<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=windows-1252">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p><br>
</p>
<div class="moz-forward-container">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=windows-1252">
<p>Steve,<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 14/06/2019 6:18 am, steve bosworth
wrote:<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%; font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">S: By saying, "of course not", I understanding
that you instead mean that your concept of an ideal
democracy only guarantees that the winner will be support
by a plurality of voting citizens who Top-rated them, I.e.
like FPTP in this respect. Correct me if I'm mistaken.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%; font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
</span></p>
</blockquote>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
C: You asked me a simple yes-no question and I answered it. If
you are not sincerely very stupid, please stop pretending to be.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%; font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">S: What other appropriate reason can a citizen
have for supporting a candidate to win other than they
"trust" them to represent their own scale of political
values and concerns?</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%; font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%; font-family:
"Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN"><br>
</span></p>
</blockquote>
C: That is entirely their business.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">C: MJ elects B. Obviously MJ punished the
A>B voters ….</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">S: I think you already know that to "punish"
means to treat someone differently while MJ treats every
grade given by every citizen in exactly the same way.</span></p>
</span></blockquote>
<br>
C: To "punish" a subset of voters in this context means to give
them cause to regret the way they voted. How do you justify not
attempting to minimise<br>
the proportion of voters in that category, while pretending to
be in favour of minimising "opportunities for tactical voting"
(as I think you put it).<br>
<br>
To the extent that you give voters incentive to vote insincerely
you tend to have a "garbage in, garbage out" problem.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">S: Please study Balinski's reasons for
concluding ...<br>
</span></span></blockquote>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">C: No thanks, I'm not interested in
joining your Bible-study group.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN"> S: Also, I think you can already see that
IBIFA's promise to give Top-rating more weight than
Middle-ratings creates an incentive to give their first
preference candidate a Top-rating..</span></span></blockquote>
<br>
C: Shock! Horror! MJ and also all sane methods that use
ratings ballots (except those that use them only to infer
ranking and perhaps also approval)<br>
have the same incentive. Generally speaking the incentive the
to give a one's favourite a top-rating (or to rank no lower than
equal-first) is not regarded as a <br>
problem in single-winner methods that we should be concerned
about. (Why on earth do you think it does? Obviously there can
only be "no incentive" <br>
if it can't make a difference whether they do or not.)<br>
<br>
Rather what is of greater concern is the incentive in most
methods for the voter to *not* do that. Fortunately neither
IBIFA or MJ (or Relevant Ratings or Approval)<br>
have that problem.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">S: </span>Also,
IBIFA gives more of an incentive dishonestly to Bottom all
of their less preferred candidates.<span
style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span></span></span></blockquote>
<br>
C: No it doesn't, as illustrated by the example in my last post.
<br>
<br>
45: A>B<br>
30: B<br>
25: C<br>
<br>
IBIFA elects A (the CW: A>B 45-30, A>C 45-25). <br>
<br>
IBIFA (like all Condorcet methods and IRV) elects A whether or
not the A supporters "dishonestly Bottom all their less
preferred candidates" <br>
but MJ (and all other versions of Median Ratings, such as
Bucklin) only elects A if they do just that. <br>
<br>
I look forward to seeing your counter-example.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM6PR06MB47245BD90D6ED3F16B23A59BB6EF0@AM6PR06MB4724.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=windows-1252">
<style type="text/css" style="display:none;"> P {margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0;} </style>
<div style="color:rgb(0,0,0);
font-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:14pt"> <span>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;color:black;
mso-ansi-language:EN" lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;color:black;
mso-ansi-language:EN" lang="EN"></span></p>
<div style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;
text-align:center;line-height:normal" align="center"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;
mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;
mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">
<hr width="98%" size="2" align="center"> </span></div>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal"> <b><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;color:black;
mso-ansi-language:EN" lang="EN">Hi Chris,</span></b></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal"> <b><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;color:black;
mso-ansi-language:EN" lang="EN">I'll respond inline
below. I look forward to our next exchange.</span></b></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal"> <b>Steve</b></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal"> <b><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;color:black;
mso-ansi-language:EN" lang="EN"><br>
</span></b></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal"> <b><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;color:black;
mso-ansi-language:EN" lang="EN">From:</span></b><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;
mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;
mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"> C.Benham <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"
moz-do-not-send="true"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a><br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, June 12, 2019 2:40 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> steve bosworth; <a
class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"
moz-do-not-send="true">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>; EM
list<br>
<b>Cc:</b> John M<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: Best Single-Winner Method-IBIFA vs.
MJ</span><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:
Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN" lang="EN">
</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN"> </span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:12.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN">Chris Benham wrote:</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN">46: A<br>
03: A>B<br>
25: C>B<br>
23: D>B<br>
<br>
97 ballots (majority threshold = 48)<br>
<br>
(If you want MJ-style multi-slot ratings ballots,
assume that all the voters have given their favourite
the highest possible<br>
rating and those that rated B above bottom all gave B
the same middle rating and that truncating here
signifies giving the<br>
lowest possible rating).<br>
<br>
MJ and Bucklin both rightly elect A. IBIFA and IRV
also elect A. A is the Condorcet winner: A>B 49-48,
A>C 49-25, A>D 49-23,<br>
A>E 49>0.<br>
<br>
A is the most Top-rated candidate: A49, C25, D23,
B0, E0.<br>
<br>
So suppose the votes are counted and it is announced
that A has won, but just before this is officially and
irrevocably confirmed<br>
someone pipes up, "Hang on a minute, we found a few more
ballots!" (Maybe they are late-arriving postal votes
that had been<br>
thought lost.) <br>
<br>
These 3 new ballots are inspected and found that all
they do is give the highest possible rating to E, a
candidate with no support<br>
on any of the other 97 ballots. What do we do now?
Laugh and carry on with confirming A as still the
winner? No.<br>
<br>
46: A<br>
03: A>B<br>
25: C>B<br>
23: D>B<br>
03: E<br>
<br>
100 ballots (majority threshold = 51)<br>
<br>
Now MJ and Bucklin and any other Median Ratings method
elects B. All methods that I find acceptable elect A
both with and without those 3E ballots. </span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
<br>
On 12/06/2019 6:34 am, steve bosworth wrote:<br
style="mso-special-character: line-break">
<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">S: Your concept of “irrelevant ballots” seems
to be central to your IBIFA method of counting. Do you
also see this concept as conflicting with my own
assumption that in a workable and ideal democracy, each
citizen’s vote would count equally –
one-person-one-vote?</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">C: Of course not. ….</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
S: Please remember that my claim is that "in a workable
and ideal democracy, [MJ makes it possible for] each
citizen’s vote [to] count equally – one-person-one-vote.
<span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;
mso-border-alt:none windowtext 0in;padding:0in"> No
citizen’s vote would be needlessly wasted either
quantitatively or qualitatively. This also means that
the… single-winner in an election will have received
at least 50% plus one of all the citizens’ votes
cast.".</span></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
S: By saying, "of course not", I understanding that you
instead mean that your concept of an ideal democracy
only guarantees that the winner will be support by a
plurality of voting citizens who Top-rated them, I.e.
like FPTP in this respect. Correct me if I'm mistaken.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">S: In any case, the plain fact is the MJ
guarantees all the above benefits while IBIFA does not.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
C: …. But "count" only has some positive sensible
meaning if we are talking about counting towards a
result that the voter prefers (as expressed on the
voter's ballot) over what would have resulted if the
voter had stayed home.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
S: It seems to me that we can only reliably talk about
the recorded votes that citizens have actually made. The
citizens who could or would have stayed at home are
unknowable. We only know who in fact voted and those
citizens who did not vote. Of course, the results of any
particular election would be different in almost any way
we might choose by hypothetically removing any key votes
relevant to our purpose.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
S: In your above example, the 3 citizens who voted for
E also Bottomed (Rejected) all the other candidates.
Why do you think that the 51 citizens who gave B their
2nd preference (and who thereby would elect B by an
absolute majority (if MJ were used) are a less important
than the group of 49 citizens who gave their 1st
preference to A?<br>
<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN">S: No citizen’s vote would be needlessly
wasted either quantitatively or qualitatively.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"> C: Refreshing our memories on what you mean
by that:<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN">S:<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>I
see a citizen’s vote as being wasted quantitatively to
the degree when it fails equally to help one of their
most trusted candidates to win. A citizen’s vote is
wasted qualitatively to the degree that it instead helps
to elect a candidate whom they judge less fit for
office, rather than an available candidate judged to be
more fit. </span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
C: If we cross out "most trusted" and replace it with
'preferred (for whatever reason)', that is fine.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
S: What other appropriate reason can a citizen have for
supporting a candidate to win other than they "trust"
them to represent their own scale of political values
and concerns?</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN"><br>
S: This also means that whenever possible, the
single-winner in an election will have received at least
50% plus one of all the citizens’ votes cast.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
C: No it doesn't. Why doesn't it mean that the winner
should preferably come from the Smith set (be the
Condorcet winner or come from the smallest set S of
candidates that pairwise beat all the outside-S
candidates)?</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
S: The discovery of MJ means that it is always possible
for the winner to have this majority, and that is
currently a necessary element in my concept of "workable
and ideal democracy". It is because the candidate from
the "Smith set", etc. may still not be supported by such
a majority that they are less attractive winner than one
who this majority support.<br>
<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN">S: In contrast to MJ, the trouble in my
view with IBIFA is that it gives more weight to higher
preferences than lower preferences, e.g. a citizen’s
Top-rated vote for a candidate is given more weight than
a citizen’s Middle-rated vote for a different candidate.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
C: Yes, I can imagine the voters would hate that.<br>
<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN">S: This leads to the demeaning
identification of some citizens votes as being
“irrelevant”. </span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">C: MJ brilliantly avoids that by "counting"
those ballots so that they cause the winner to change
from A (perhaps a Condorcet winner) to B, when those
ballots express indifference between A and B.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
S: Contrary to what you may be implying, MJ does not
count "those ballots [intending] to change" the winner.
MJ counts all the grades given to all the candidates by
all the voters equally in order to fine the absolute
majority winner, the one with the highest median-grade.
The grade of Reject given both to A and B by the 3
citizens who only preferred E simply caused a new
highest median-grade to exist. The new median-grade for
A became Bottom (Reject) while B's became 2nd
preference.<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN">S: IBIFA also prompts dishonest voting
(tactical voting) because it gives more weight to a
Top-rating than a Middle-rating. </span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
C: I've already explained, and gave an example, that MJ
has a much stronger truncation incentive than does
IBIFA.<br>
<br>
S:: As far as I can see, truncation is not a problem for
MJ. <span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>It
automatically counts a grade of Reject for each
candidate not explicitly give one of its other grades by
a citizen: Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, or
Poor.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>This both
gives the count as much relevant information as possible
and makes it as easy as possible for each citizen to
vote.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>In your
view, please explain the nature of the problem that<span
style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>truncation can
sometimes pose. </span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
C: Imagine how happy the A>B voters are that MJ
doesn't "give more weight to higher preferences than
lower preferences" and ensures that "whenever possible,
the single-winner in an election will have received at
least 50% plus one of all the citizens’ votes cast."</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:12.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN"><br>
S: Please again note that 49 of the IBIFA voter are
"happy" with their winner, while 51 of the MJ voters
would be happy with their winner.<span
style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span> Again, how do you
justify IBIFA’s needlessly giving fewer citizen
satisfaction with the result of the election?</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">C: MJ elects B. Obviously MJ punished the
A>B voters ….</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">S: I think you already know that to "punish"
means to treat someone differently while MJ treats every
grade given by every citizen in exactly the same way.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">[….]</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:12.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN">C: I think you'll find that Balinski’s
claim that MJ is so wonderful at resisting tactical
voting is mainly based on the comparison with Average
Rating (now aka Score Voting) which gives voters a very
strong incentive to just submit approval ballots (i.e.
only use the top and bottom grades).</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">C: MJ just gives voters a weaker (but still
quite strong) incentive to do that.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"><br>
S: Please study Balinski's reasons for concluding that
MJ reduces both the incentives and opportunities for
successful dishonest voting by almost "half" (Majority
Judgment, </span><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:
Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin"> pp. 14, 15,
19, 187-198, 374</span><span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN">). Also, I think you can already see that
IBIFA's promise to give Top-rating more weight than
Middle-ratings creates an incentive to give their first
preference candidate a Top-rating, even if they would
have honestly graded that candidate as only Acceptable
if using MJ rather than IBIAF for that elections.<span
style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span><span
style="mso-spacerun:yes"> </span>Also, IBIFA gives
more of an incentive dishonestly to Bottom all of their
less preferred candidates.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">
</span>With MJ you cannot give any extra help to the
candidate you most favor, no matter which grade you give
them provide it is one of the grades above that
candidate's median-grade. Nor can you give extra damage
to the candidate who do not want to win provided you
award them a grade lower than his median-grade.</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN"></span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
normal;background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
"Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
lang="EN">[….]</span></p>
<p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
11pt;margin-bottom:12.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN" lang="EN"><br>
Chris Benham</span></p>
<span
style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:107%;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
New Roman";
mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
EN;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
lang="EN">Steve</span><br>
</span></div>
<div style="color:rgb(0,0,0);
font-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:14pt"> <span></span></div>
<div>
<div style="color:rgb(0,0,0);
font-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:14pt"> <br>
</div>
<hr tabindex="-1" style="display:inline-block; width:98%">
<div id="divRplyFwdMsg" dir="ltr"><font style="font-size:11pt"
face="Calibri, sans-serif" color="#000000"><b>From:</b>
C.Benham <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" moz-do-not-send="true"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a><br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, June 12, 2019 2:40 AM<br>
<b>To:</b> steve bosworth; <a
class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" moz-do-not-send="true">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>;
EM list<br>
<b>Cc:</b> John M<br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: Best Single-Winner Method-IBIFA vs. MJ</font>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div style="background-color:#FFFFFF">
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px"> <br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="x_moz-cite-prefix">
<blockquote type="cite">46: A<br>
03: A>B<br>
25: C>B<br>
23: D>B<br>
<br>
97 ballots (majority threshold = 48)<br>
<br>
(If you want MJ-style multi-slot ratings ballots,
assume that all the voters have given their favourite
the highest possible<br>
rating and those that rated B above bottom all gave B
the same middle rating and that truncating here
signifies giving the<br>
lowest possible rating).<br>
<br>
MJ and Bucklin both rightly elect A. IBIFA and IRV
also elect A. A is the Condorcet winner: A>B 49-48,
A>C 49-25, A>D 49-23,<br>
A>E 49>0.<br>
<br>
A is the most Top-rated candidate: A49, C25, D23,
B0, E0.<br>
<br>
So suppose the votes are counted and it is announced
that A has won, but just before this is officially and
irrevocably confirmed<br>
someone pipes up, "Hang on a minute, we found a few more
ballots!" (Maybe they are late-arriving postal votes
that had been<br>
thought lost.) <br>
<br>
These 3 new ballots are inspected and found that all
they do is give the highest possible rating to E, a
candidate with no support<br>
on any of the other 97 ballots. What do we do now?
Laugh and carry on with confirming A as still the
winner? No.<br>
<br>
46: A<br>
03: A>B<br>
25: C>B<br>
23: D>B<br>
03: E<br>
<br>
100 ballots (majority threshold = 51)<br>
<br>
Now MJ and Bucklin and any other Median Ratings method
elects B. All methods that I find acceptable elect A
both with<br>
and without those 3E ballots. </blockquote>
<br>
Steve,<br>
<br>
On 12/06/2019 6:34 am, steve bosworth wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span><span style="">Your concept
of “irrelevant ballots” seems to be central to your
IBIFA method of counting.<span style=""> </span>Do
you also see this concept as conflicting with my own
assumption that in a workable and ideal democracy,
each citizen’s vote would count equally –
one-person-one-vote?</span></span></blockquote>
<br>
Of course not. But "count" only has some positive
sensible meaning if we are talking about counting towards
a result that the voter prefers <br>
(as expressed on the voter's ballot) over what would have
resulted if the voter had stayed home.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span><span style=""><span
style=""></span>No citizen’s vote would be
needlessly wasted either quantitatively or
qualitatively.</span></span></blockquote>
Refreshing our memories on what you mean by that:<br>
<blockquote type="cite">I see a citizen’s vote as being
wasted quantitatively to the degree that it fails
equally to help one of their most trusted candidates to
win. A citizen’s vote is wasted qualitatively to the
degree that it instead helps to elect a candidate whom
they judge less fit for office, rather than an available
candidate judged to be more fit. </blockquote>
<br>
If we cross out "most trusted" and replace it with
'preferred (for whatever reason)', that is fine.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span><span style=""><span
style=""></span>This also means that whenever
possible, the single-winner in an election will have
received at least 50% plus one of all the citizens’
votes cast.</span></span></blockquote>
<br>
No it doesn't. Why doesn't it mean that the winner should
preferably come from the Smith set (be the Condorcet
winner or come from the smallest<br>
set S of candidates that pairwise beat all the outside-S
candidates)?<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span>In contrast to MJ, the
trouble in my view with IBIFA is that it gives more
weight to higher preferences than lower preferences,
e.g. a citizen’s Top-rated vote for a candidate is
given more weight than a citizen’s Middle-rated vote
for a different candidate.</span></blockquote>
<br>
Yes, I can imagine the voters would hate that.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span><span style=""></span>This
leads to the demeaning identification of some citizens
votes as being “irrelevant”. </span></blockquote>
<br>
</div>
<div class="x_moz-cite-prefix">MJ brilliantly avoids that by
"counting" those ballots so that they cause the winner to
change from A (perhaps a Condorcet winner) to B,<br>
when those ballots express indifference between A and B.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span>It also prompts dishonest
voting (tactical voting) because a Top-rating counts
more than a Middle-rating when using IBIFA. </span></blockquote>
<br>
I've already explained, and gave an example, that MJ has a
much stronger truncation incentive than does IBIFA.<br>
<br>
45: A>B<br>
30: B<br>
25: C<br>
<br>
IBIFA elects A (the CW: A>B 45-30, A>C 45-25).
<br>
<br>
Imagine how happy the A>B voters are that MJ doesn't "<span>give
more weight to higher preferences than lower
preferences" and<br>
ensures </span><span><span><span style="">that
"whenever possible, the single-winner in an election
will have received at least 50% plus one of all the
citizens’ votes cast."<br>
<br>
MJ elects B. Obviously MJ punished the A>B
voters for not "dishonestly" simply voting A, and
IBIFA didn't.<br>
<br>
IBIFA is much more Condorcet-ish than MJ. In the
example no Condorcet method would punish those
A>B voters like MJ does.<br>
<br>
That is one of the reasons that "some people" </span></span></span><span><span><span
style=""><span>continue to propose the "less than
satisfactory Condorcet methods."<br>
<br>
I think you'll find that the Balinski claim that
MJ is so wonderful at resisting tactical voting is
mainly based on the comparison with<br>
Average Rating (now aka Score Voting) which gives
voters a very strong incentive to just submit
approval ballots (i.e. only use the<br>
top and bottom grades).<br>
<br>
MJ just gives voters a weaker (but still quite
strong) incentive to do that. I would say that in
general the best Condorcet<br>
methods plus IRV plus IBIFA are all somewhat
better than MJ at not penalising voters for voting
sincerely.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</span></span></span></span></div>
<div class="x_moz-cite-prefix"><span><span><span style=""></span></span></span><br>
<br>
<br>
On 12/06/2019 6:34 am, steve bosworth wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div style="color:rgb(0,0,0);
font-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;
font-size:14pt"> <span>
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
font-size:11pt"> </p>
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
font-size:11pt"> <span style="">Hi Chris,</span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
font-size:11pt"> <span style="">Your concept of
“irrelevant ballots” seems to be central to your
IBIFA method of counting.<span style=""> </span>Do
you also see this concept as conflicting with my
own assumption that in a workable and ideal
democracy, each citizen’s vote would count equally
– one-person-one-vote?<span style=""> </span>No
citizen’s vote would be needlessly wasted either
quantitatively or qualitatively. <span style=""> </span>This
also means that whenever possible, the
single-winner in an election will have received at
least 50% plus one of all the citizens’ votes
cast.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
font-size:11pt"> <span style="">If we do disagree,
how to you justify IBIFA’s violations of the above
democratic principles, especially when MJ provides
a simpler and more meaningful method which
guarantees that its elections conform to the above
democratic principles?</span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
font-size:11pt"> In contrast to MJ, the trouble in
my view with IBIFA is that it gives more weight to
higher preferences than lower preferences, e.g. a
citizen’s Top-rated vote for a candidate is given
more weight than a citizen’s Middle-rated vote for a
different candidate. <span style=""> </span>This
leads to the demeaning identification of some
citizens votes as being “irrelevant”. It also
prompts dishonest voting (tactical voting) because a
Top-rating counts more than a Middle-rating when
using IBIFA. </p>
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
font-size:11pt"> <span style="font-size:12.0pt">In
contrast to IBIFA, please n</span><span style="">ote
that MJ gives the same weight to each of the
different grades that might be given to the its
winner. Only one of the grades given by a voter
can be added to the total which defines the
winner’s majority.<span style=""> </span>An
Excellent only has the priority of being looked
for first.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
font-size:11pt"> <span style="">What do you think
of the following possible explanation of how you
have been needlessly lead to adopt your idea of
“irrelevant ballots”.<span style=""> </span></span>As
I see it, perhaps this flaw in IBIFA stems from a
Condorcet habit of minds which mistakenly assumes
that the primary electoral concern is to find the
candidate who is preferred, head to head, over each
of the other candidates.<span style=""> </span>The
voter is only to focus on comparing and ranking the
particular candidates in the race.<span style=""> </span>These
comparisons and rankings presumably proceed upon the
qualities intuitively identified by the voter as
needed for an ideal candidate for the office being
sought.<span style=""> </span>Alternatively, it
would proceed most rationally after the voter
analyzes and clarifies the hierarchy of such ideal
qualities. </p>
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
font-size:11pt"> In contrast, Balinski suggests that
each candidate should, in the light of these
qualities, be given one of the 6 grades regarding
their suitability for office (Excellent, Very Good,
Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject).<span style="">
</span>However, a follower of Condorcet does not
grade the candidates but simply proceeds to ranking
them.<span style=""> </span>Next he uses a
Condorcet method to see if a Condorcet winner
exists.<span style=""> </span>However, this is
less than satisfactory because we all know that each
Condorcet method sometimes fails to find such a
winner, let alone a winner who has received an
absolute majority of the preferences.</p>
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
font-size:11pt"> Given that MJ guarantees the
election of the candidate who is judged to be most
fit for the office by an absolute majority of the
grades given to this winner, (i.e. grades equal to
or higher than the highest median-grade given to any
of the candidate), why does anyone continues to
propose the less than satisfactory Condorcet
methods?</p>
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
font-size:11pt"> <span style="">Finally, you have
also said that you do not understand MJ's
procedure for breaking ties. <span style=""> </span><span
style=""> </span>Please let me try to clarify
this again:</span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
font-size:11pt; margin-bottom:19.5pt;
line-height:normal; background:white"> <span
style="font-size:12.0pt">In a single-office
election, the Majority Judgment (MJ) winner is the
one who has received grades from an absolute
majority of all the voters that are equal to, or
higher than, the highest <i>median-grade</i>
given to any candidate. This median-grade is found
as follows:</span></p>
<ul style="margin-bottom:0in">
<li><span style="">Place all the grades, high to
low, top to bottom, in side-by-side columns, the
name of each candidate at the top of each of
these columns.</span></li>
<li><span style="">The median-grade for each
candidate is the grade located half way down
each column, i.e. in the middle if there is an
odd number of voters, the lower middle if the
number is even.</span><br>
<br>
<span style="font-size:12.0pt; line-height:115%">If
more than one candidate has the same highest
median-grade, the MJ winner is discovered by
temporarily removing (one-by-one) any grades
equal in value to the current highest median
grade from each tied candidate’s total until
only one of the previously tied candidates
currently has the highest remaining
median-grade.</span><br>
<br>
What do you think?<span style=""> </span>What
telling criticism of MJ can be made?<br>
<br>
<span style="">I look forward to the next step in
our dialogue.</span><br>
<br>
<span style="">Steve</span></li>
</ul>
<br>
</span></div>
</blockquote>
<div id="x_DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2"><br>
<table style="border-top:1px solid #D3D4DE">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td style="width:55px; padding-top:13px"><br>
</td>
<td style="width:470px; padding-top:12px;
color:#41424e; font-size:13px;
font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;
line-height:18px"><br>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</body>
</html>