, condorcet+fptp 59%, copeland,fptp 48%.
[Usual disclaimers apply.]
<br>
<br>
[I would say a word in favour of SPE with an FPTP
preranking. This is a symmetrisation of the method of
Llull's De Arte Eleccionis of 1299, so it's essentially the
oldest Condorcet method in existence which isn't vitiated by
indecisiveness. Its virtue lies in its linear-time
countability, which is only a factor if counting is manual
and there is a risk of a sizeable number of candidates
standing. SPE is about as resistant to burial as is
minimax.]
<br>
<br>
Wiser judgements than Solomon's are imaginable. If there was
a an expert consensus that among those methods simple enough
to gain the approval of voters and legislators, XYZ was
best, then Robert would probably listen; but the onus is on
experts to build a consensus, not on advocates to take
sides. <br>
<br>
CJC<br>
<br>
</font><br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 18/02/2023 06:05, Forest
Simmons wrote:
<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CANUDvfrekM+i32SwTQsBwOeG09vOS_KxaGS-uA_tLTHr0Touyw@mail.gmail.com"
class="cite">
<div dir="auto">Let me rephrase the question ... suppose
that there were only three candidates and you already knew
that they were in a rock paper scissors pairwise
preference cycle.
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">How would you decide which one to vote for
if you could only vote for one?
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">That's the one you should make your first
choice on an RCV ballot if the cycle breaker is FPTP as
you have been suggesting.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">That decision is at least as difficult as
the approval decision would be, because under approval
strategy you should approve that candidate X (the one
you would vote for if you had only one vote) AND also
approve your favorite if X was not already your
favorite.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">These are the same candidates that you
would naturally rank on an RCV ballot ... leaving the
3rd choice unranked ... the one that is neither your
favorite nor your compromise.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">If you mis-triangulate the compromise in
an FPTP election ... too bad: you wasted your vote. But
the approval ballot also counts towards everybody you
like better than your compromise, including your
favorite.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">That's why Approval is often proposed as a
Condorcet completion method in the absence of a runoff.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Implicit approval takes advantage of the
natural strategy of truncating the candidates you don't
like, while ranking your preferred of the two front
runners AND anybody you liked better ... including your
favorite ... whether or not it was a frontrunner.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Yes, the cycle is already there ... but it
cannot split the votes unless the method allows vote
splitting by not having any contingent backup vote.
Approval has the simplest backup vote capability ... any
other method requires some kind of runoff/elimination
step to ameliorate the potential vote split.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Example ballot profile:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">40 A>B (Sincere is A>C)</div>
<div dir="auto">35 B>C</div>
<div dir="auto">25 C>A</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Under Plurality A wins.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The Implicit Approval (fewest truncations)
winner is B with only 25 truncations, compared with 35 A
truncations and 40 C truncations.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">This is a typical kind of ballot profile
resulting from the burial by the largest faction ... of
the sincere Condorcet Winner (C in this example).
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">If the C supporters wanted to protect C,
they could have truncated A:
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">25 C instead of 25 C>A.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">This would not change the Plurality
winner, but reinforces the Implicit Approval winner,
which gives the sincere CW a defense against burial by
punishing the burying faction ... electing their sincere
last choice instead of their sincere second choice.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">With this defensive truncation B still has
the fewest truncations 25, but now the burial
perpetrator A has way more truncations (60) than either
of the others ... no chance of success in their burial
gambit.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Electing the Plurality choice (lacking a
ballot CW) rewards the burial perpetrator in this
example .... so it encourages candidates with large
first place support to bury the sincere CW.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">This example is typical in this respect
... the insincere burial (of sincere CW) gambit is most
tempting to the faction with the greatest first place
support.
<br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">On the other hand it is not tempting to
bury the CW when lacking a CW the implicit approval
candidate is elected ... because this burial gambit will
almost certainly fail if not outright backfire.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It seems to me that anybody who
understands why Approval is superior to FPTP Plurality
as an election method ... such a person should be able
to see how Approval is a better fall back alternative
than Plurality (absent a CW) .... an appreciable
positive difference at no extra cost.
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><span style="font-family:sans-serif">The
little Dutch boy was right to put his finger in the
dike ... a stitch in time is in deed worth nine.
</span><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Feb 17, 2023,
7:07 PM robert bristow-johnson <
<a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com"
moz-do-not-send="true">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>>
wrote:
<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex
"><br>
<br>
> On 02/17/2023 9:44 PM EST Forest Simmons <<a
href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com"
rel="noreferrer" moz-do-not-send="true">forest.simmons21@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:
<br>
> <br>
> <br>
> Suppose the whole election was to choose one of the
three candidates ... no noncycle members were in the
election at all.
<br>
> <br>
> Would you recommend FPTP Plurality over Approval?<br>
> <br>
> <br>
<br>
I dunno. I would recommend Condorcet RCV and, only in
the super-rare case of a cycle, I would recommend
plurality of first-choice votes because it's no worse
than we already have now with FPTP and it's simple to
explain to voters why that one candidate (the one with
more first-choice votes than anyone else) is, in some
sense, uniquely more preferred by the electorate over
any other candidate.
<br>
<br>
In a competitive 3-way race, I dunno if Approval would
be better than FPTP. I *do* know, if it were Approval,
that I would have a tactical decision to make regarding
my second-favorite candidate.
<br>
<br>
But with RCV, I would have no tactical decision to
make. I would know immediately what I would do with my
second-fav.
<br>
<br>
--<br>
<br>
r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ <a
href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com"
rel="noreferrer" moz-do-not-send="true">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
<br>
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br>
<br>
.<br>
.<br>
.<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
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