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<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><font size="2">Hi Kristofer,</font></div><div style="font-size: 16px;"><br></div>
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Le mardi 14 juillet 2020 à 18:40:19 UTC−5, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de> a écrit :
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<div><br></div><div><div dir="ltr">> I was thinking about the possibility of using the mechanism to direct a<br clear="none">> government or organization to act in a minmax manner: one that intend to<br clear="none">> make the worst off best off, rather than improve the condition of the<br clear="none">> median voter.</div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Just to interject quickly. To my mind these two things are (naively) the same, and</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">if results matched the preference of the median voter you would have a good</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">thing. What I expect instead, with two factions fighting over who can capture a </div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">majority, is that the factions don't propose (or don't enact) the median position.</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">They want the vote of that position, and those voters can come to the victory party,</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">but they won't be in control.</div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr">> From what I remember, Jobst and Forest were originally<br clear="none">> trying to find a method to avoid a majority dictatorship, so my idea is<br clear="none">> in a way to consistently take that to its logical conclusion. If the<br clear="none">> state or the organization must pay attention to every voter, or to a<br clear="none">> supermajority of them, then it can't afford to leave some of them badly off.<br clear="none">> <br clear="none">> But if it's to be used as a part of normal operating procedure, then it<br clear="none">> has to resist strategy to some degree, and it can't take the whole<br clear="none">> organization or state down with it at the first sign of trouble. So if<br clear="none">> the brinkmanship scenario is a problem, then either the mechanism has to<br clear="none">> be augmented to stop it being a problem, or the assembly has to somehow<br clear="none">> be able to keep the peace enough that politics will never become that<br clear="none">> contentious to begin with.<br clear="none"><br>It seems like a tall order...<br><br clear="none">> Yes, that is a possibility - that a way out is to make the consensus<br clear="none">> option at least as good on expectation as the roll of the dice,<br clear="none">> discounted by whatever risk aversion exists.<br clear="none">> <br clear="none">> That's an important point, I think. The consensus option doesn't have to<br clear="none">> be extremely good. For it to be chosen, it just has to be preferred to<br clear="none">> rolling the dice by everyone. If it's barely better, that's still good<br clear="none">> enough to make it pass.</div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">I think that may be true (if we rule out, as I say, a value to being perceived</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">as unwilling to compromise), but I wonder how often such a consensus</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">option could be expected to exist? I picture the math of it very simply but</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">it seems like it should be nearly a wash.</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">When you say "to make the consensus option at least as good" do you</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">envision some kind of mechanism that could actually improve what the</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">consensus option is? Or maybe, easier to imagine: a rule that imposes </div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">some kind of universal penalty if consensus isn't achieved. A forfeiture of </div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">office seems like the most obvious.</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br clear="none">>> Maybe I've overlooked something though.<br clear="none">>> <br clear="none">>> Going off topic, the idea I like here is to require each voter to <br clear="none">>> nominate a majority of the voters (as though they would form a<br clear="none">>> government). The most-nominated voter determines the outcome of the<br clear="none">>> question. In this way, defection requires a potentially dangerous<br clear="none">>> form of burial.<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> Wouldn't that give a coordinated majority the ability to control the<br clear="none">> outcome? Or am I missing something?</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">They certainly can ensure that one of them wins it, but not which one of</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">them wins it. Imagine a 55:45 complete partisan split. The 55 can purely</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">vote for themselves (i.e. each casts 51-55 approvals). But the 45 will</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">each have to vote for 6+ of the 55. If there really is no difference among </div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">the 55, then nothing has been gained. You have to hope there is a</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">"moderate wing" within the 55 that the 6+ votes can be given to.</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Kevin</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><br></div></div>
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