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<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Yes,
Kristofer, </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">the
standard statistical test, I use, is a “hypothesis”. Elections
are hypotheses ( - they are not absolutely determined). This is
the song I have
been chirruping all along: All elections are a statistic or
statistical
distribution. And their representation is no better than a good
estimate. (This
is in keeping with the theorem of the Impossibility of
determinate election
results.)</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">At
least, binomial STV knows it is a statistic. It is an explicitly
statistical
method. I even had cause to invent a statistical quota: the
harmonic mean
quota. This is one of the four averages of FAB STV. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">So,
it is quite reasonable to use a statistical test to verify
(highly probably)
the achievement of a quota. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">I
do not know whether that would be required, in practise.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold""> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Regards,</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Richard
Lung.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold""> </span></p>
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 02/03/2022 23:02, Kristofer
Munsterhjelm wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:1e08fad2-0698-ccfe-b8f7-95a7ed10a39d@t-online.de">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">On 28.02.2022 19:17, Richard Lung wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">Kristofer,
STV makes no assumptions about parties or outside bodies. To do so, you
have to make the candidates into party candidates, voted on certain
party lines. This happens, of course, but existing elections commonly
are not systems of personal choice, that STV is, and which can transcend
party divisions with a transferabe vote, to express unity, thru freely
personal ranked choice, as well as party or faction division. Division
is all party list systems, or single member systems (most of Europe and
America between them) can do.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
Of course. But if the STV election method is used as part of a partisan
system, then the STV elections will be partisan.
For instance, the Australian Senate STV ballots explicitly list the
party membership of the candidates who are up for election. See
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Victorian-senate-paper-folded-01.png">https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Victorian-senate-paper-folded-01.png</a>.
In my example, the voters don't directly vote for the A party and then
the B party. They vote for the candidates associated with those parties,
and the candidates who run are listed on the ballot as being members of
their respective parties; or they are not, but the voters know what
parties they are part of.
Even in a nonpartisan environment, I think something analogous to the
example I provided can be used as long as the candidates mainly identify
themselves along a single axis (say economic left versus right, or
unitary state vs confederation). Then the voters close to one side of
the axis (say those preferring a unitary state) will correspond to the A
voters, and the voters close to the other (say those preferring
confederation) will correspond to the B voters. No explicit party line
needs to be instated as long as the voting is sufficiently strongly
single issue.
So I was trying to give at least a not too unrealistic example to show
that the majority failure can be induced in at least somewhat a
realistic setting.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">The object of attaining a quota cannot simply be ignored because, at
least in theory, best average keep values can be obtained without
achieving a quota. It was probably a short-coming on my part, not to
fully appreciate a need for rule priorities.
I would not wish to bother you. You may have, perhaps justifiably, had
enough of binomial stv, but that does not justify your depreciating it.
I take the criticism of what is only standard statistical testing, as
"naive" as a criticism of statistics, rather than personal criticism.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
Yes. When I respond to claims about the method, I am certainly not
objecting to you as a person. I am using "naive" here in the sense of
applying a simple mechanism (here, statistical hypothesis testing) in a
context it's not well suited for without modification.
I argued that using significance testing in a straightforward matter
could lead to strange outcomes. So either the method should use
something else than hypothesis testing, or it needs a (more
sophisticated) model that incorporates the knowledge that "200 voters,
100 of which vote this way" is the same thing as "2000 voters, 1000 of
which vote this way".
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">To suggest this old man needs to finish the new stv system is
inevitably true. It is also less than just. Most of FAB STV has not
even been touched upon - only hand count first order binomial stv, in
single districts. Binomial STV develops a democratic system, not
merely a winner system. They are different games, over which we
appear to be at odds. Politicians are more interested in the latter:
The main thing is to win! (That led to the riot on Capitol Hill.)
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
That's true, but some of the things you say about Binomial STV applies
to it as a winner method: for instance, a claim that it's monotone means
that ranking candidates lower don't help them and ranking them higher
don't hurt them.
Even proportionality, in the STV context, usually means Droop
proportionality, which is a property that can be tested and disproven --
or mathematically proven.
A method may be only a minor part of a greater democratic system, but it
still deserves to be examined. And particularly when claims about the
method involve combinations of properties that are rarely found in other
methods, I think it's important that they can be verified.
About single districts: I've been limiting myself to single-winner
because that's what Forest's example was. If you'd do a similar
explanation for electing two winners out of three using the same
example, I could probably check that too.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">Binomial stv can work essentially the same way for both single and
multi-member constituencies, thru its keep value averaging. It doesn't
have to be AV/IRV and STV/Hare system. So it does not lack consistency
compared to other systems.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
I'm not sure what you mean here. Ordinary STV also works essentially the
same way for single- and multi-winner. Surplus redistribution just
doesn't happen because the election is over before it's necessary.
The same thing goes for CPO-STV and Schulze STV: both of the latter
methods naturally reduce to a Condorcet method when there's a single
winner, without the election officials having to switch to a separate
method for single-winner constituencies.
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">What I called IIA might indeed be better called something else --
perhaps "scale invariance"? At any rate, the order of keep values
remains constant, whatever the size of the quota, which is, in effect, a
change of constant.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
That sounds right. I don't know multi-winner Binomial STV, but what
you've shown passes homogeneity/scale invariance because it's
essentially electing the candidate with the maximum value of (first
preferences)/(last preferences); and multiplying the total number of
voters multiplies both the denominator and numerator by the same
constant, which cancels out.
-km
</pre>
</blockquote>
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