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    <p>Forest,<br>
    </p>
    <p>My main concern is with the autocratic nature of single member
      monopolies, generally little or no better than minimally
      democratic, and unaccountable. They have not got beyond the
      ancient Greek tyranny, deserving of their reputation in the vulgar
      sense of tyranny. </p>
    <p>R.L.<br>
    </p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 07/06/2022 19:06, Forest Simmons
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CANUDvfoHvR+P+_hdaCdZgC3HZoJtPybQsyCZNeV=AsKBvrH6jQ@mail.gmail.com">
      <div dir="auto">I wish you could have made Nader win .. informal
        polls, including a Time magazine poll that was continually
        updated online until it became too embarrassing to the
        neoliberal establishment, showed that Nader was the landslide
        Sincere Condorcet Winner.</div>
      <br>
      <div class="gmail_quote">
        <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">El mar., 7 de jun. de 2022
          10:16 a. m., Richard Lung <<a
            href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com" moz-do-not-send="true"
            class="moz-txt-link-freetext">voting@ukscientists.com</a>>
          escribió:<br>
        </div>
        <blockquote class="gmail_quote">
          <div>
            <p><br>
            </p>
            <p> </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>Consider a typical single member
                scenario, like the 2000 </span><span>US</span><span>
                presidential election. Say George W Bush (label B) gets
                101. Al Gore (label A) gets 100. Ralph Nader (label C)
                gets 10. (After his vote got squeezed from strategic
                voting.)</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>Bush is elected on single
                preference votes. If there were a second ballot, or
                instant run-off vote (IRV), Al Gore wins on second
                preferences of Nader, the “spoiler” who is eliminated.</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>So, IRV passes on independence of
                irrelevant alternatives (IIA). But IRV fails on the </span><span>Laplace</span><span>
                law of preference gradation. (Orders of preference vote
                gradually fall off in count importance.) This also means
                that the IIA criterion is inconsistent with the </span><span>Laplace</span><span>
                law.</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>Binomial STV avoids the dilemma
                of this inconsistency.</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>Suppose IRV gives:</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span>100 A C _</span> </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>101 B _ _</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span><span>  </span>10 C A _</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span>With IRV, A picks
                up the second preferences of C, and wins with 110.</span>
            </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>Binomial STV counts abstentions,
                shown by the dash lines. The third preferences are all
                abstentions, and they do nothing to change the simple
                plurality count. It is conceivable that in a less
                contentious world than ours, this could be the case. But
                it is assumed that the voters have been informed that
                last preferences can be given to count against
                candidates. And the full slate of preferences is as
                follows:</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span>100 A > C > B</span>
            </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>101 B > A > C</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span><span>  </span>10 C > A >
                B</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span>The keep value
                quotient (kvq), of a candidate, is the election keep
                value, divided by the exclusion keep value:</span> </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>the keep value is the quota,
                211/2 = 105.5, divided by candidate vote.</span></p>
            <span></span><span>kvq A = 0/100. Here, zero means close to
              0, giving a very small fraction.</span>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span>B = 110/101</span>
            </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>C = 101/10</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span>Unity, or less, is
                the election (or exclusion) threshold of an election (or
                exclusion) keep value. Less than unity passes the
                threshold. So, A wins with binomial STV, without
                breaking the </span><span>Laplace</span><span> law, or
                IIA.</span> </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span>Suppose, however,
                that Bush supporters decide to vote insincerely, by
                making Gore their last preference – even tho Nader is
                the last person they want to see win, but know he can’t,
                anyway. </span> </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>(However, this scenario might be
                sincere in </span><span>UK</span><span>, with A as
                Labour, B as Tory, and C as Liberal Democrat. In either
                case, a change in the vote, sincere or otherwise, will
                change the count in a toward manner, with good
                book-keeping.)</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span></span><span>The
                preference slate becomes:</span> </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span>100 A > C > B</span>
            </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>101 B > C > A</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span><span>  </span>10 C > A >
                B</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span>Then, kvq becomes:</span>
            </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>A = 101/100</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>B = 110/101</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>C = 0/10</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span>There is a
                contradictory answer. B is closer to the quota but A is
                closer to the quotient.</span> </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>This is not a logical
                contradiction but a contingent contradiction. Decision,
                as to the winner, is not a democratic decision, but an
                administrative decision, at present FPTP, based on a
                convention, reached by previous agreement. (Single
                majority is the least democratic system, in the first
                place.)</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>A first approximation of an
                administrative decision (It would be “spurious accuracy”
                to go further) is:</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>B quota deficit: 105.5/101 ~
                1.0446.</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>A quotient deficit: 101/100 =
                1.01.</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span>Therefore, an
                administrative election is of Gore. (The Supreme Court
                also made an administrative decision.) </span> </p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>The result would most likely be
                similar, if Binomial STV, used more accurate figures. To
                say nothing of the investigation, by Greg Palast, of the
                electoral roll. (The Best Democracy That Money Can Buy.)
              </span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span><span>I repeat that for a
                democratic decision, as from those Keltic reports,
                prevously cited, I don’t recommend less than 4 or 5
                member Andrae/Hare system (at-large STV/PR).</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>Regards,</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span>Richard Lung.</span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span><br>
              </span></p>
            <p class="MsoNormal"><span><br>
              </span> </p>
            <p> </p>
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          ----<br>
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