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<p>This is my favourite Condorcet method that uses high-intensity
Score ballots (say 0-100):<br>
<br>
*Voters fill out high-intensity Score ballots (say 0-100) with
many more available distinct scores<br>
(or rating slots) than there are candidates. Default score is
zero.<br>
<br>
1. Inferring ranking from scores, if there is a pairwise beats-all
candidate that candidate wins.<br>
<br>
2. Otherwise infer approval from score by interpreting each ballot
as showing approval for the<br>
candidates it scores above the average (mean) of the scores it
gives.<br>
Then use Approval Sorted Margins to order the candidates and
eliminate the lowest-ordered<br>
candidate.<br>
</p>
<p>3. Among remaining candidates, ignoring eliminated candidates,
repeat steps 1 and 2 until <br>
there is a winner.*<br>
<br>
To save time we can start by eliminating all the non-members of
the Smith set and stop when<br>
we have ordered the last 3 candidates and then elect the
highest-ordered one.<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins</a><br>
</p>
<p>In simple 3-candidate case this is the same as Approval Sorted
Margins where the voters signal<br>
their approval cut-offs just by having a large gap in the scores
they give.<br>
<br>
That method fulfils Forest's recent 3-candidate, 3-groups of
voters scenarios requirements, resists Burial <br>
relatively well and meets mono-raise. The motivation behind this
version is to minimise any disadvantage <br>
held by naive (and/or uninformed) sincere voters.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</p>
<p><b>Forest Simmons</b> <a title="[EM] What are some simple
methods that accomplish the following conditions?"
href="mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20What%20are%20some%20simple%20methods%20that%20accomplish%20the%20following%0A%20conditions%3F&In-Reply-To=%3CCAP29onet%2BO9hCZJ6hvNnnpUWNyrDkKa9xFXrX5P-RPoF6ndtfw%40mail.gmail.com%3E">fsimmons
at pcc.edu </a><br>
<i>Thu May 30 </i></p>
<p> </p>
<blockquote type="cite">In the example profiles below 100 = P+Q+R,
and 50>P>Q>R>0. <br>
<br>
I am interested in simple methods that always ...<br>
<br>
(1) elect candidate A given the following profile:<br>
P: A<br>
Q: B>>C<br>
R: C,<br>
<br>
and<br>
(2) elect candidate C given<br>
P: A<br>
Q: B>C>><br>
R: C,<br>
<br>
and<br>
(3) elect candidate B given<br>
P: A<br>
Q: B>>C (or B>C)<br>
R: C>>B. (or C>B)<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<p><br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
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