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<p>Richard L,<br>
<br>
You didn't exactly answer my question (What is your working
definition of a "points system"?).<br>
I infer from what you write that you are talking about methods
that use ranking ballots and just award points according<br>
to some predetermined fixed schedule of so many points for being
ranked first and so many for being ranked second and<br>
so on and then just elects the candidate with highest (or as with
one version of Borda I've heard of, the lowest) total score.<br>
<br>
Why do you think that is relevant to my suggested VIASME method?
To refresh your memory:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p>This is my favourite Condorcet method that uses
high-intensity Score ballots (say 0-100):<br>
<br>
*Voters fill out high-intensity Score ballots (say 0-100) with
many more available distinct scores<br>
(or rating slots) than there are candidates. Default score is
zero.<br>
<br>
1. Inferring ranking from scores, if there is a pairwise
beats-all candidate that candidate wins.<br>
<br>
2. Otherwise infer approval from score by interpreting each
ballot as showing approval for the<br>
candidates it scores above the average (mean) of the scores it
gives.<br>
Then use Approval Sorted Margins to order the candidates and
eliminate the lowest-ordered<br>
candidate.<br>
</p>
<p>3. Among remaining candidates, ignoring eliminated
candidates, repeat steps 1 and 2 until <br>
there is a winner.*<br>
<br>
To save time we can start by eliminating all the non-members
of the Smith set and stop when<br>
we have ordered the last 3 candidates and then elect the
highest-ordered one.<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins</a><br>
</p>
In simple 3-candidate case this is the same as Approval Sorted
Margins where the voters signal<br>
their approval cut-offs just by having a large gap in the
scores they give.</blockquote>
<br>
It could be that you have misunderstood what I mean by "high
intensity Score ballots". It has nothing to <br>
do with anything Borda-like. The voter assign however many points
to each candidate that they wish.<br>
<br>
In the US, "Score Voting" (formerly and also called "Range
Voting") is a version of Average Ratings where<br>
the voters give candidates any score they like in the 0-99
inclusive range. <br>
<br>
Actually since in VIASME the scores are only used to infer ranking
and sometimes approval, the individual voters <br>
can in theory use any range of scores they like. <br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 25/06/2019 4:09 am, Richard Lung
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:b6855d6d-7e86-6f32-d5d2-58117856b5d3@ukscientists.com">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Thankyou for asking.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">It's standard statistics. I refered
to it occasionally over the years. <br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">To give a more representative summary
of classes of data, they may be weighted. If no accurate
information is available, the weights to respective classes may
be assumed. Hence Borda method fits the statistical description,
weighting in arithmetic progression. JFS Ross, Elections and
Electors, 1955, suggested that the weighting would be more
realistic using the geometric mean. This would be weighting in
geometric progression. The British broadcaster Robin Day favored
weighting in harmonic progression! <br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">But the point is they are all
assumptions. This is the basic drawback to score voting systems.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">The other standard statistical phrase
is weighting in arithmetic proportion, which applies when
statisticians have the weighting data for the proportionate
importance of the classes of data. An example of this
well-defined count is the Gregory weighting of the total
transferable vote or alternatively, and more consistently, the
Meek method keep values. <br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Of course, this accurate count does
not apply to deficit votes, as well as surplus votes for
candidates. That is, until FAB STV.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">By the way, as far as method of
counting is concerned, FAB STV is unlike traditional STV in that
it does not distinguish between AV and STV, because only the
latter is PR with potential surplus transfers. Consequently,
there is no special "single winner method" with FAB STV. <br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">But there is a but, which, without
going into details, essentially is JS Mill distinction between
democracy and maiorocracy.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Richard L.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 24/06/2019 15:58, Chris Benham
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:7ef3bf09-96b1-b695-0b70-a12ce7966195@yahoo.com.au">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=UTF-8">
<p>Richard L,<br>
<br>
Can you please expand a bit on the meaning and relevance of
your profound observation?<br>
<br>
What is your working definition of a "points system"? (I can
perhaps guess from your reference to the Borda method.)<br>
<br>
How is your reference to some variants of the multi-winner?
Single Transferable Vote algorithm relevant to the discussion
of a single-winner method?<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 23/06/2019 11:54 pm, Richard
Lung wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:8d4967a0-62af-e27a-f389-6cd6a7d2c08e@ukscientists.com">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=UTF-8">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Points systems (Borda method is
the archetype) are an assumed weighting of preferences.
Gregory method transfer value or Meek method keep values are
a real weighting of preferences.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Richard L.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 20/06/2019 21:03, Forest
Simmons wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAP29oncPN-XO-U=5UqaeR4h8-bgOqYHL=exBcoZx9nmGVUzSWg@mail.gmail.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;
charset=UTF-8">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>Chris, I like it especially the part about naive
voters voting sincerely being at no appreciable
disadvantage while resisting burial and complying with
the CD criterion. <br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>From your experience in Australia where full rankings
are required (as I understand it) what do you think
about the practicality of rating on a scale of zero to
99, as compared with ranking a long list of candidates?
Is it a big obstacle?<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
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