<div dir="ltr"><div>Chris, your point about pushover strategy is a good one. I was making the suggestion in an effort to persuade Steve.</div><div><br></div><div>Another example which demonstrates problems with MJ is the following:</div><div><br></div><div>101: A > B > C > D > E > F > G</div><div>101: B > A = C > D > E > F > G</div><div>101: C > B = D > A = E > F > G</div><div>050: D > C = E > B = F > A = G</div><div>099: E > D = F > C = G > B > A</div><div>099: F > E = G > D > C > B > A</div><div>099: G > F > E > D > C > B > A</div><div><br></div><div>which is taken from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_judgment#Outcome_in_political_environments">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_judgment#Outcome_in_political_environments</a> . Majority Judgment selects B while Condorcet (or MCA/Bucklin) selects C, who seems to be minimizing variance.</div><div><br></div>Smith//Relevant-Ratings is an interesting method (essentially what Chris was suggesting earlier). It seems to be able to handle several burial attack strategies successfully.</div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 8:26 AM C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>I was going to type simply "Good question."<br>
<br>
One of the major justifications MJ has is that it (like Relevant
Ratings and IBIFA and Bucklin and Approval)<br>
meets the Favorite Betrayal Criterion (aka FBC) which isn't
compatible with Condorcet.<br>
<br>
In other words, MJ's (main) excuse for failing Condorcet is that
it meets FBC.<br>
</p>
<p>But when you add a 2-candidate runoff you always have a possible
Push-over incentive and so no<br>
compliance with FBC.<br>
<br>
And so the whole thing becomes a weird method that meets Condorcet
but probably fails Smith.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="gmail-m_6078095119902729035moz-cite-prefix">On 18/06/2019 2:54 pm, Ted Stern wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">
<div><br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Jun 17, 2019,
18:51 robert bristow-johnson <<a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" target="_blank">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<p><br>
<br>
---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] (3) Best Single-Winner Method<br>
From: "Ted Stern" <<a href="mailto:dodecatheon@gmail.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">dodecatheon@gmail.com</a>><br>
Date: Mon, June 17, 2019 5:24 pm<br>
To: "steve bosworth" <<a href="mailto:stevebosworth@hotmail.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">stevebosworth@hotmail.com</a>><br>
Cc: "<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>"
<<a href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a>><br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
> I would certainly favor Majority Judgment over many
other options, if there<br>
> were no other choice, though I'd prefer if it
included a runoff against the<br>
> Condorcet Winner if one exists.<br>
</p>
<p>I know that i am just stuck in Condorcet land and I
haven't completely groked MJ (because i don't like the
ballot), but can you guys help me understand how **any**
candidate beats the Condorcet Winner in a runoff?</p>
</blockquote>
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</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Voters are not rational. Also, in a runoff, they
are not necessarily the same voters. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<p>If you have an election method and subject that winner
of that
method to the CW (whom must have been chosen from
ranked-ballot results) in a runoff, does not always the
CW win? If so, then why not just elect the CW?</p>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Indeed, that would be the case. But I think
voters may not realize the ramifications of their selections
in early use of any new method, so an option to reconsider
might be beneficial. </div>
<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<p><br>
--<br>
<br>
r b-j <a href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
<br>
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br>
</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
</blockquote>
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