<div dir="auto">How can this one simple tweak improve on any method currently in use?<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Because currently no Landau efficient method is in use, and each step of this method takes you closer to the Landau plateau in the direction of steepest ascent, so to speak.<br><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It works like gradient ascent. The hyperplane that bisects the line segment between W and C is roughly tangent to the level surface of the smoothed local ballot mass density. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The number of ballots/voters on the W side of the hyper plane is smallest (so pairwise opposition to C is minimal) when C is in the direction of steepest ballot/voter mass increase ... i.e. the vector from W to C is roughly parallel to the mass density gradient. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The beauty of gradient ascent is that no matter where you start, each step gets you closer to the Landau plateau supporting the single peak, if there is one i.e. the region of local maximum average ballot density.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That's why this method is so robust!</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Shouldn't there be a law that any method based on RCV ballots be perforce retrofitted with this tweak, unless it has a built in seamless way of provably guaranteeing Landau efficiency? Who could rationally object to this zero-cost Landau insurance "coverage"?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Any questions? Comments? Gripes?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">-Forest</div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Nov 3, 2022, 8:40 PM Forest Simmons <<a href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com">forest.simmons21@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto">Here is a simple tweak that will vastly improve any election method that is not already Landau efficient:<div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Initialize the variable W with the name of the winner of the imperfect method.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Elect W if no candidate covers W,</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Otherwise ...</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">While W is covered let C be the candidate among those covering W with the least pairwise opposition from W, i.e. the one minimizing the number of ballots on which it is outranked by W.</div><div dir="auto">Then update W with the name of candidate C. (End While)</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Elect the candidate named by the final value of W.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Rationale: If C covers W, then geometrically C is between W and the (generalized) median voter. The more closely C covers W from the voters, the fewer voters will prefer W over C.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It doesn't matter how horrible your imperfect method is ... IRV, Borda, Nanson, Coombs,, Copeland, Black, Random Favorite Candidate, Random Truncated Candidate, etc or even non-horrible like MJ, MinMax, Ranked Pairs, Schulze CSSD, River, etc..... </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If it can elect a covered candidate, then this tweak is needed!</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">-Forest</div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Nov 2, 2022, 10:30 PM Forest Simmons <<a href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">forest.simmons21@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Nov 2, 2022, 9:04 PM Ralph Suter <<a href="mailto:RLSuter@aol.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">RLSuter@aol.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p>Thanks very much for the detailed comparison and clarification. I
just haven't had time to follow the election-methods list well
enough to nearly as knowledgeable about alternative methods as I
would like to be.<br>
</p>
<p>Given the shortcomings of the article, can the authors at least
be credited for pointing out that IRV is seriously flawed in that
it can result in a winner that is outranked by another candidate?
(I prefer calling it IRV, because "ranked choice voting"
misleadingly implies that there is only one form of ranked
voting.).<br></p></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Yes, I'm glad they made that important point.</div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><p>
</p>
<p>IRV also has two other major flaws: (1) It can take a long time
before it's possible even to make an educated guess of the winner.
In the Alaska special election, it took more than two weeks. </p></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto">It's because every round requires a complete pass through the ballots to execute the vote transfers. Their suggestion, Baldwin, has the exact same problem. DMC does not because bothered the pairwise matrix and the "total votes" implicit approval are precinct summable, with only one pass through the ballots.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><p>(2)
It makes useful polling, either pre-election or exit polling, all
but impossible.</p>
<p>Would DMC avoid both flaws? Also, do you think it's easily enough
explainable for it to gain the support needed to replace IRV?</p></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto">IRV is highly entrenched, but STAR and Approval have made some progress, and they seem to be more open minded.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">STAR is instant top two score runoff. Once you have the candidate scores along with pairwise defeat scores ready for the instant runoff, why not pit the top score candidate against the champion of the 2nd and 3rd score candidates. Better yet take this to its logical conclusion ... do SequentialvPairwise Elimination starting at the bottom of the score list and working up, so that the final matchup is between the top score candidate and the champion from below.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I'm good at explaining methods, but I am not an organizer or influencer. I'm in my mid seventies so my energy, sight, and other faculties are not what they once were.</div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<p>Finally, do you have any thoughts about the best way to conduct
open primaries? Alaska's top four primary followed by a ranked
choice general election seems clearly superior to California's top
two.primary followed by a majority winner general election.</p>
<p>Would either or both top two or top four be improved by using
approval voting or some other method to choose the final two or
four? Also, would top five be even better than top four, or would
top three be nearly as good as top for?</p></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto">Someone with more open primary experience could advise you better on this. However...</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If possible I would say "Top k approval" with k between one and four, determined by how close the other approval scores are to the leader's.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If no challenger gets 70 percent of the leading approval, then it seems that a runoff would be a waste of time and money. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">On the other hand, if four candidates were within five approval points of the leader, all four should be allowed in the runoff (it seems to me).</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">In any case, the standard for runoff participation should be delineated clearly well in advance.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">IMHO</div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<p>Thanks again for your really helpful feedback.</p></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto">Thanks for caring about democracy enough to inform yourself and others!</div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<p>-Ralph<br>
</p>
<div>On 11/2/2022 3:28 PM, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">
<div dir="auto">"Single most important"?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Not anywhere close!</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div>The "tweak" proposed by Maskin and Foley is either Baldwin
(if the total votes are recalibrated between rounds as in IRV)
or Benham applied to the Borda order the same way DMC is
Benham applied to the implicit approval order ... without
recalibration between rounds.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Neither one is appreciably better than IRV.
Baldwin retains IRV's non-monotonicity and its procedural mess
of vote transfers, while the monotonic version more fully
retains Borda's clone dependence and burial incentive.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A much better "tweak" is to interpret "total
votes" as implicit approval, the number of ballots on which a
candidate is voted ahead of one or more other candidates.</div>
<div dir="auto"> </div>
<div dir="auto">This definition of total votes is especially apt
when the ballots only allow ranking of a few candidates, as is
the case of all RCV ballots in the USA wherever RCV has been
publically adopted so far. Voters have to consider carefully
which candidates are worth ranking. That gives extra value to
implicit approval.<br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">After tallying the total votes (i.e. the ballot
totals of votes of any rank) of the candidates, in each round
eliminate the candidate with the fewest total votes, until
among the remaining candidates there is an undefeated
candidate ... (total votes not recalibrated between rounds).</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">This method is monotonic, clone free, and
Condorcet efficient.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It has a name: Implicit Approval DMC, Definite
Majority Choice, the very method proposed by a consensus of
the EM list to Toby Nixon twelve years ago after careful
consideration of the merits of all of the competing proposals
(including BTR-IRV, another tweak better than Baldwin) ... not
just an off the cuff tweak. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">DMC is a streamlined procedure for determining
the common winner of Ranked Pairs, Schulze CSSD (Clone free
Schwartz Sequential Dropping), and Jobst's River, the three
great methods that reduce to one common method in the case
where the strengths of the pairwise defeats are measured by
the total votes (implicit approvals) of the respective winners
of those defeats.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The Maskin-Foley proposal is anything but the
proposal to end all proposals.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I'm afraid Maskin hasn't learned anything in the
two decades since he was busy publically proposing ("The
Fairest Vote of All") clone dependent Borda as a Condorcet
completion method for clone dependent Copeland.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Has he been too busy resting on his Nobel
laurels to learn anything from the well informed feedback
engendered by his Scientific American article?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Some of these academics from the big name
universities assume that they can come up with a method
superior to any proposal from the rabble by merely shooting
from the hip in an op ed.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">-Forest<br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Nov 1, 2022, 7:53
PM Ralph Suter <<a href="mailto:RLSuter@aol.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">RLSuter@aol.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div>Rob,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>For some reasons, my last several messages,
including the following sent today, haven't been
posted.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The article mentioned below may be the single most
important and potentially ifluential one regarding
election methods that has been published for many
years. It may finally get people to realize that
instant runoff voting is a seriously flawed ranked
choice method and should be replaced by a form of
Condorcet voting.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Will you please post it for me or copy and send it
to the list?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Thanks,</div>
<div>Ralph Suter<br>
</div>
<div><br>
-------- Forwarded Message --------
<table cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th valign="BASELINE" nowrap align="RIGHT">Subject: </th>
<td>"Total Vote Runoff" proposed as better way
to determine ranked-choice winners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th valign="BASELINE" nowrap align="RIGHT">Date: </th>
<td>Tue, 1 Nov 2022 13:13:21 -0500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th valign="BASELINE" nowrap align="RIGHT">From: </th>
<td>Ralph Suter <a href="mailto:RLSuter@aol.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank"><RLSuter@aol.com></a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th valign="BASELINE" nowrap align="RIGHT">To: </th>
<td><a href="mailto:election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>In a Washington Post opinion article published
today (11/2/2022), election law scholar Edward Foley
and economist (and Nobel laureate) Erik Maskin propose
a "tweak" to correct what they describe a flaw in how
ranked choice winners are currently determined. They
call the resulting election method a "total Vote
Runoff".
<div>
<p>Would anyone like to comment? It appears they are
essentially proposing replacing instant run-off
voting with Condorcet voting.<br>
</p>
<p>-Ralph Suter</p>
<p>---------------------------------</p>
<h1 id="m_8768747030206967609m_-7690299396013583726m_3463429254897923384m_-7431514869562813392main-content"><span>Alaska’s
ranked-choice voting is flawed. But there’s an
easy fix.</span></h1>
<div>
<div>
<div><span>
<div><span>
<div><span>By </span><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/people/edward-b-foley/" rel="author noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">Edward B.
Foley</a><span><span> and<span> </span></span></span><span rel="author">Eric S. Maskin</span></div>
</span></div>
</span><span></span></div>
<div><span>November 1, 2022 at 7:00 a.m. EDT</span></div>
<div><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/11/01/alaska-final-four-primary-begich-palin-peltola/" rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/11/01/alaska-final-four-primary-begich-palin-peltola/</a></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Excerpt:<br>
<span></span></div>
</div>
</div>
<p>Alaska’s special election in August for the House
of Representatives was heralded as a triumph for
ranked-choice voting, because MAGA favorite Sarah
Palin, a personification of polarization, could
not attract enough second-choice votes from
moderate Republican Nick Begich’s supporters to
win.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>That’s true. But the way Alaska uses
ranked-choice voting also caused the defeat of
Begich, whom most Alaska voters preferred to
Democrat Mary Peltola, the candidate who ended up
winning.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>This anomalous outcome, contrary to the principle
that the majority’s preference should prevail,
would be easily remedied by one small change.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>The key to ranked-choice voting is that a voter
lists the candidates in order of preference,
starting with their favorite, rather than naming
just that favorite. The problem in Alaska — and
other ranked-choice systems now in use, from Maine
to San Francisco —<b> </b>is the rule for
eliminating candidates when no one gets a majority
of first-place votes. By tweaking this rule,
Alaska’s system would become more palatable to
Republicans and Democrats alike, and more likely
to be adopted across the country.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Begich was eliminated because he had the fewest
first-place votes. That seems logical at first
glance. But the flaw in this outcome — and why
Republicans have reason to be resentful — is that
a majority of voters would have favored Begich had
the race come down to a head-to-head matchup
against either Peltola (52 percent to 48 percent)
or Palin (61 percent to 39 percent). He lost only
because it was a three-way race.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Here’s how to fix the flaw. If Alaska eliminated
the candidate with the fewest <i>total</i> votes,
rather than the fewest <i>first-place</i> votes,
the ranked-choice system would be sure to elect a
candidate such as Begich who defeats all rivals in
one-on-one matchups.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Call it a “Total Vote Runoff.” A candidate’s
total votes in such a system would be determined
by the number of other candidates he or she is
ranked above. For example, when a candidate is
ranked first on a ballot in an election involving
three candidates, then this first-choice candidate
is ranked above two other candidates and gets two
votes from this ballot.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>When that same candidate is ranked second on
another ballot, the candidate is favored over only
one other candidate and would receive only one
vote from that ballot.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>A candidate ranked last on a ballot, or not
ranked at all, is not favored over anyone and gets
no votes from that ballot.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Calculating the number of votes that a candidate
gets on each ballot — two, one or zero — and
adding up the candidate’s votes from all the
ballots yields the candidate’s total votes.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Using this method, we can identify the number of
ballots on which each of Alaska’s three candidates
was ranked first or second and then calculate each
candidate’s total votes (there were only three
candidates in the House special election):</p>
<blockquote>
<div id="m_8768747030206967609m_-7690299396013583726m_3463429254897923384m_-7431514869562813392header">
<h3> <span>Alaska House results using total
vote runoff</span> </h3>
<p><b><span>First-place votes get counted twice
because voters put their first choice
ahead of two other candidates.</span></b></p>
<span>Column 1: Candidate</span><br>
<span>Column 2: first-place votes</span><br>
<span>Column 3: first-place votes, counted again</span><br>
<span>Column 4: second-place votes</span><br>
<span>Column 5: Overall Total<br>
</span> </div>
<div id="m_8768747030206967609m_-7690299396013583726m_3463429254897923384m_-7431514869562813392chart" aria-hidden="false">
<div>
<div>
<table cellspacing="0">
<thead><tr>
<th style="border-bottom:1px solid #000000;font-size:78%" colspan="1" scope="col"><br>
</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div id="m_8768747030206967609m_-7690299396013583726m_3463429254897923384m_-7431514869562813392chart" aria-hidden="false">
<div>
<div>
<table width="341" height="99" cellspacing="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th style="font-size:100%" colspan="1" scope="row">Begich</th>
<td style="font-size:100%" colspan="1">53,810</td>
<td style="font-size:100%" colspan="1">53,810</td>
<td style="font-size:100%" colspan="1">81,253</td>
<td style="font-size:100%" colspan="1">188,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th colspan="1" scope="row">Peltola</th>
<td colspan="1">75,799</td>
<td colspan="1">75,799</td>
<td colspan="1">19,024</td>
<td colspan="1">170,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th colspan="1" scope="row">Palin</th>
<td colspan="1">58,973</td>
<td colspan="1">58,973</td>
<td colspan="1">31,611</td>
<td colspan="1">149,557</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div> <span> <span><span>Source:</span> <a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer
noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" href="https://www.elections.alaska.gov/results/22SSPG/RcvDetailedReport.pdf" target="_blank">Alaska
official results, Alaska cast vote
records, MIT Election Data and Science
Lab, Election Law at Ohio State, author
calculations </a></span> </span> </div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>
<p>Palin had the fewest total votes, so she would
have been the first candidate eliminated in a
“Total Vote Runoff” tweak to RCV.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>With Palin eliminated, the race would have been
between Begich and Peltola. Because a majority
preferred Begich to Peltola, he would have been
elected. Total Vote Runoff captures the will of
the majority more accurately than Alaska’s current
elimination system does.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Republicans should like Total Vote Runoff because
its procedure would help ameliorate the “<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2022-election/mcconnell-says-republicans-may-not-win-senate-control-citing-candidate-rcna43777" rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">candidate quality</a>”
problem that plagues their party, as Senate
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) lamented.
A candidate popular only with the party’s base
would be eliminated early in a Total Vote Runoff,
leaving a more broadly popular Republican to
compete against a Democrat.</p>
</div>
<div>
<p>Democrats, too, should welcome Total Runoff
Voting to protect against losses caused by
excessively progressive candidates who are
unacceptable to a large portion of independent
voters. Alaska-style ranked-choice voting might
keep in contention a left-wing candidate whose
first-place votes reflect enthusiastic but limited
support, but Total Runoff Voting would promote
Democratic candidates whose wide appeal makes them
more competitive overall.</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div>
</blockquote></div>