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<div>I feel compelled to point out that proportionality is not the same as Droop proportionality. Something can fail one particular "brand" of proportionality and still be proportional.</div><div><br></div>
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On Tuesday, 4 February 2020, 07:48:49 GMT, Markus Schulze <markus.schulze8@gmail.com> wrote:
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<div><div id="ydpc8f99byiv4833146614"><div dir="ltr">Dear Kristofer,<br><br>your argumentation basically is: When some voters rank X higher,<br>then it is not possible that some other candidate Y becomes a<br>member of a solid coalition.<br><br>My argument basically is: When some voters rank X higher,<br>then it can happen that some other candidate Y who couldn't<br>be elected without violating Droop proportionality can now<br>be elected without violating Droop proportionality.<br>(In example 3 of my paper "On Dummett's 'Quota Borda System'" ,<br>X=B and Y=E.) Candidate Y can then kick candidate X out of<br>the winning set.<br><br><div>Markus Schulze</div><div><br></div></div></div>----<br>Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="https://electorama.com/em " rel="nofollow" target="_blank">https://electorama.com/em </a>for list info<br></div>
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