<div dir="ltr">I think Example 7 in that paper ("Sequential PAV as an apportionment method") closely maps to the Texas situation.<div><br>I suspect you essentially come up with a large set of induced candidates via 26 "parties" (one per delegate), where each party has 9 candidates (one for each of their presidential candidates, plus NOTA). That's 234 "induced candidates". And you can induce votes for those candidates, run the PAV algorithm on it, and figure out an equivalent apportionment as described in the paper.<br></div><div><br></div><div>But for now I need to get back to other things....</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Mar 15, 2020 at 9:53 AM Neal McBurnett <<a href="mailto:nealmcb@gmail.com">nealmcb@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr">Thanks. I'm very glad to see that! I'm a huge fan of PAV.<div><br></div><div>I joined the Discord discussion, which notes:<div><br></div><div>> The Green Party of Texas are supposed to use "Proportional Approval Voting" for purposes of delegate apportionment for allocating our 26 delegates for the Presidential nomination.</div><div><br></div><div>The Green Party candidates for president are (first names): Howie Dario Kent Sedinam Susan Dennis David Chad and NOTA.</div><div><br></div><div><div>See details at <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Green_Party_presidential_primaries" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Green_Party_presidential_primaries</a></div><div><br></div><div></div></div><div>A copy of the ballots etc. was shared on Discord.<div><br></div><div>There I noted that one way to do this sort of thing with PAV would be to have delegates explicitly run. Then people can approve of however many delegates they want, and you pick the top 26 via PAV. Then the delegates can use whatever scheme you want to select the overall winner. But that would be an unusual procedure.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Note also that I have put Python code for PAV up at <a href="https://github.com/nealmcb/pr_voting_methods" target="_blank">https://github.com/nealmcb/pr_voting_methods</a></div><div><br></div><div>There I also analyzed some real-world data from Block Plurality elections in Colorado via PAV.</div><div><br></div></div><div>But back to the delegate allocation question at hand...</div><div><br></div><div><div>I dare say the question conventionally is more like an apportionment procedure, as used for allocating seats in congress to states, or seats in the legislatures of most countries to parties.</div><div><br></div><div>In many countries, they use "highest averages methods" (also known as "divisor methods").</div><div>Democrats in the US use the largest remainder method (also known as Hare–Niemeyer method, Hamilton method or as Vinton's method).<br></div><div><br></div><div>Both have strengths and weaknesses under different circumstances:</div><div><br></div><div> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highest_averages_method" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highest_averages_method</a><br> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Largest_remainder_method" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Largest_remainder_method</a><br></div><div><br></div><div></div><div>Recently I ran across what seems to be a grand-unification theory of sorts, I guess.</div><div><br></div><div>Multiwinner Approval Rules as Apportionment Methods<br> Markus Brill University of Oxford <a href="mailto:mbrill@cs.ox.ac.uk" target="_blank">mbrill@cs.ox.ac.uk</a> Jean-Franc¸ois Laslier Paris School of Economics <a href="mailto:jean-francois.laslier@ens.fr" target="_blank">jean-francois.laslier@ens.fr</a> Piotr Skowron University of Oxford <a href="mailto:piotr.skowron@cs.ox.ac.uk" target="_blank">piotr.skowron@cs.ox.ac.uk</a><br> <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.08691.pdf" target="_blank">https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.08691.pdf</a><br><br>> We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that they induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature on proportional representation. For instance, we show that Proportional Approval Voting induces the D’Hondt method and that Monroe’s rule induces the largest remainder method. We also consider properties of apportionment methods and exhibit multiwinner rules that induce apportionment methods satisfying these properties.<br></div><div><br></div><div>But I haven't digested it yet.</div><div><br></div><div>Thoughts?</div><div></div></div></div></div><div><br></div><div>Neal McBurnett <a href="http://neal.mcburnett.org/" target="_blank">http://neal.mcburnett.org/</a><br></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Mar 14, 2020 at 8:54 PM Rob Lanphier <<a href="mailto:robla@robla.net" target="_blank">robla@robla.net</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi Forest (and everyone else on EM),<br>
<br>
As I found out today, the Texas Green Party is using PAV for delegate counts.<br>
Someone from the party joined the Discord server operated by The<br>
Center for Election Science, and is trying to figure out vote totals<br>
for PAV.<br>
<br>
Remind me to send a summary later if I don't follow up. I'm still in<br>
a real-time discussion as of right now.<br>
<br>
Here's a direct link to get an invite to the Discord server (if you<br>
aren't on it)<br>
<a href="https://discord.gg/vxzeh4B" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://discord.gg/vxzeh4B</a><br>
<br>
Rob<br>
----<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info<br>
</blockquote></div><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir="ltr">Neal McBurnett <a href="http://neal.mcburnett.org/" target="_blank">http://neal.mcburnett.org/</a><br></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_signature">Neal McBurnett <a href="http://neal.mcburnett.org/" target="_blank">http://neal.mcburnett.org/</a><br></div>