<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<body>
<p> <br>
</p>
<p>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;
font-family:"Arial Rounded MT Bold"">Hello</span><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold""> </span><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Forest</span><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">,</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold""> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">All
the sciences that share the same structure of measurement are
subject to formal
inter-disciplinary comparisons. Evolutionary theory has been
adapted by several
disciplines, including speculation on the multi-verse.
Transferable voting especially
suits evolution, as Enid Lakeman observed, in How Democracies
Vote.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Perhaps
because I was too late to be educated in the New maths, it took
me too long to
tumble to the fact that a comparison of election method or
“electics” with
physics depends on a complex value election count. And that
depends on an
election, in at least two dimensions.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Binomial
STV is a complete single dimension of choice. The operative word
is complete,
which makes possible its consistent binomial theorem expansion
into exponentially
higher orders of count, for unlimited analysis in depth.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">The
completeness also makes possible the combination of a second
dimension into a
complex number election count.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Binomial
STV is a complete dimension, because it accurately rationally
book-keeps, in
keep values, all the voters preferential information. Other
electoral systems
do not do this. They make arbitrary or expedient rules to come
to a result that
does not well follow the voters wishes. They either exclude
preferential
information or they do not include it, in the first place. They
use the
preferences in ways not requested by the voters. In the case of
traditional STV
methods, they do try to always follow the voters preferences,
but do so, less rationally
accurately, only on an ordinal scale, in the exclusion count.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold""> Regards,</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span
style="font-size:16.0pt;font-family:"Arial Rounded MT
Bold"">Richard Lung.<br>
</span></p>
<p><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<w:WordDocument>
<w:View>Normal</w:View>
<w:Zoom>0</w:Zoom>
<w:Compatibility>
<w:BreakWrappedTables/>
<w:SnapToGridInCell/>
<w:ApplyBreakingRules/>
<w:WrapTextWithPunct/>
<w:UseAsianBreakRules/>
<w:UseFELayout/>
</w:Compatibility>
<w:BrowserLevel>MicrosoftInternetExplorer4</w:BrowserLevel>
</w:WordDocument>
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if !mso]><object
classid="clsid:38481807-CA0E-42D2-BF39-B33AF135CC4D" id=ieooui></object>
<style>
st1\:*{behavior:url(#ieooui) }
</style>
<![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 10]>
<style>
/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0cm;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman";
mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";}
</style>
<![endif]--></p>
<p><br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 01/03/2022 22:25, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CANUDvfqW7E8F_zXzX0GRxNj6wcoAknw68uvFfKL5NMPwjK1svQ@mail.gmail.com">
<div dir="auto">Richard,
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I enjoy all of the connections you make
including with quantum mechanics ... understanding is a
network of connections anchored in the ideas most familiar and
intuitive to us.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">My PR idea for Binomial Bucklin is based on the
idea once articulated by Kevin that Bucklin can be thought of
as a procedure for arriving at a reasonable approval cutoff
... i.e. a DesignatedStrategyVoting version of approval just
as Instant Runoff can be considered a DSV version of Plurality
.... a procedure for finding a reasonable candidate for whom
to cast your one and only vote.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">And just as Approval can be adapted for PR in
the form of PAV, Sequential PAV, or even the Martin Harper
Lottery, so also should Binomial Bucklin have similar possible
modifications to various PR versions.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Best Wishes,</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Forest</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">El mar., 1 de mar. de 2022
1:09 p. m., Richard Lung <<a
href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">voting@ukscientists.com</a>>
escribió:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote">
<div> Hello Forest,<br>
<br>
Yes, with Binomial STV, a blank ballot paper is the same as
None Of The Above. That would count as a whole vote against
any candidate. But any blank preferences go towards a
fraction of a vote, counting towards a quota for an empty
seat, by the usual Gregory method, expressed in keep value
terms.<br>
<br>
<p>I had to introduce this feature, to establish the
relative satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the
candidates. To take an extreme example, an extremely
disaffected voter might vote preference 10 out of ten
candidates, against some especially detested candidate,
and leave the rest blank. Preference 1 would help to elect
a non-candidate.</p>
<p>I take it this case would be untypical, and preference
entropy would weigh in favor of election counts,
reinforced by low exclusion counts. Binomial STV has
formally equal election and exclusion counts, like physics
laws that are formally time-reversible. But in practise,
they go one way, except on the quantum (very small) scale.<br>
</p>
<br>
Bucklin method sounds like a method used once in British
Columbia in about 1951. Enid Lakeman, in How Democracies
Vote, explained how it is not proportional representation,
as was mistakenly suggested during the BC Citizens Assembly
referendums. One faction could take all the seats with 51%
of the votes. And Bucklin seems to still employ ordinal
scale (only calculating by more or less) displacements or
transfers of candidates votes.<br>
<br>
<p>Binomial STV is essentially Gregory method PR, expressed
in keep values, that allow accurate calculating
quota-deficit candidates, as well as quota-surplus
candidates. And also applied to counting exclusions, as
well as elections. This allows for a keep value order of
popularity. All kinds of STV have theoretical limitations
but transfer well from vote to count. Adding a rational
exclusion count should be worthy of further investigation,
including real world examples. <br>
</p>
<p>Binomial STV is a uniquely scalable system, capable of
consistent exponential expansion of the count, according
to the binomial theorem, offering unlimited
representation, perhaps of the exponential growth of human
knowledge. <br>
</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Richard Lung.<br>
</p>
<br>
On 01/03/2022 00:58, Forest Simmons wrote:<br>
<span>> "...It follows that if the abstentions add up to
a quota, a seat is
> not taken...."
> > Kind of like NOTA ... none of the above.
> > I'm trying to think how I would design a method
in the spirit of
> Binomial STV .... elections vs exclusions ...
preferences vs reverse
> preferences.
> > Perhaps some variant of Bucklin that gradually
collapses ballot
> rankings inward (ER Whole?) when not enough top or
bottom votes exist
> to meet quotas for further inclusion or exclusion ...
taking special
> care to insure both monotonicity and clone
independence in the
> process, if possible.
> > I think collapsing has more potential for
monotonicity than does
> elimination, and I'm glad that Binomial stv keeps all
of the players
> in the game until the final count, like Bucklin does.
> > -Forest
> > > > El dom., 27 de feb. de 2022 4:54 p.
m., Richard Lung
> <a href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com"
target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" moz-do-not-send="true"><voting@ukscientists.com></a>
escribió:
> > > On 28/02/2022 00:45, Richard Lung wrote:
>> >> Thanks for your thoughts, Kevin,
>> >> In this simple instance, the election
and exclusion quotas cancel.
>> But I would be lost without it, in multi-member
PR cases of
>> involved transferable voting. There are a few
examples in my
>> e-books, (The Super-Vote supercharged..., Elect
and Exclude..., FAB
>> STV...) free from Smashwords, in epub format, and
pdf versions free
>> from archive. org where putting "Richard Lung" in
quotes in the
>> text box should come up with about 19 titles.
>> >> The square root may not be strictly
necessary, which may be why I
>> keep forgetting it. But it keeps the average keep
values on a par
>> with the election and exclusion keep values. The
square root is for
>> the correct form of the geometric mean, -- an
important average.
>> >> Yes, you are right, there is some other
rule not stated -- All the >> abstentions are
counted. in more complex elections, they have to
>> be, so as not to distort the relative importnce
of the election
>> and exclusion counts. It follows that if the
abstentions add up to
>> a quota, a seat is not taken. This provides an
incentive to
>> nominate good candidates, who work for the voters
rather than their
>> nominees.
>> >> So, a candidate is not necessarily
electable. More-over a large
>> enough quota like Hare, with a small number of
seats would also be >> prohibitive of election,
given the voters free choice.
>> >> Regards,
>> >> Richard Lung.
>> >> >> >> On 27/02/2022 19:30,
Kevin Venzke wrote:
>>> Hi Kristofer/Richard,
>>> >>> I wonder not just about the
square root, but also if the quota
>>> has some additional role in the method,
perhaps when there are 4+
>>> candidates.
>>> >>> Because this expression: ( quota
/ keep ) * ( exclude / quota ) >>> Appears to
simplify to: ( exclude / keep )
>>> >>> This creates the appearance that
the quota has no effect on the
>>> outcome.
>>> >>> Richard stated that final values
below unity are electable. It
>>> looks like there will always be an electable
candidate, unless
>>> it's a complete tie, or perhaps if there is
some other rule not
>>> yet stated here.
>>> >>> It seems to me that the
3-candidate 1-winner case of this method
>>> is monotone. It would help to see a
four-candidate election
>>> resolved, too.
>>> >>> Kevin
>>> >>> Le dimanche 27 février 2022,
07:41:20 UTC−6, Kristofer
>>> Munsterhjelm<a
href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" target="_blank"
rel="noreferrer" moz-do-not-send="true"><km_elmet@t-online.de></a>
a écrit :
>>>> On 27.02.2022 14:04, Richard Lung wrote:
>>>>> Thank you, Kristofer,
>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>> for first example.
>>>>> >>>>> The quota is
100/(1+1) = 50.
>>>>> >>>>> Election keep
value is quota/(candidates preference votes)
>>>>> >>>>> Exclusion keep
value equals quota/(candidates reverse
>>>>> preference vote):
>>>>> >>>>> Geometric mean
keep value ( election keep value multiplied by
>>>>> inverse exclusion keep value):
>>>> Geometric mean:
>>>> >>>> A: square root of (50/51
x 2/50) ~ 0.198 B: square root of
>>>> (50/49 x 1/50) ~ 0.143 C: ~= infinity (or
very high)
>>>> >>>> So B wins, having the
lowest keep value. Is this correct?
>>>> >>>> (You seem to have
omitted the square root in your calculations,
>>>> but it shouldn't make a difference.
Without the square root, A
>>>> and B's values are 0.0392 and 0.0204
respectively.)
>>> Hi Kristofer/Richard,
>>> >>> I wonder not just about the
square root, but also if the quota
>>> has some additional role in the method,
perhaps when there are 4+
>>> candidates.
>>> >>> Because this expression: ( quota
/ keep ) * ( exclude / quota ) >>> Appears to
simplify to: ( exclude / keep )
>>> >>> This creates the appearance that
the quota has no effect on the
>>> outcome.
>>> >>> Richard says final values below
unity are electable. It seems
>>> like there will always be an electable
candidate, unless it's a
>>> complete tie, or perhaps if there is some
other rule not yet
>>> stated here.
>>> >>> Kevin
>>> >>> >>> Le dimanche 27
février 2022, 07:41:20 UTC−6, Kristofer
>>> Munsterhjelm<a
href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de" target="_blank"
rel="noreferrer" moz-do-not-send="true"><km_elmet@t-online.de></a>
a écrit :
>>>> On 27.02.2022 14:04, Richard Lung wrote:
>>>>> Thank you, Kristofer,
>>>>> >>>>>
>>>>> for first example.
>>>>> >>>>> The quota is
100/(1+1) = 50.
>>>>> >>>>> Election keep
value is quota/(candidates preference votes)
>>>>> >>>>> Exclusion keep
value equals quota/(candidates reverse
>>>>> preference vote):
>>>>> >>>>> Geometric mean
keep value ( election keep value multiplied by
>>>>> inverse exclusion keep value):
>>>> Geometric mean:
>>>> >>>> A: square root of (50/51
x 2/50) ~ 0.198 B: square root of
>>>> (50/49 x 1/50) ~ 0.143 C: ~= infinity (or
very high)
>>>> >>>> So B wins, having the
lowest keep value. Is this correct?
>>>> >>>> (You seem to have
omitted the square root in your calculations,
>>>> but it shouldn't make a difference.
Without the square root, A
>>>> and B's values are 0.0392 and 0.0204
respectively.)
> ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see <a
href="https://electorama.com/em" target="_blank"
rel="noreferrer" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">https://electorama.com/em</a>
> for list info
> </span>epresentatio<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
</body>
</html>