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<p>On 24/06/2019 3:13 am, John wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">The single-election approach simply cannot
provide a good election on its own for statistical reasons,
and mixing bad rules into good rules won't make better rules.</div>
</blockquote>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">John,<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">"Bad rules" give bad results. Instead
of this dismissive philosophical hand-waving, why don't you be so
kind as to furnish an example where VIASME<br>
gives a result that you consider to be bad (and where your
specified preferred method gives a better result)?<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
On 24/06/2019 3:13 am, John wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAKYQpdu8+dsf20a84qdn2cpy+psCHveZtTO7DTuQJzhT7DF3Yw@mail.gmail.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div dir="auto">My point is mostly that score is useless, and
hybrid methods are essentially trying to cover for Score by
incorporating it while avoiding it's use in practice. It's kind
of like saying you have a new ear infection treatment where you
use amoxicillin, and if that doesn't work you attach leeches to
the earlobes.
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I have found that even e.g. Tideman's
Alternative resisits burying, although I cover it with a
robust candidate selection via a proportional primary election
specifically to prevent formation of useful oligarchy
coalitions. Someone should quantify "resists burying" for all
these methods one day.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Note that resistance doesn't mean burying does
nothing. In some 4-candidate examples, I had to inflate a
candidate's voter base (to about 31% in one example) to
eliminate the Condorcet winner, and the practical result was
if 4% of voters whose first choice was the Condorcet winner
preferred a candidate less-desirable to the burying coalition,
that candidate was elected. In simple terms, it produced
worse results for the tactical voters than if they had voted
honestly.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The single-election approach simply cannot
provide a good election on its own for statistical reasons,
and mixing bad rules into good rules won't make better rules.</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Jun 23, 2019, 12:50 PM
C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"
target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" moz-do-not-send="true">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p><br>
On 22/06/2019 9:15 am, John wrote:<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">The great purported benefit of score
systems is that more voters can rank A over B, yet due
to the scores score can elect B:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</blockquote>
John,<br>
<br>
Is every method that uses score ballots a "score system"?
My suggested VIASME method meets Smith and therefore avoids<br>
the "benefit" you refer to.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Wrapping it in a better system and
using that information to make auxiliary decisions is
still incorporating bad data. Bad data is worse than no
data.</blockquote>
<br>
As it relates to VIASME, I'm afraid you've lost me. A few
years ago James Green-Armytage proposed a Condorcet method
that asked the voters to both<br>
rank the candidates (with equal ranking and truncation
allowed) and also give each of them a high-resolution score
and the ranking and the scoring <br>
had to be consistent with each other. If there was a
Condorcet winner the scoring was ignored.<br>
<br>
Well it seems to me that the ranking is a redundant extra
chore for the voter because it can be inferred from the
scoring. That is what I propose for<br>
VIASME. The Green-Armytage method was called
Cardinal-Weighted Pairwise and was designed to try to
resist Burial strategy. He had a simpler-ballot<br>
version called Approval-Weighted Pairwise. One of the
reasons I don't much like it is that it can elect a
candidate that is pairwise-beaten by a more approved<br>
candidate.<br>
<p><a
class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Cardinal_pairwise"
rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Cardinal_pairwise</a><br>
<br>
On 22/06/2019 8:57 am, Felix Sargent wrote: </p>
<blockquote type="cite">That's not even going into what
happens when a voter ranks an ordinal ballot
strategically, placing "guaranteed losers" to 2nd and 3rd
places in order to improve the chances of their first
choice candidate (in IRV at least). </blockquote>
<br>
Felix, the Burial strategy you describe doesn't work in IRV
because your 2nd and 3rd place preferences won't be counted
if your first choice candidate is still alive.<br>
It is methods that fail Later-no-Help (such as all the
Condorcet methods) that are vulnerable to that, some more
than others.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<div
class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683moz-cite-prefix">On
22/06/2019 9:15 am, John wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">The error comes when you make inferences.
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The great purported benefit of score
systems is that more voters can rank A over B, yet due
to the scores score can elect B:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A:1.0 B:0.9 C:0.1</div>
<div dir="auto">C:1.0 A:0.5 B:0.4</div>
<div dir="auto">B:1.0 A:0.2 C:0.1</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A=1.7, B=2.3, C=2.2</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Both B and C defeat A, despite A
defeating both ranked.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">If the first voter scores B as 0.7, C
wins.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Whenever a system attempts to use score
or its low-resolution Approval variant, it is relying
on this information.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So why does this matter?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The voters are 100% certain and precise
that these are their votes:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A>B>C</div>
<div dir="auto">C>A>B</div>
<div dir="auto">B>A>C</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">We know A defeats B, A defeats C, and B
defeats C. A is the Condorcet winner.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">For score votes, 1.0 is always 1.0.
It's the first rank, the measure. This is of course
another source of information distortion in cardinal
systems: how is the information meaningful as a
comparison between two voters?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">How do you know 10 voters voting A first
at 1.0 aren't half as invested in A as 6 voters voting
B 1.0, this really A=5 B=6?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Ten of us prefer strawberry to peanut
butter.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Six of us WILL DIE IF YOU OPEN A JAR OF
PEANUT BUTTER HERE.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Score systems claim to represent this
and capture this information, but they can't.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">(Notice I used the negative: that 1.0
vote is an expression of the damage of their
0.0-scored alternative.)</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Even setting that aside, however, you
have a problem where an individual might put down 0.7
or 0.9 or 0.5 for the SAME candidate in the SAME
election, solely based on how bad they are at creating
a cardinal comparison. Humans are universally bad at
cardinal comparison.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So now you can actually elect A, B, or C
based on how well-rested people are, how hungry they
are, or anything else that impacts their mood and thus
the sharpness or softness by which they critically
compare candidates.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It's a sort of random number generator.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Wrapping it in a better system and using
that information to make auxiliary decisions is still
incorporating bad data. Bad data is worse than no
data.</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jun 21, 2019,
7:27 PM Felix Sargent <<a
href="mailto:felix.sargent@gmail.com"
rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">felix.sargent@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>I don't know how you can think that blurrier
data would end up with a more precise result. <br>
</div>
<div>No matter how you cut it, if you rank ABCD then
it translates into a score of <br>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">A: 1.0</div>
<div dir="auto">B: .75<br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">C: 0.5</div>
<div dir="auto">D: 0.25</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div>There's no way of describing differences
between candidates beyond a straight line
between first place and last place. <br>
</div>
<div>Even if the voter is imprecise in the
difference between A and B they will never make
the error of rating B more than A, whereas the
error between a voter's actual preferences and
the preferences that are recorded with an
ordinal ballot has the liability of being
massive. Consider I like A and B but HATE C. ABC
does not tell you that.<br>
</div>
<div>That's not even going into what happens when
a voter ranks an ordinal ballot strategically,
placing "guaranteed losers" to 2nd and 3rd
places in order to improve the chances of their
first choice candidate (in IRV at least). <br>
</div>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Your analysis depends on the question of how
intelligent you believe the average voter to be. <br>
</div>
<div>If voters can use Amazon and Yelp star ratings,
they can do score voting.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div dir="ltr"
class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683m_3685997563850768520gmail_signature"
data-smartmail="gmail_signature">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div dir="ltr">
<div><a href="https://felixsargent.com"
rel="noreferrer noreferrer
noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">Felix Sargent</a><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jun 21,
2019 at 2:14 PM John <<a
href="mailto:john.r.moser@gmail.com"
rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">john.r.moser@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="auto">
<div>Cardinal voting collects higher-resolution
data, but not necessarily precise data.
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Let's say you score
candidates:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A: 1.0</div>
<div dir="auto">B: 0.5</div>
<div dir="auto">C: 0.25</div>
<div dir="auto">D: 0.1</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">In reality, B is 90% as
favored as A. C is 70% as favored as B. The
real numbers would be:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A: 1.0</div>
<div dir="auto">B: 0.9</div>
<div dir="auto">C: 0.63</div>
<div dir="auto">D: etc.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">How would this happen?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Cardinal: I approve of A 90%
as much as B.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Natural and honest: I prefer A
to win, and I am not just as happy with B
winning, or close to it. I feel maybe half
as good about that? B is between C and D
and I don't like C, but I like D less.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Strategic: even voting 0.5 for
B means possibly helping B beat A, but what
if C wins...</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The strategic nightmare is
inherent to score and approval systems.
When approvals aren't used to elect but only
for data, people are not naturally inclined
to analyze a score representing their actual
approval.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Why?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Because people decide by
simulation. Simulation of ordinal preference
is easy: I like A over B. Even then,
sometimes you can't seem to decide who is
better.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Working out precisely how much
I approve of A versus B is harder. It takes
a lot of effort and the basic simulation
approach responds heavily to how good you
feel about A losing to B, not about how much
B satisfies you on a scale of 0 to A.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Score and approval voting
source a high-error, low-confidence sample.
It's like recording climate data by licking
your finger and holding it in the wind each
day, then writing down what you think is the
temperature. Someone will say, "it's more
data than warmer/colder trends!" While
ignoring that you are not Mercury in a
graduated cylinder.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri,
Jun 21, 2019, 3:10 PM Felix Sargent <<a
href="mailto:felix.sargent@gmail.com"
rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">felix.sargent@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>Valuation can be ordinal, in that
you can know that 3 is more than 2.</div>
<div>There are two questions before us:
Which voting method collects more
data? Which tabulation method picks
the best winner from that data?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Which voting method collects more
data?</div>
<div>Cardinal voting collects higher
resolution data than ordinal voting.
Consider this thought experiment. If I
give you a rating of A:5 B:2 C:1 D:3
E:5 F:2 you should create an ordered
list from that -- AEDFBC. If I gave
you AEDFBC you couldn't convert that
back into its cardinal data.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Which tabulation picks a better
winner from the data?</div>
<div>Both Score and Approval voting pick
the person with the highest votes.</div>
<div>Summing ordinal data, on the other
hand, is very complicated, as to avoid
loops. Methods like Condorcet or IRV
have been proposed to eliminate those
but ultimately they're hacks for
dealing with incomplete information.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div dir="ltr"
class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683m_3685997563850768520gmail-m_-2045031879217701627m_-57446879386365185gmail_signature">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div dir="ltr">
<div><a
href="https://felixsargent.com"
rel="noreferrer
noreferrer noreferrer
noreferrer"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">Felix
Sargent</a><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On
Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 5:23 AM John <<a
href="mailto:john.r.moser@gmail.com"
rel="noreferrer noreferrer
noreferrer noreferrer"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">john.r.moser@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="auto">Voters can't readily
provide meaningful information as
score voting. It's highly-strategic
and the comparison of cardinal
values is not natural.
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">All valuation is
ordinal. Prices are based from
cost; but what people WILL pay,
given no option to pay less, is
based on ordinal comparison.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Is X worth 2 Y?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">For the <span
class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683m_3685997563850768520gmail-m_-2045031879217701627m_-57446879386365185gmail-m_-253417112080945646money">$1,000</span> iPhone
I could have a OnePlus 6t and a
Chromebook. The 6t...I can get a
cheaper smartphone, but I prefer
the 6t to that phone plus whatever
else I buy.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I have a higher
paying job, so each dollar is
worth fewer hours, so the ordinal
value of a dollar to me is lower.
<span
class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683m_3685997563850768520gmail-m_-2045031879217701627m_-57446879386365185gmail-m_-253417112080945646money">$600</span> of
my dollars is fewer hours than <span
class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683m_3685997563850768520gmail-m_-2045031879217701627m_-57446879386365185gmail-m_-253417112080945646money">$600</span> minimum
wage dollars. I have access to my
most-preferred purchases and can
buy way down into my
less-preferred purchases.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Information about
this is difficult to pin down by
voter. Prices in the stock market
set by a constant, public auction
among millions of buyers and
sellers. A single buyer can
hardly price one stock against
another, and prices against what
they think their gains will be
relative to current price.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">When pricing
candidates, you'll see a lot like
Mohs hardness: 2 is 200, 3 is 500,
4 is 1,500; but we label things
that are 250 or 450 as 2.5,
likewise between 500 and 1,500 is
3.5. Being between X and Y is
always immediately HALFWAY between
X and Y, most intuitively.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The rated system
sucks even before you factor in
strategic concerns (which only
matter if actually using a
score-driven method).</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Approval is just
low-resolution (1 bit) score
voting.</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On
Fri, Jun 21, 2019, 12:01 AM
C.Benham <<a
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"
rel="noreferrer noreferrer
noreferrer noreferrer"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>Forest,<br>
<br>
With paper and pencil ballots
and the voters only writing in
their numerical scores it
probably isn't very practical
for the Australian Electoral
Commission<br>
hand vote-counters.<br>
<br>
But if it isn't compulsory to
mark each candidate and the
default score is zero, I'm
sure the voters could quickly
adapt.<br>
<br>
In the US I gather that there
is at least one reform
proposal to use these type of
ballots. One of these, "Score
Voting" aka "Range Voting", <br>
proposes to just use Average
Ratings with I gather the
default score being "no
opinion" rather than zero and
some tweak to prevent an
unknown<br>
candidate from winning.<br>
<br>
So it struck me that if we can
collect such a large amount of
detailed information from the
voters then we could do a lot
more with it, and if we<br>
want something that meets the
Condorcet criterion this is my
suggestion.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<a
href="https://rangevoting.org/"
rel="noreferrer noreferrer
noreferrer noreferrer
noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://rangevoting.org/</a><br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p><big><b>How score voting
works:</b></big></p>
<ol type="a">
<li>Each<span> </span><a
href="https://rangevoting.org/MeaningOfVote.html"
title="What a 'vote' is"
style="border:1px
none;color:rgb(0,0,0);text-decoration:none;background:rgb(209,154,59)
none repeat scroll 0%
0%" rel="noreferrer
noreferrer noreferrer
noreferrer noreferrer"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">vote</a><span> </span>consists
of a numerical score
within some range (say<span> </span><a
href="https://rangevoting.org/Why99.html" title="Other scores such as
0-10 also are possible
and we do not insist on
0-99. Link explains why
0-99 is a good choice
and how to use other
scores."
style="border:1px
none;color:rgb(95,14,0);text-decoration:none"
rel="noreferrer
noreferrer noreferrer
noreferrer noreferrer"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">0
to 99</a>) for each
candidate. Simpler is 0 to
9 ("single digit score
voting").</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<br>
<div
class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683m_3685997563850768520gmail-m_-2045031879217701627m_-57446879386365185gmail-m_-253417112080945646m_-816986146098263387moz-cite-prefix">On
21/06/2019 5:33 am, Forest
Simmons wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>Chris, I like it
especially the part about
naive voters voting
sincerely being at no
appreciable disadvantage
while resisting burial and
complying with the CD
criterion. <br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>From your experience in
Australia where full
rankings are required (as
I understand it) what do
you think about the
practicality of rating on
a scale of zero to 99, as
compared with ranking a
long list of candidates?
Is it a big obstacle?<br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div
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src="https://static2.avg.com/2000491/web/i/ipm/icon-envelope-tick-green-avg-v1.png"
alt=""
style="width:46px;height:29px"
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<td
style="width:470px;padding-top:12px;color:rgb(65,66,78);font-size:13px;font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;line-height:18px">Virus-free.
<a
href="http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient&utm_term=oa-4885-b"
style="color:rgb(68,83,234)" rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer
noreferrer
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target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">www.avg.com</a>
</td>
</tr>
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</table>
<a
href="#m_-4020123439663180047_m_-1234290807304547683_m_3685997563850768520_m_-2045031879217701627_m_-57446879386365185_m_-253417112080945646_m_-816986146098263387_DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2"
width="1" height="1"
rel="noreferrer noreferrer
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moz-do-not-send="true"> </a></div>
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Election-Methods mailing list - see <a
href="https://electorama.com/em"
rel="noreferrer noreferrer
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target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">https://electorama.com/em</a>
for list info<br>
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