<div dir="auto"><div>Agreed. My favorite paper on this topic is Niemi, 1984:<div dir="auto"><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1955800">https://www.jstor.org/stable/1955800</a><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Greg</div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Jun 23, 2019, 10:26 AM Richard Lung <<a href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com">voting@ukscientists.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div class="m_-6910164836152471330moz-cite-prefix">I agree with all this.</div>
<div class="m_-6910164836152471330moz-cite-prefix">It was said long ago, with regard to
many votes per seats and cumulative voting, as by Enid Lakeman:
Multiple votes count against each other. Single transferable
voting is the way to go.</div>
<div class="m_-6910164836152471330moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="m_-6910164836152471330moz-cite-prefix">Richard L.<br>
</div>
<div class="m_-6910164836152471330moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="m_-6910164836152471330moz-cite-prefix">On 22/06/2019 00:29, robert
bristow-johnson wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p> </p>
<p>i am not a member of the RangeVoting list so i do not think my
response will post there.<br>
<br>
John Moser reiterates the complaint that I have always had with
Score Voting (i think that term is a better semantic than
"Range"), which, perhaps surprizingly, is also the end complaint
i have with Approval Voting, *even* *though* Score Voting
requires too much information from voters and Approval Voting
collects too little information from voters (as does FPTP). </p>
<p>Score voting requires more thought (and expertise, as if they
are Olympic figure-skating judges) from voters for them to
determine exactly how much they should score a particular
candidate. But the real problem for the voter is that the voter
is a partisan. They know they wanna score their favorite
candidate a "10". They may like their second favorite, but they
do not want their second choice to beat their first choice. But
they may hate any of the remaining candidates and they
sure-as-hell want either their first or second choice to beat
any of the remaining candidates. So their tactical burden in
the voting booth is "How much do I score my second choice?"</p>
<p>And Approval Voting has the same problem, but for the opposite
reason that Approval Voting is less "expressive" than
Ranked-Choice. The voter has the same tactical decision to make
regarding their second favorite candidate: "Do I approve my
second choice or not?"</p>
<p>These tactical decisions would also be affected by how likely
the voter believes (from the pre-election polls) that the race
will end up essentially between their first and second-choice
candidates. If the voter thinks that will be the case, the
partisan voter is motivated to score his/her favorite a "10" and
the second favorite a "0" (or approve the favorite and not
approve the second choice).</p>
<p>This really essentially comes down to a fundamental principle
of voting and elections in a democracy, which is: "One person -
one vote." If I really really like Candidate A far better than
Candidate B and you prefer Candidate B only slightly more than
your preference for Candidate A, then my vote for A>B should
count no more (nor less) than your vote for B>A. Even if
your feelings about the candidates is not as strong as mine,
your franchise should be as strong as my franchise. But Score
Voting explicitly rejects that notion and in doing so, will lead
to a burden of tactical voting for regular voters.</p>
<p>Only the ordinal ranked-ballot extracts from voters the "right
amount" of information. If a voter ranks A>B>C, all that
voter is saying is that if the election were held between A and
B, this voter is voting for A. If the election is between A and
C, this voter is voting for A. And if the election ends up
being between B and C, this voter votes for B. That's **all**
that this ballot says. We should not read more into it and we
should not expect more information from the voter such as "How
much more do you prefer A over C than your preference of A over
B?" It shouldn't matter.</p>
<p>my $0.02 .</p>
<p>r b-j</p>
<p><br>
---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] High Resolution Inferred Approval version of
ASM<br>
From: "John" <a class="m_-6910164836152471330moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:john.r.moser@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"><john.r.moser@gmail.com></a><br>
Date: Fri, June 21, 2019 2:14 pm<br>
To: "Felix Sargent" <a class="m_-6910164836152471330moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:felix.sargent@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"><felix.sargent@gmail.com></a><br>
Cc: <a class="m_-6910164836152471330moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:RangeVoting@yahoogroups.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">RangeVoting@yahoogroups.com</a><br>
"Forest Simmons" <a class="m_-6910164836152471330moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:fsimmons@pcc.edu" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"><fsimmons@pcc.edu></a><br>
"EM" <a class="m_-6910164836152471330moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"><election-methods@lists.electorama.com></a><br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
> Cardinal voting collects higher-resolution data, but not
necessarily<br>
> precise data.<br>
><br>
> Let's say you score candidates:<br>
><br>
> A: 1.0<br>
> B: 0.5<br>
> C: 0.25<br>
> D: 0.1<br>
><br>
> In reality, B is 90% as favored as A. C is 70% as favored
as B. The real<br>
> numbers would be:<br>
><br>
> A: 1.0<br>
> B: 0.9<br>
> C: 0.63<br>
> D: etc.<br>
><br>
> How would this happen?<br>
><br>
> Cardinal: I approve of A 90% as much as B.<br>
><br>
> Natural and honest: I prefer A to win, and I am not just as
happy with B<br>
> winning, or close to it. I feel maybe half as good about
that? B is<br>
> between C and D and I don't like C, but I like D less.<br>
><br>
> Strategic: even voting 0.5 for B means possibly helping B
beat A, but what<br>
> if C wins...<br>
><br>
> The strategic nightmare is inherent to score and approval
systems. When<br>
> approvals aren't used to elect but only for data, people
are not naturally<br>
> inclined to analyze a score representing their actual
approval.<br>
><br>
> Why?<br>
><br>
> Because people decide by simulation. Simulation of ordinal
preference is<br>
> easy: I like A over B. Even then, sometimes you can't seem
to decide who<br>
> is better.<br>
><br>
> Working out precisely how much I approve of A versus B is
harder. It takes<br>
> a lot of effort and the basic simulation approach responds
heavily to how<br>
> good you feel about A losing to B, not about how much B
satisfies you on a<br>
> scale of 0 to A.<br>
><br>
> Score and approval voting source a high-error,
low-confidence sample. It's<br>
> like recording climate data by licking your finger and
holding it in the<br>
> wind each day, then writing down what you think is the
temperature.<br>
> Someone will say, "it's more data than warmer/colder
trends!" While<br>
> ignoring that you are not Mercury in a graduated cylinder.<br>
><br>
</p>
<p>--<br>
<br>
r b-j <a class="m_-6910164836152471330moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
<br>
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br>
</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<br>
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