<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body dir="auto"><div></div><div><br></div><div>Kristofer, </div><div><br></div><div>Werner Heisenberg said that if in the end you cannot say what you have found, then all your finding is worthless.</div><div>Fortunately, voters only need to know how to do the vote. Those who expect the count also to be understandable by everyone - typically claimed by anti-reformers - talk as if elections were an exception to the division of labor.</div><div>("Complicated, that word of fear," as HG Wells described a refrain to STV.)</div><div>My system is an example. I doubt anyone understands FAB STV (I don't understand it, or even the much simpler hand count, because it hasn't been tested and modified in the light of experience.) </div><div>But all voters need to know is that: You have a preference vote equal to the number of candidates. The first preference counts as much to elect a candidate, as the last preference counts to exclude a candidate. A blank paper ( "white paper" as they call it in France, same as NOTA) is one vote towards a seat remaining vacant. Individual preferences left blank also contribute, in their degree, to a vacancy.</div><div><br></div><div>For example, 10 candidates contest 5 seats. The first five preferences count more or less to 5 seat elections. The last 5 preferences count less or more, to the exclusion of the other 5 candidates.</div><div><br></div><div>Note that the election counts and exclusion counts need not count against each other. An exclusion quota consolidates an election quota. In other words, a candidate is helped both by popularity and lack of unpopularity.</div><div><br></div><div>Regards,</div><div>Richard Lung.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br>On 7 May 2022, at 6:20 am, Forest Simmons <<a href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com">forest.simmons21@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br><br></div><div><div dir="auto">That's a good template for all of us to imitate in our outreach to the proletariat!<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Let me see how well I can imitate it for my latest attempt in the fpA-gpC vein:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family:sans-serif">Candidates are arranged into</span><br style="font-family:sans-serif"><span style="font-family:sans-serif">one-on-one match-ups like runoffs where the candidate who would win a</span><br style="font-family:sans-serif"><span style="font-family:sans-serif">runoff with only the two wins. If there is a candidate who wins every</span><br style="font-family:sans-serif"><span style="font-family:sans-serif">runoff he's part of, he is elected. </span><br></div><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family:sans-serif"><br></span></div><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family:sans-serif">Otherwise candidates get reward value for every matchup they win or tie, but lose value for every matchup they lose.</span></div><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family:sans-serif"><br></span></div><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family:sans-serif">The candidate with the greatest net reward value is elected.</span></div><div dir="auto"><span style="font-family:sans-serif"><br></span></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">Specifically, a candidate's prize/reward value is proportional to its estimated formidability as an opponent in these matchups. You get your opponent's prize value when you defeat or tie him in a matchup. Otherwise, you pay out that value.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif">The formidability of a candidate is gauged as a function of its respective first and last place showings on the ballots.</font></div><div dir="auto"><font face="sans-serif"><br></font></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">El vie., 6 de may. de 2022 3:02 a. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm <<a href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de">km_elmet@t-online.de</a>> escribió:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On 06.05.2022 06:19, Forest Simmons wrote:<br>
> There were several 3-slot methods I was considering when I started this<br>
> thread, but the main one was a version of median judgment first proposed<br>
> by Andy Jennings in his dissertstion more than a decade ago. A few years<br>
> ago Adrien Fabre independently published the method as "Usual<br>
> Judgment." And last month I discovered the method independently in the<br>
> case of three judgment categories. <br>
> <br>
> As soon as I made a graphic available showing the helical ramp<br>
> interpolation that characterizes the method, the versions of Jennings<br>
> and Fabre were brought to my attention. Both of them contemplated more<br>
> than three categories. <br>
> <br>
> A Wikipedia article (Highest Median Voting Rules) comparing various<br>
> median judgment methods (rightly) affirms that among the known median<br>
> judgment methods, Usual Judgment dominates the others in criteria<br>
> compliances ... resolving nagging imperfections (lack of Reverse<br>
> Symmetry and Participation compliances) of Majority Judgment, for example.<br>
> <br>
> However, the article pointed out that the perfection of Usual Judgment,<br>
> especially in the intricacies of its general case tie breaking<br>
> procedure, might put too high a demand on the attention span of the<br>
> average voter.<br>
> <br>
> This kind of "problem" is a public relations problem only for methods<br>
> whose proponents make too big a deal of the elegance of the arcane<br>
> intricacies that do not concern the lay citizen. <br>
> <br>
> When someone picks up a proposal like MAM, for example, from this EM<br>
> list and tries to sell it to the public without filtering out the<br>
> technical discussions designed to persuade the other EM experts ... Big<br>
> Mistake!<br>
<br>
For MAM, I think I would put it like this: Candidates are arranged into<br>
one-on-one match-ups like runoffs where the candidate who would win a<br>
runoff with only the two wins. If there is a candidate who wins every<br>
runoff he's part of, he is elected. Otherwise, landslides count more<br>
than close runoffs in determining the winner.<br>
<br>
It would probably be a good idea to also mention that there's been a<br>
beats-all candidate in every ranked election known so far. (Except<br>
possibly one actual runoff election in Romania, maybe? -- but that<br>
wasn't a ranked election.)<br>
<br>
I'm a theoretician, not a public activist, so I imagine my description<br>
could be polished further :-)<br>
<br>
The truly tough methods to describe would be things like fpA-fpC where<br>
the rules seem to be just pulled out of the air with no rhyme or reason,<br>
unless you happen to know that it makes the method satisfy some<br>
desirable criterion. Or Sinkhorn or Keener, which are incomprehensible<br>
without a lot of linear algebra.<br>
<br>
-km<br><br>
</blockquote></div></div>
</div><div><span>----</span><br><span>Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info</span><br></div></body></html>