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<div>First initialize a set named "TheBank" with the most promising agenda item. </div>
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<div>Then, as long as even one agenda item is beaten pairwise by every member of TheBank, add the most promising of these to TheBank. </div>
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<div>After that, as long as even one agenda item pairwise beats every member ofTheBank, deposit the least promising of these into TheBank. </div>
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<div>Finally, elect the member of TheBank that pairwise beats all of its other members.</div>
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<div>I believe that this method satisfies mono-raise as long as the agenda does.</div>
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<div>If so, then this is the best agenda based method so far, because (1) no other agenda based method is simpler to describe or compute, and (2) it always elects from a proper subclass of Landau called "Banks", without need for any mention of "covering" or
for that matter, "Condorcet", "Landau", or "maximal chain".</div>
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<div>If this is true, then there is no good excuse for continuing to propose make-shift tweaks of second and third rate election methods. In particular, ignorance and misplaced zeal are not good excuses!</div>
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<div style="font-size:85%;color:#575757" dir="auto">Sent from my MetroPCS 4G LTE Android Device</div>
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