<div dir="auto">That's another reason why Score Sorted Margins is so much better than Smith//whatever or Smith,whatever.... it seamlessly elects from Smith without the unnecessary, annoying "names dropping."<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">It stands on it's own two feet ... and with its own very convincing heuristic. It is an obvious improvement on the most used, traditional, venerable, Single Pairwise Elimination (SPE) method that has been used in Parliament, committees, and other deliberative assemblies, from time immemorial, and recommended by Robert's Rules of Order since its first publication in the 1800's.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">SPE makes one pass of bubble sort through the agenda order from lowest score to highest, without paying attention to which out-of-order pair should have priority for rectification ... which should be the pair whose score order is least definite:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">If the scores are A(70), B(69), C(50), and the pairwise defeats are C defeats B and B defeats A . So which score order is more certain? A>B or B>C ?</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">One uncertain score voter could change the score order to B>A, but it would take about ten score voters to change the score order of B>C to C>B.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">SSM respects this priority, while SPE ignores it, and mindlessly gives priority to the lower swap.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That would not matter if pairwise defeat were a transitive relation, but it is not, which is why Condorcet cycles exist.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">SSM efficiently and seamlessly resolves all cycles, and ranks all of the Smith candidates ahead of the other candidates in a finish order that obeys strict symmetry reversal, which SPE does not.</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">El mié., 26 de ene. de 2022 3:52 p. m., Richard, the VoteFair guy <<a href="mailto:electionmethods@votefair.org">electionmethods@votefair.org</a>> escribió:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On 1/26/2022 12:02 PM, Colin Champion wrote:<br>
> ... for what it’s worth I entirely agree with you.<br>
> ... Computing the Smith set is a task beyond the understanding<br>
> of normal people. ...<br>
<br>
Colin, thanks for the confirmation!<br>
<br>
The topic arose on Reddit -- in r/EndFPTP -- when someone insisted that <br>
Smith/IRV -- was better than RCIPE (Ranked Choice Including Pairwise <br>
Elimination). When I said that was too difficult to understand, he(?) <br>
disagreed. I wanted to ensure there wasn't something I was overlooking <br>
as to how it might be easy.<br>
<br>
As Kristofer pointed out, it can be easy in most cases, but not in all <br>
cases.<br>
<br>
On 1/26/2022 12:02 PM, Colin Champion wrote:<br>
> ... What’s worse, in my view, is that it lacks any intuitive meaning.<br>
> The argument “X deserves to be elected rather than Y because X is in<br>
> the Smith set and Y isn’t” will be found persuasive by about 20 <br>
people on the planet. ...<br>
<br>
I agree!<br>
<br>
IMO the idea of improving IRV by limiting the winners to the Smith set <br>
is like putting expensive racing tires on an old pickup truck.<br>
<br>
Richard Fobes<br>
The VoteFair guy<br>
<br>
<br>
On 1/26/2022 12:02 PM, Colin Champion wrote:<br>
> Richard – for what it’s worth I entirely agree with you. Computing the<br>
> Smith set is a task beyond the understanding of normal people. What’s<br>
> worse, in my view, is that it lacks any intuitive meaning. The argument<br>
> “X deserves to be elected rather than Y because X is in the Smith set<br>
> and Y isn’t” will be found persuasive by about 20 people on the planet<br>
> (amongst whom I am not numbered).<br>
> Colin<br>
----<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br>
</blockquote></div>