<div dir="auto">My point is mostly that score is useless, a d hybrid methods are essentially trying to cover for Score by incorporating it while avoiding it's use in practice. It's kind of like saying you have a new ear infection treatment where you use amoxicillin, and if that doesn't work you attach leeches to the earlobes.<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I have found that even e.g. Tideman's Alternative resisits burying, although I cover it with a robust candidate selection via a proportional primary election specifically to prevent formation of useful oligarchy coalitions. Someone should quantify "resists burying" for all these methods one day.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Note that resistance doesn't mean burying does nothing. In some 4-candidate examples, I had to inflate a candidate's voter base (to about 31% in one example) to eliminate the Condorcet winner, and the practical result was if 4% of voters whose first choice was the Condorcet winner preferred a candidate less-desirable to the burying coalition, that candidate was elected. In simple terms, it produced worse results for the tactical voters than if they had voted honestly.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The single-election approach simply cannot provide a good election on its own for statistical reasons, and mixing bad rules into good rules won't make better rules.</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Jun 23, 2019, 12:50 PM C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p><br>
On 22/06/2019 9:15 am, John wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">The great purported benefit of score systems is
that more voters can rank A over B, yet due to the scores
score can elect B:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</blockquote>
John,<br>
<br>
Is every method that uses score ballots a "score system"? My
suggested VIASME method meets Smith and therefore avoids<br>
the "benefit" you refer to.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Wrapping it in a better system and using
that information to make auxiliary decisions is still
incorporating bad data. Bad data is worse than no data.</blockquote>
<br>
As it relates to VIASME, I'm afraid you've lost me. A few years
ago James Green-Armytage proposed a Condorcet method that asked
the voters to both<br>
rank the candidates (with equal ranking and truncation allowed)
and also give each of them a high-resolution score and the ranking
and the scoring <br>
had to be consistent with each other. If there was a Condorcet
winner the scoring was ignored.<br>
<br>
Well it seems to me that the ranking is a redundant extra chore
for the voter because it can be inferred from the scoring. That is
what I propose for<br>
VIASME. The Green-Armytage method was called Cardinal-Weighted
Pairwise and was designed to try to resist Burial strategy. He
had a simpler-ballot<br>
version called Approval-Weighted Pairwise. One of the reasons I
don't much like it is that it can elect a candidate that is
pairwise-beaten by a more approved<br>
candidate.<br>
</p>
<p><a class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Cardinal_pairwise" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Cardinal_pairwise</a><br>
<br>
On 22/06/2019 8:57 am, Felix Sargent wrote:
<blockquote type="cite">That's not even going into what happens
when a voter ranks an ordinal ballot strategically, placing
"guaranteed losers" to 2nd and 3rd places in order to improve
the chances of their first choice candidate (in IRV at least). </blockquote>
<br>
Felix, the Burial strategy you describe doesn't work in IRV
because your 2nd and 3rd place preferences won't be counted if
your first choice candidate is still alive.<br>
It is methods that fail Later-no-Help (such as all the Condorcet
methods) that are vulnerable to that, some more than others.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683moz-cite-prefix">On 22/06/2019 9:15 am, John wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">The error comes when you make inferences.
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The great purported benefit of score systems is
that more voters can rank A over B, yet due to the scores
score can elect B:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A:1.0 B:0.9 C:0.1</div>
<div dir="auto">C:1.0 A:0.5 B:0.4</div>
<div dir="auto">B:1.0 A:0.2 C:0.1</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A=1.7, B=2.3, C=2.2</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Both B and C defeat A, despite A defeating both
ranked.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">If the first voter scores B as 0.7, C wins.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Whenever a system attempts to use score or its
low-resolution Approval variant, it is relying on this
information.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So why does this matter?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The voters are 100% certain and precise that
these are their votes:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A>B>C</div>
<div dir="auto">C>A>B</div>
<div dir="auto">B>A>C</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">We know A defeats B, A defeats C, and B defeats
C. A is the Condorcet winner.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">For score votes, 1.0 is always 1.0. It's the
first rank, the measure. This is of course another source of
information distortion in cardinal systems: how is the
information meaningful as a comparison between two voters?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">How do you know 10 voters voting A first at 1.0
aren't half as invested in A as 6 voters voting B 1.0, this
really A=5 B=6?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Ten of us prefer strawberry to peanut butter.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Six of us WILL DIE IF YOU OPEN A JAR OF PEANUT
BUTTER HERE.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Score systems claim to represent this and
capture this information, but they can't.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">(Notice I used the negative: that 1.0 vote is an
expression of the damage of their 0.0-scored alternative.)</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Even setting that aside, however, you have a
problem where an individual might put down 0.7 or 0.9 or 0.5
for the SAME candidate in the SAME election, solely based on
how bad they are at creating a cardinal comparison. Humans
are universally bad at cardinal comparison.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So now you can actually elect A, B, or C based
on how well-rested people are, how hungry they are, or
anything else that impacts their mood and thus the sharpness
or softness by which they critically compare candidates.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">It's a sort of random number generator.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Wrapping it in a better system and using that
information to make auxiliary decisions is still incorporating
bad data. Bad data is worse than no data.</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jun 21, 2019, 7:27 PM
Felix Sargent <<a href="mailto:felix.sargent@gmail.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">felix.sargent@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>I don't know how you can think that blurrier data would
end up with a more precise result. <br>
</div>
<div>No matter how you cut it, if you rank ABCD then it
translates into a score of <br>
</div>
<div>
<div dir="auto">A: 1.0</div>
<div dir="auto">B: .75<br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">C: 0.5</div>
<div dir="auto">D: 0.25</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div>There's no way of describing differences between
candidates beyond a straight line between first place
and last place. <br>
</div>
<div>Even if the voter is imprecise in the difference
between A and B they will never make the error of rating
B more than A, whereas the error between a voter's
actual preferences and the preferences that are recorded
with an ordinal ballot has the liability of being
massive. Consider I like A and B but HATE C. ABC does
not tell you that.<br>
</div>
<div>That's not even going into what happens when a voter
ranks an ordinal ballot strategically, placing
"guaranteed losers" to 2nd and 3rd places in order to
improve the chances of their first choice candidate (in
IRV at least). <br>
</div>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Your analysis depends on the question of how
intelligent you believe the average voter to be. <br>
</div>
<div>If voters can use Amazon and Yelp star ratings, they
can do score voting.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div dir="ltr" class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683m_3685997563850768520gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div dir="ltr">
<div><a href="https://felixsargent.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">Felix Sargent</a><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at
2:14 PM John <<a href="mailto:john.r.moser@gmail.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">john.r.moser@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="auto">
<div>Cardinal voting collects higher-resolution data,
but not necessarily precise data.
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Let's say you score candidates:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A: 1.0</div>
<div dir="auto">B: 0.5</div>
<div dir="auto">C: 0.25</div>
<div dir="auto">D: 0.1</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">In reality, B is 90% as favored as A.
C is 70% as favored as B. The real numbers would
be:</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">A: 1.0</div>
<div dir="auto">B: 0.9</div>
<div dir="auto">C: 0.63</div>
<div dir="auto">D: etc.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">How would this happen?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Cardinal: I approve of A 90% as much
as B.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Natural and honest: I prefer A to win,
and I am not just as happy with B winning, or close
to it. I feel maybe half as good about that? B is
between C and D and I don't like C, but I like D
less.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Strategic: even voting 0.5 for B means
possibly helping B beat A, but what if C wins...</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The strategic nightmare is inherent to
score and approval systems. When approvals aren't
used to elect but only for data, people are not
naturally inclined to analyze a score representing
their actual approval.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Why?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Because people decide by simulation.
Simulation of ordinal preference is easy: I like A
over B. Even then, sometimes you can't seem to
decide who is better.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Working out precisely how much I
approve of A versus B is harder. It takes a lot of
effort and the basic simulation approach responds
heavily to how good you feel about A losing to B,
not about how much B satisfies you on a scale of 0
to A.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Score and approval voting source a
high-error, low-confidence sample. It's like
recording climate data by licking your finger and
holding it in the wind each day, then writing down
what you think is the temperature. Someone will
say, "it's more data than warmer/colder trends!"
While ignoring that you are not Mercury in a
graduated cylinder.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jun 21,
2019, 3:10 PM Felix Sargent <<a href="mailto:felix.sargent@gmail.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">felix.sargent@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>Valuation can be ordinal, in that you can
know that 3 is more than 2.</div>
<div>There are two questions before us: Which
voting method collects more data? Which
tabulation method picks the best winner from
that data?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Which voting method collects more data?</div>
<div>Cardinal voting collects higher resolution
data than ordinal voting. Consider this
thought experiment. If I give you a rating of
A:5 B:2 C:1 D:3 E:5 F:2 you should create an
ordered list from that -- AEDFBC. If I gave
you AEDFBC you couldn't convert that back into
its cardinal data.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Which tabulation picks a better winner from
the data?</div>
<div>Both Score and Approval voting pick the
person with the highest votes.</div>
<div>Summing ordinal data, on the other hand, is
very complicated, as to avoid loops. Methods
like Condorcet or IRV have been proposed to
eliminate those but ultimately they're hacks
for dealing with incomplete information.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div dir="ltr" class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683m_3685997563850768520gmail-m_-2045031879217701627m_-57446879386365185gmail_signature">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>
<div dir="ltr">
<div><a href="https://felixsargent.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">Felix
Sargent</a><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jun
21, 2019 at 5:23 AM John <<a href="mailto:john.r.moser@gmail.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">john.r.moser@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="auto">Voters can't readily provide
meaningful information as score voting. It's
highly-strategic and the comparison of
cardinal values is not natural.
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">All valuation is ordinal.
Prices are based from cost; but what
people WILL pay, given no option to pay
less, is based on ordinal comparison.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Is X worth 2 Y?</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">For the <span class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683m_3685997563850768520gmail-m_-2045031879217701627m_-57446879386365185gmail-m_-253417112080945646money">$1,000</span> iPhone
I could have a OnePlus 6t and a
Chromebook. The 6t...I can get a cheaper
smartphone, but I prefer the 6t to that
phone plus whatever else I buy.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I have a higher paying job,
so each dollar is worth fewer hours, so
the ordinal value of a dollar to me is
lower. <span class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683m_3685997563850768520gmail-m_-2045031879217701627m_-57446879386365185gmail-m_-253417112080945646money">$600</span> of
my dollars is fewer hours than <span class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683m_3685997563850768520gmail-m_-2045031879217701627m_-57446879386365185gmail-m_-253417112080945646money">$600</span> minimum
wage dollars. I have access to my
most-preferred purchases and can buy way
down into my less-preferred purchases.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Information about this is
difficult to pin down by voter. Prices in
the stock market set by a constant, public
auction among millions of buyers and
sellers. A single buyer can hardly price
one stock against another, and prices
against what they think their gains will
be relative to current price.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">When pricing candidates,
you'll see a lot like Mohs hardness: 2 is
200, 3 is 500, 4 is 1,500; but we label
things that are 250 or 450 as 2.5,
likewise between 500 and 1,500 is 3.5.
Being between X and Y is always
immediately HALFWAY between X and Y, most
intuitively.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">The rated system sucks even
before you factor in strategic concerns
(which only matter if actually using a
score-driven method).</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Approval is just
low-resolution (1 bit) score voting.</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri,
Jun 21, 2019, 12:01 AM C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" rel="noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>Forest,<br>
<br>
With paper and pencil ballots and the
voters only writing in their numerical
scores it probably isn't very
practical for the Australian Electoral
Commission<br>
hand vote-counters.<br>
<br>
But if it isn't compulsory to mark
each candidate and the default score
is zero, I'm sure the voters could
quickly adapt.<br>
<br>
In the US I gather that there is at
least one reform proposal to use these
type of ballots. One of these, "Score
Voting" aka "Range Voting", <br>
proposes to just use Average Ratings
with I gather the default score being
"no opinion" rather than zero and
some tweak to prevent an unknown<br>
candidate from winning.<br>
<br>
So it struck me that if we can collect
such a large amount of detailed
information from the voters then we
could do a lot more with it, and if we<br>
want something that meets the
Condorcet criterion this is my
suggestion.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<a href="https://rangevoting.org/" rel="noreferrer noreferrer
noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://rangevoting.org/</a><br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p><big><b>How
score voting works:</b></big></p>
<ol type="a">
<li>Each<span> </span><a href="https://rangevoting.org/MeaningOfVote.html" title="What a 'vote' is" style="border:1px none;color:rgb(0,0,0);text-decoration:none;background:rgb(209,154,59) none repeat scroll 0% 0%" rel="noreferrer noreferrer
noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">vote</a><span> </span>consists
of a numerical score within some
range (say<span> </span><a href="https://rangevoting.org/Why99.html" title="Other scores such as 0-10
also are possible and we do not
insist on 0-99. Link explains
why 0-99 is a good choice and
how to use other scores." style="border:1px none;color:rgb(95,14,0);text-decoration:none" rel="noreferrer noreferrer
noreferrer noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">0 to 99</a>)
for each candidate. Simpler is 0
to 9 ("single digit score
voting").</li>
</ol>
</blockquote>
<br>
<div class="m_-4020123439663180047m_-1234290807304547683m_3685997563850768520gmail-m_-2045031879217701627m_-57446879386365185gmail-m_-253417112080945646m_-816986146098263387moz-cite-prefix">On
21/06/2019 5:33 am, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>Chris, I like it especially the
part about naive voters voting
sincerely being at no appreciable
disadvantage while resisting
burial and complying with the CD
criterion. <br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>From your experience in
Australia where full rankings are
required (as I understand it) what
do you think about the
practicality of rating on a scale
of zero to 99, as compared with
ranking a long list of
candidates? Is it a big obstacle?<br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
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