<div dir="ltr">Chris and Steve, you might find it interesting to compare my restatement of Relevant Ratings with a similar formulation for Majority Judgment:<div><br></div><div><ol style="margin:0.3em 0px 0px 3.2em;padding:0px"><li style="font-family:sans-serif;margin-bottom:0.1em">Initialize the rating level R to MAXRATING</li><li style="font-family:sans-serif;margin-bottom:0.1em">Initialize candidate totals, <b>T(X)</b>, to zero <i>[T(X) is a shorthand for the total number of ballots voting for X at ratings >= R]</i></li><li style="font-family:sans-serif;margin-bottom:0.1em">Assume <b>TR(X,R)</b> <i>[the total number of ballots rating candidate X at rating R]</i> has been tabulated while counting ballots</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em"><font face="sans-serif">Repeat until a winner is found and R is greater than zero.</font><ol style="font-family:sans-serif;margin:0.3em 0px 0px 3.2em;padding:0px"><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">For each candidate X, add <b>TR(X,R)</b>, the number of ballots rating X at level R, to T(X)</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Is <b>T(X) > 50%</b>? If so X is a member of the current qualifying set</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">If the current qualifying set has at least one member Q, the candidate with the highest T(Q) is the winner</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Otherwise, decrement R by one</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">For each candidate X, is <b>T(X) > (50% - (TR(X,R)/2))</b> (using new R)? If so, then X is a member of a new qualifying set.<br></li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">If the new qualifying set has at least one member Q', then the candidate with the highest T(Q') is the winner.</li></ol></li><li style=""><font face="sans-serif">If no winner has been found, the candidate with highest T(X) is the winner.</font></li></ol><div><br></div><div>In Majority Judgment, each candidate has a majority grade 3-tuple, consisting of their median rating, followed by the rating that occurs after removing median ballots, followed by the number of ballots that break the secondary tie. The median rating is found by following the above process for each candidate separately.</div><div><br></div><div>If X satisfies the comparison in step 4.2, X's majority grade is <b>(R, R-1, TR(X,R)).</b></div></div><div><b><br></b></div><div>If X satisfies the comparison in step 4.5, X's majority grade (using the initial R before decrementing) is <b>(R-1, R, TR(X,R))</b></div><div><b><br></b></div><div>If X falls through to step 5, X's majority grade is <b>(0,0,T(X)).</b></div><div><b><br></b></div><div>Hopefully it should be clear how this is the same as relevant rating when every ballot is relevant -- the maximum approved candidate on ballots that rate X below rating R will simply be the total number of ballots (100%) minus the ballots rating X at and above R. So for T(X) > TCA(X,R) is equivalent to T(X) > 100% - T(X), == 2*T(X) > 100%, == T(X) > 50%. Similarly for the other comparison.</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 1:48 PM Ted Stern <<a href="mailto:dodecatheon@gmail.com">dodecatheon@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">I've modified my electowiki page to include a simpler calculation of Relevant Rating:<div><br></div><div><ol style="margin:0.3em 0px 0px 3.2em;padding:0px;font-family:sans-serif;font-size:14px"><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Initialize the rating level R to MAXRATING</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Initialize candidate totals, <b>T(X)</b>, to zero</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Initialize <b>TCA(X,C)</b> to the highest approval for any candidate on ballots that rate X below R</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Repeat until a winner is found:<ol style="margin:0.3em 0px 0px 3.2em;padding:0px"><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">For each candidate X, add ballots rating X at level R to T(X)</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Is <b>T(X) > TCA(X,C)</b>? If so X is a member of the current qualifying set</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">If the current qualifying set has at least one member Q, the candidate with the highest T(Q) is the winner</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">Otherwise, decrement R by one</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">For each candidate X, set <b>TCA(X,C)</b> to the highest approval for any candidate on ballots that rate X below the new R rating level</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">For each candidate X, is <b>T(X) > TCA(X,C)</b> (using new TCA(X,C))? If so, then X is a member of a new qualifying set.</li><li style="margin-bottom:0.1em">If the new qualifying set has at least one member Q', then the candidate with the highest T(Q') is the winner.</li></ol></li></ol></div><div><br></div><div>You could easily augment this algorithm with your Condercet modification.</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 11:12 AM C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>IBIFA very naturally meets Plurality, Minimal Defense and
Non-Drastic Defense so it occurred to <br>
me to use it as a "Condorcet-completion" method thus:<br>
<br>
*Voters fill out out either unlimited rankings ballots or
multi-slot ratings ballots. <br>
<br>
A pairwise-beats-all candidate wins. Otherwise carry on the IBIFA
process until a <br>
Smith-set member qualifies. If only one does that candidate is
elected.<br>
</p>
<p>If more than one does in the same round, then simplest and
probably good enough<br>
is just to elect the one with highest score in that round.*<br>
<br>
(That last provision is Bucklin-like as in original IBIFA. Using
the Smith set the more<br>
complex Relevant Ratings and the possibly a bit arbitrary-looking
"revised IBIFA"<br>
I think would be very unlikely to give different winners.)<br>
<br>
I think this is my favourite method that meets both Condorcet and
Minimal Defense.<br>
<br>
Also it can be used with an approval cutoff to meet what Forest
was asking for on 30 May 2019.<br>
<br>
All rankings/ratings would be used to identify the Smith set, but
for the IBIFA stage ballots would<br>
be treated as if they truncate all their unapproved candidates.
The default should be approval of<br>
all candidates voted above at least one candidate.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p><b>Forest Simmons</b> <a title="[EM] What are some simple
methods that accomplish the following conditions?" href="mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20What%20are%20some%20simple%20methods%20that%20accomplish%20the%20following%0A%20conditions%3F&In-Reply-To=%3CCAP29onet%2BO9hCZJ6hvNnnpUWNyrDkKa9xFXrX5P-RPoF6ndtfw%40mail.gmail.com%3E" target="_blank">fsimmons
at pcc.edu </a><br>
<i>Thu May 30 </i></p>
<p>
</p><blockquote type="cite">In the example profiles below 100 = P+Q+R,
and 50>P>Q>R>0. <br>
<br>
I am interested in simple methods that always ...<br>
<br>
(1) elect candidate A given the following profile:<br>
P: A<br>
Q: B>>C<br>
R: C,<br>
<br>
and<br>
(2) elect candidate C given<br>
P: A<br>
Q: B>C>><br>
R: C,<br>
<br>
and<br>
(3) elect candidate B given<br>
P: A<br>
Q: B>>C (or B>C)<br>
R: C>>B. (or C>B)<br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<p></p>
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