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      <p>Steve,<br>
        <br>
      </p>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 14/06/2019 6:18 am, steve bosworth
        wrote:<br>
        <br>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%; font-family:
            "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
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            normal;background:white"><span
              style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
              "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
              lang="EN">S: By saying, "of course not", I understanding
              that you instead mean that your concept of an ideal
              democracy only guarantees that the winner will be support
              by a plurality of voting citizens who Top-rated them, I.e.
              like FPTP in this respect.  Correct me if I'm mistaken.</span></p>
          <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%; font-family:
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              lang="EN"><br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
            </span></p>
        </blockquote>
      </div>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
        C: You asked me a simple yes-no question and I answered it.  If
        you are not sincerely very stupid, please stop pretending to be.<br>
        <br>
        <blockquote type="cite">
          <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%; font-family:
            "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
            11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
            normal;background:white"><span
              style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
              "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
              lang="EN">S:  What other appropriate reason can a citizen
              have for supporting a candidate to win other than they
              "trust" them to represent their own scale of political
              values and concerns?</span></p>
          <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%; font-family:
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              lang="EN"></span></p>
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            "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
            11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
            white"> <span
              style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
              New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
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            </span></p>
        </blockquote>
        C: That is entirely their business.<br>
        <br>
        <blockquote type="cite"><span>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN">C:  MJ elects B.  Obviously MJ punished the
                A>B voters ….</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN">S: I think you already know that to "punish"
                means to treat someone differently while MJ treats every
                grade given by every citizen in exactly the same way.</span></p>
          </span></blockquote>
        <br>
        C: To "punish" a subset of voters in this context means to give
        them cause to regret the way they voted. How do you justify not
        attempting to minimise<br>
         the proportion of voters in that category, while pretending to
        be in favour of minimising "opportunities for tactical voting" 
        (as I think you put it).<br>
        <br>
        To the extent that you give voters incentive to vote insincerely
        you tend to have a "garbage in, garbage out" problem.<br>
        <br>
        <blockquote type="cite"><span><span
              style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
              "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
              lang="EN">S:  Please study Balinski's reasons for
              concluding ...<br>
            </span></span></blockquote>
      </div>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
      </div>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix">C: No thanks, I'm not interested in
        joining your Bible-study group.<br>
      </div>
      <div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
        <blockquote type="cite"><span><span
              style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
              New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
              EN" lang="EN"> S: Also, I think you can already see that
              IBIFA's promise to give Top-rating more weight than
              Middle-ratings creates an incentive to give their first
              preference candidate a Top-rating..</span></span></blockquote>
        <br>
        C: Shock! Horror!   MJ and also all sane methods that use
        ratings ballots (except those that use them only to infer
        ranking and perhaps also approval)<br>
        have the same incentive.  Generally speaking the incentive the
        to give a one's favourite a top-rating (or to rank no lower than
        equal-first) is not regarded as a <br>
        problem in single-winner methods that we should be concerned
        about.  (Why on earth do you think it does? Obviously there can
        only be "no incentive" <br>
        if it can't make a difference whether they do or not.)<br>
        <br>
        Rather what is of greater concern is the incentive in most
        methods for the voter to *not* do that. Fortunately neither
        IBIFA or MJ (or Relevant Ratings or Approval)<br>
        have that problem.<br>
        <br>
        <blockquote type="cite"><span><span
              style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
              New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
              EN" lang="EN"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">S: </span>Also,
              IBIFA gives more of an incentive dishonestly to Bottom all
              of their less preferred candidates.<span
                style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span></span></span></blockquote>
        <br>
        C: No it doesn't, as illustrated by the example in my last post.
        <br>
        <br>
        45: A>B<br>
        30: B<br>
        25: C<br>
        <br>
        IBIFA elects  A  (the CW:   A>B 45-30,   A>C 45-25). <br>
        <br>
        IBIFA (like all Condorcet methods and IRV) elects A whether or
        not the A supporters "dishonestly Bottom all their less
        preferred candidates" <br>
        but MJ (and all other versions of Median Ratings, such as
        Bucklin) only elects A if they do just that.  <br>
        <br>
        I look forward to seeing your counter-example.<br>
        <br>
        Chris Benham<br>
        <br>
      </div>
      <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:AM6PR06MB47245BD90D6ED3F16B23A59BB6EF0@AM6PR06MB4724.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com">
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            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
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              normal"> <b><span
                  style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                  New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;color:black;
                  mso-ansi-language:EN" lang="EN">Hi Chris,</span></b></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
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              normal"> <b><span
                  style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                  New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;color:black;
                  mso-ansi-language:EN" lang="EN">I'll respond inline
                  below. I look forward to our next exchange.</span></b></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
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              normal"> <b>Steve</b></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
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              normal"> <b><span
                  style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                  New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;color:black;
                  mso-ansi-language:EN" lang="EN"><br>
                </span></b></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
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              normal"> <b><span
                  style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                  New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;color:black;
                  mso-ansi-language:EN" lang="EN">From:</span></b><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;
                mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New
                Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;
mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;color:black;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"> C.Benham <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
                  href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"
                  moz-do-not-send="true"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a><br>
                <b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, June 12, 2019 2:40 AM<br>
                <b>To:</b> steve bosworth; <a
                  class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
                  href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"
                  moz-do-not-send="true">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>; EM
                list<br>
                <b>Cc:</b> John M<br>
                <b>Subject:</b> Re: Best Single-Winner Method-IBIFA vs.
                MJ</span><span
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              </span></p>
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                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN"> </span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
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                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN">Chris Benham wrote:</span></p>
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mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN">46: A<br>
                03: A>B<br>
                25: C>B<br>
                23: D>B<br>
                <br>
                97 ballots  (majority threshold = 48)<br>
                <br>
                (If  you want MJ-style  multi-slot ratings ballots,
                assume that all the voters have given their favourite
                the highest possible<br>
                rating and those that rated B above bottom all gave B
                the same middle rating and that truncating here
                signifies giving the<br>
                lowest possible rating).<br>
                <br>
                MJ and Bucklin  both rightly elect A.   IBIFA  and IRV
                also elect A.  A is the Condorcet winner: A>B 49-48,
                A>C 49-25, A>D 49-23,<br>
                A>E 49>0.<br>
                <br>
                A is the most Top-rated candidate:  A49,  C25,  D23, 
                B0, E0.<br>
                <br>
                So suppose the votes are counted and it is announced
                that A has won, but just before this is officially and
                irrevocably confirmed<br>
                someone pipes up, "Hang on a minute, we found a few more
                ballots!"  (Maybe they are late-arriving postal votes
                that had been<br>
                thought lost.)   <br>
                <br>
                These 3 new ballots are inspected and found that all
                they do is give the highest possible rating to E, a
                candidate with no support<br>
                on any of the other 97 ballots. What do we do now? 
                Laugh and carry on with confirming A as still the
                winner?  No.<br>
                <br>
                46: A<br>
                03: A>B<br>
                25: C>B<br>
                23: D>B<br>
                03: E<br>
                <br>
                100 ballots  (majority threshold = 51)<br>
                <br>
                Now MJ  and Bucklin and any other Median Ratings method
                elects B.  All methods that I find acceptable elect A
                both with and without those 3E ballots.  </span></p>
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                <br>
                On 12/06/2019 6:34 am, steve bosworth wrote:<br
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                <br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
              </span></p>
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                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN">S: Your concept of “irrelevant ballots” seems
                to be central to your IBIFA method of counting.  Do you
                also see this concept as conflicting with my own
                assumption that in a workable and ideal democracy, each
                citizen’s vote would count equally –
                one-person-one-vote?</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
              white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN">C:  Of course not.  ….</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"><br>
                S: Please remember that my claim is that "in a workable
                and ideal democracy, [MJ makes it possible for] each
                citizen’s vote [to] count equally – one-person-one-vote.
                 <span style="color:black;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;
                  mso-border-alt:none windowtext 0in;padding:0in"> No
                  citizen’s vote would be needlessly wasted either
                  quantitatively or qualitatively.  This also means that
                  the…  single-winner in an election will have received
                  at least 50% plus one of all the citizens’ votes
                  cast.".</span></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"><br>
                S: By saying, "of course not", I understanding that you
                instead mean that your concept of an ideal democracy
                only guarantees that the winner will be support by a
                plurality of voting citizens who Top-rated them, I.e.
                like FPTP in this respect.  Correct me if I'm mistaken.</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"><br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
                <br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
              </span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN">S:  In any case, the plain fact is the MJ
                guarantees all the above benefits while IBIFA does not.</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"><br>
                C:  …. But "count" only has some positive sensible
                meaning if we are talking about counting towards a
                result that the voter prefers (as expressed on the
                voter's ballot) over what would have resulted if the
                voter had stayed home.</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"><br>
                S:  It seems to me that we can only reliably talk about
                the recorded votes that citizens have actually made. The
                citizens who could or would have stayed at home are
                unknowable.  We only know who in fact voted and those
                citizens who did not vote. Of course, the results of any
                particular election would be different in almost any way
                we might choose by hypothetically removing any key votes
                relevant to our purpose.</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"><br>
                S:  In your above example, the 3 citizens who voted for
                E also Bottomed (Rejected) all the other candidates. 
                Why do you think that the 51 citizens who gave B their
                2nd preference (and who thereby would elect B by an
                absolute majority (if MJ were used) are a less important
                than the group of 49 citizens who gave their 1st
                preference to A?<br>
                <br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
                <br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
              </span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
              white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN">S: No citizen’s vote would be needlessly
                wasted either quantitatively or qualitatively.</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"> C: Refreshing our memories on what you mean
                by that:<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
                <br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
              </span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
              white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN">S:<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>I
                see a citizen’s vote as being wasted quantitatively to
                the degree when it fails equally to help one of their
                most trusted candidates to win. A citizen’s vote is
                wasted qualitatively to the degree that it instead helps
                to elect a candidate whom they judge less fit for
                office, rather than an available candidate judged to be
                more fit. </span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"><br>
                C: If we cross out "most trusted" and replace it with
                'preferred (for whatever reason)', that is fine.</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"><br>
                S:  What other appropriate reason can a citizen have for
                supporting a candidate to win other than they "trust"
                them to represent their own scale of political values
                and concerns?</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
              white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN"><br>
                S: This also means that whenever possible, the
                single-winner in an election will have received at least
                50% plus one of all the citizens’ votes cast.</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"><br>
                C:  No it doesn't.  Why doesn't it mean that the winner
                should preferably come from the Smith set (be the
                Condorcet winner or come from the smallest set S of
                candidates that pairwise beat all the outside-S
                candidates)?</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"><br>
                S:  The discovery of MJ means that it is always possible
                for the winner to have this majority, and that is
                currently a necessary element in my concept of "workable
                and ideal democracy".  It is because the candidate from
                the "Smith set", etc. may still not be supported by such
                a majority that they are less attractive winner than one
                who this majority support.<br>
                <br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
                <br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
              </span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
              white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN">S:  In contrast to MJ, the trouble in my
                view with IBIFA is that it gives more weight to higher
                preferences than lower preferences, e.g. a citizen’s
                Top-rated vote for a candidate is given more weight than
                a citizen’s Middle-rated vote for a different candidate.</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"><br>
                C:  Yes, I can imagine the voters would hate that.<br>
                <br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
                <br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
              </span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
              white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN">S:  This leads to the demeaning
                identification of some citizens votes as being
                “irrelevant”. </span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN">C:  MJ brilliantly avoids that by "counting"
                those ballots so that they cause the winner to change
                from A (perhaps a Condorcet winner) to B, when those
                ballots express indifference between A and B.</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
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                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
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                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
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                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
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                lang="EN"><br>
                S: Contrary to what you may be implying, MJ does not
                count "those ballots [intending] to change" the winner. 
                MJ counts all the grades given to all the candidates by
                all the voters equally in order to fine the absolute
                majority winner, the one with the highest median-grade. 
                The grade of Reject given both to A and B by the 3
                citizens who only preferred E simply  caused a new
                highest median-grade to exist.  The new median-grade for
                A became Bottom (Reject) while B's became 2nd
                preference.<br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
                <br style="mso-special-character:line-break">
              </span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
              white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN">S:  IBIFA also prompts dishonest voting
                (tactical voting) because it gives more weight to a
                Top-rating than a Middle-rating. </span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
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              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"><br>
                C:  I've already explained, and gave an example, that MJ
                has a much stronger truncation incentive than does
                IBIFA.<br>
                <br>
                S:: As far as I can see, truncation is not a problem for
                MJ. <span style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>It
                automatically counts a grade of Reject for each
                candidate not explicitly give one of its other grades by
                a citizen:  Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, or
                Poor.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>This both
                gives the count as much relevant information as possible
                and makes it as easy as possible for each citizen to
                vote.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>In your
                view, please explain the nature of the problem that<span
                  style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>truncation can
                sometimes pose. </span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
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              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
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                lang="EN"><br>
                C:  Imagine how happy the A>B voters are that MJ
                doesn't "give more weight to higher preferences than
                lower preferences" and ensures that "whenever possible,
                the single-winner in an election will have received at
                least 50% plus one of all the citizens’ votes cast."</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:12.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
              white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN"><br>
                S: Please again note that 49 of the IBIFA voter are
                "happy" with their winner, while 51 of the MJ voters
                would be happy with their winner.<span
                  style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span> Again, how do you
                justify IBIFA’s needlessly giving fewer citizen
                satisfaction with the result of the election?</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN">C:  MJ elects B.  Obviously MJ punished the
                A>B voters ….</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN">S: I think you already know that to "punish"
                means to treat someone differently while MJ treats every
                grade given by every citizen in exactly the same way.</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
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              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN">[….]</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:12.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
              white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN">C: I think you'll find that Balinski’s
                claim that MJ is so wonderful at resisting tactical
                voting is mainly based on the comparison with Average
                Rating (now aka Score Voting) which gives voters a very
                strong incentive to just submit approval ballots (i.e.
                only use the top and bottom grades).</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN">C:  MJ just gives voters a weaker (but still
                quite strong) incentive to do that.</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
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                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
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                lang="EN"><br>
                S:  Please study Balinski's reasons for concluding that
                MJ reduces both the incentives and opportunities for
                successful dishonest voting by almost "half" (Majority
                Judgment, </span><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                New Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:
                Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin"> pp. 14, 15,
                19, 187-198, 374</span><span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN">).  Also, I think you can already see that
                IBIFA's promise to give Top-rating more weight than
                Middle-ratings creates an incentive to give their first
                preference candidate a Top-rating, even if they would
                have honestly graded that candidate as only Acceptable
                if using MJ rather than IBIAF for that elections.<span
                  style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span><span
                  style="mso-spacerun:yes">  </span>Also, IBIFA gives
                more of an incentive dishonestly to Bottom all of their
                less preferred candidates.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">   
                </span>With MJ you cannot give any extra help to the
                candidate you most favor, no matter which grade you give
                them provide it is one of the grades above that
                candidate's median-grade.  Nor can you give extra damage
                to the candidate who do not want to win provided you
                award them a grade lower than his median-grade.</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
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                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN"></span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:
              normal;background:white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:
                "Times New
Roman";mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:EN"
                lang="EN">[….]</span></p>
            <p style="margin: 0in 0in 8pt; line-height: 107%;
              font-family: "Calibri",sans-serif; font-size:
              11pt;margin-bottom:12.0pt;line-height:normal;background:
              white"> <span
                style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
                New Roman";
mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
                EN" lang="EN"><br>
                Chris Benham</span></p>
            <span
style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:107%;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times
              New Roman";
mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-ansi-language:
              EN;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"
              lang="EN">Steve</span><br>
          </span></div>
        <div style="color:rgb(0,0,0);
          font-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size:14pt"> <span></span></div>
        <div>
          <div style="color:rgb(0,0,0);
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          </div>
          <hr tabindex="-1" style="display:inline-block; width:98%">
          <div id="divRplyFwdMsg" dir="ltr"><font style="font-size:11pt"
              face="Calibri, sans-serif" color="#000000"><b>From:</b>
              C.Benham <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
                href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" moz-do-not-send="true"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a><br>
              <b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, June 12, 2019 2:40 AM<br>
              <b>To:</b> steve bosworth; <a
                class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
                href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" moz-do-not-send="true">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>;
              EM list<br>
              <b>Cc:</b> John M<br>
              <b>Subject:</b> Re: Best Single-Winner Method-IBIFA vs. MJ</font>
            <div> </div>
          </div>
          <div style="background-color:#FFFFFF">
            <p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
              0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px"> <br>
              <br>
            </p>
            <div class="x_moz-cite-prefix">
              <blockquote type="cite">46: A<br>
                03: A>B<br>
                25: C>B<br>
                23: D>B<br>
                <br>
                97 ballots  (majority threshold = 48)<br>
                <br>
                (If  you want MJ-style  multi-slot ratings ballots,
                assume that all the voters have given their favourite
                the highest possible<br>
                rating and those that rated B above bottom all gave B
                the same middle rating and that truncating here
                signifies giving the<br>
                lowest possible rating).<br>
                <br>
                MJ and Bucklin  both rightly elect A.   IBIFA  and IRV
                also elect A.  A is the Condorcet winner: A>B 49-48,
                A>C 49-25, A>D 49-23,<br>
                A>E 49>0.<br>
                <br>
                A is the most Top-rated candidate:  A49,  C25,  D23, 
                B0, E0.<br>
                <br>
                So suppose the votes are counted and it is announced
                that A has won, but just before this is officially and
                irrevocably confirmed<br>
                someone pipes up, "Hang on a minute, we found a few more
                ballots!"  (Maybe they are late-arriving postal votes
                that had been<br>
                thought lost.)   <br>
                <br>
                These 3 new ballots are inspected and found that all
                they do is give the highest possible rating to E, a
                candidate with no support<br>
                on any of the other 97 ballots. What do we do now? 
                Laugh and carry on with confirming A as still the
                winner?  No.<br>
                <br>
                46: A<br>
                03: A>B<br>
                25: C>B<br>
                23: D>B<br>
                03: E<br>
                <br>
                100 ballots  (majority threshold = 51)<br>
                <br>
                Now MJ  and Bucklin and any other Median Ratings method
                elects B.  All methods that I find acceptable elect A
                both with<br>
                and without those 3E ballots.  </blockquote>
              <br>
              Steve,<br>
              <br>
              On 12/06/2019 6:34 am, steve bosworth wrote:<br>
              <blockquote type="cite"><span><span style="">Your concept
                    of “irrelevant ballots” seems to be central to your
                    IBIFA method of counting.<span style="">  </span>Do
                    you also see this concept as conflicting with my own
                    assumption that in a workable and ideal democracy,
                    each citizen’s vote would count equally –
                    one-person-one-vote?</span></span></blockquote>
              <br>
              Of course not.  But "count" only has some positive
              sensible meaning if we are talking about counting towards
              a result that the voter prefers <br>
              (as expressed on the voter's ballot) over what would have
              resulted if the voter had stayed home.<br>
              <br>
              <blockquote type="cite"><span><span style=""><span
                      style=""></span>No citizen’s vote would be
                    needlessly wasted either quantitatively or
                    qualitatively.</span></span></blockquote>
              Refreshing our memories on what you mean by that:<br>
              <blockquote type="cite">I see a citizen’s vote as being
                wasted quantitatively to the degree that it fails
                equally to help one of their most trusted candidates to
                win. A citizen’s vote is wasted qualitatively to the
                degree that it instead helps to elect a candidate whom
                they judge less fit for office, rather than an available
                candidate judged to be more fit. </blockquote>
              <br>
              If we cross out "most trusted" and replace it with
              'preferred (for whatever reason)', that is fine.<br>
              <br>
              <blockquote type="cite"><span><span style=""><span
                      style=""></span>This also means that whenever
                    possible, the single-winner in an election will have
                    received at least 50% plus one of all the citizens’
                    votes cast.</span></span></blockquote>
              <br>
              No it doesn't.  Why doesn't it mean that the winner should
              preferably come from the Smith set (be the Condorcet
              winner or come from the smallest<br>
              set S of candidates that pairwise beat all the outside-S
              candidates)?<br>
              <br>
              <blockquote type="cite"><span>In contrast to MJ, the
                  trouble in my view with IBIFA is that it gives more
                  weight to higher preferences than lower preferences,
                  e.g. a citizen’s Top-rated vote for a candidate is
                  given more weight than a citizen’s Middle-rated vote
                  for a different candidate.</span></blockquote>
              <br>
              Yes, I can imagine the voters would hate that.<br>
              <br>
              <blockquote type="cite"><span><span style=""></span>This
                  leads to the demeaning identification of some citizens
                  votes as being “irrelevant”. </span></blockquote>
              <br>
            </div>
            <div class="x_moz-cite-prefix">MJ brilliantly avoids that by
              "counting" those ballots so that they cause the winner to
              change from A (perhaps a Condorcet winner) to B,<br>
              when those ballots express indifference between A and B.<br>
              <br>
              <blockquote type="cite"><span>It also prompts dishonest
                  voting (tactical voting) because a Top-rating counts
                  more than a Middle-rating when using IBIFA. </span></blockquote>
              <br>
              I've already explained, and gave an example, that MJ has a
              much stronger truncation incentive than does IBIFA.<br>
              <br>
              45: A>B<br>
              30: B<br>
              25: C<br>
              <br>
              IBIFA elects  A  (the CW:  A>B 45-30,  A>C 45-25). 
              <br>
              <br>
              Imagine how happy the A>B voters are that MJ doesn't "<span>give
                more weight to higher preferences than lower
                preferences" and<br>
                ensures </span><span><span><span style="">that
                    "whenever possible, the single-winner in an election
                    will have received at least 50% plus one of all the
                    citizens’ votes cast."<br>
                    <br>
                    MJ elects B.  Obviously MJ punished the A>B
                    voters for not "dishonestly" simply voting A, and
                    IBIFA didn't.<br>
                    <br>
                    IBIFA is much more Condorcet-ish than MJ.  In the
                    example no Condorcet method would punish those
                    A>B voters like MJ does.<br>
                    <br>
                    That is one of the reasons that "some people" </span></span></span><span><span><span
                    style=""><span>continue to propose the "less than
                      satisfactory Condorcet methods."<br>
                      <br>
                      I think you'll find that the Balinski claim that
                      MJ is so wonderful at resisting tactical voting is
                      mainly based on the comparison with<br>
                      Average Rating (now aka Score Voting) which gives
                      voters a very strong incentive to just submit
                      approval ballots (i.e. only use the<br>
                      top and bottom grades).<br>
                      <br>
                      MJ just gives voters a weaker (but still quite
                      strong) incentive to do that.  I would say that in
                      general the best Condorcet<br>
                      methods plus IRV plus IBIFA  are all somewhat
                      better than MJ at not penalising voters for voting
                      sincerely.<br>
                      <br>
                      Chris Benham<br>
                      <br>
                    </span></span></span></span></div>
            <div class="x_moz-cite-prefix"><span><span><span style=""></span></span></span><br>
              <br>
              <br>
              On 12/06/2019 6:34 am, steve bosworth wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote type="cite">
              <div style="color:rgb(0,0,0);
                font-family:Calibri,Helvetica,sans-serif;
                font-size:14pt"> <span>
                  <p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
                    0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
                    0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
                    font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
                    font-size:11pt"> </p>
                  <p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
                    0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
                    0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
                    font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
                    font-size:11pt"> <span style="">Hi Chris,</span></p>
                  <p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
                    0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
                    0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
                    font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
                    font-size:11pt"> <span style="">Your concept of
                      “irrelevant ballots” seems to be central to your
                      IBIFA method of counting.<span style="">  </span>Do
                      you also see this concept as conflicting with my
                      own assumption that in a workable and ideal
                      democracy, each citizen’s vote would count equally
                      – one-person-one-vote?<span style="">  </span>No
                      citizen’s vote would be needlessly wasted either
                      quantitatively or qualitatively. <span style=""> </span>This
                      also means that whenever possible, the
                      single-winner in an election will have received at
                      least 50% plus one of all the citizens’ votes
                      cast.</span></p>
                  <p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
                    0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
                    0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
                    font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
                    font-size:11pt"> <span style="">If we do disagree,
                      how to you justify IBIFA’s violations of the above
                      democratic principles, especially when MJ provides
                      a simpler and more meaningful method which
                      guarantees that its elections conform to the above
                      democratic principles?</span></p>
                  <p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
                    0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
                    0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
                    font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
                    font-size:11pt"> In contrast to MJ, the trouble in
                    my view with IBIFA is that it gives more weight to
                    higher preferences than lower preferences, e.g. a
                    citizen’s Top-rated vote for a candidate is given
                    more weight than a citizen’s Middle-rated vote for a
                    different candidate. <span style=""> </span>This
                    leads to the demeaning identification of some
                    citizens votes as being “irrelevant”. It also
                    prompts dishonest voting (tactical voting) because a
                    Top-rating counts more than a Middle-rating when
                    using IBIFA. </p>
                  <p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
                    0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
                    0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
                    font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
                    font-size:11pt"> <span style="font-size:12.0pt">In
                      contrast to IBIFA, please n</span><span style="">ote
                      that MJ gives the same weight to each of the
                      different grades that might be given to the its
                      winner. Only one of the grades given by a voter
                      can be added to the total which defines the
                      winner’s majority.<span style="">  </span>An
                      Excellent only has the priority of being looked
                      for first.</span></p>
                  <p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
                    0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
                    0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
                    font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
                    font-size:11pt"> <span style="">What do you think
                      of the following possible explanation of how you
                      have been needlessly lead to adopt your idea of
                      “irrelevant ballots”.<span style="">  </span></span>As
                    I see it, perhaps this flaw in IBIFA stems from a
                    Condorcet habit of minds which mistakenly assumes
                    that the primary electoral concern is to find the
                    candidate who is preferred, head to head, over each
                    of the other candidates.<span style="">  </span>The
                    voter is only to focus on comparing and ranking the
                    particular candidates in the race.<span style="">  </span>These
                    comparisons and rankings presumably proceed upon the
                    qualities intuitively identified by the voter as
                    needed for an ideal candidate for the office being
                    sought.<span style="">  </span>Alternatively, it
                    would proceed most rationally after the voter
                    analyzes and clarifies the hierarchy of such ideal
                    qualities. </p>
                  <p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
                    0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
                    0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
                    font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
                    font-size:11pt"> In contrast, Balinski suggests that
                    each candidate should, in the light of these
                    qualities, be given one of the 6 grades regarding
                    their suitability for office (Excellent, Very Good,
                    Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject).<span style=""> 
                    </span>However, a follower of Condorcet does not
                    grade the candidates but simply proceeds to ranking
                    them.<span style="">  </span>Next he uses a
                    Condorcet method to see if a Condorcet winner
                    exists.<span style="">  </span>However, this is
                    less than satisfactory because we all know that each
                    Condorcet method sometimes fails to find such a
                    winner, let alone a winner who has received an
                    absolute majority of the preferences.</p>
                  <p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
                    0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
                    0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
                    font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
                    font-size:11pt"> Given that MJ guarantees the
                    election of the candidate who is judged to be most
                    fit for the office by an absolute majority of the
                    grades given to this winner, (i.e. grades equal to
                    or higher than the highest median-grade given to any
                    of the candidate), why does anyone continues to
                    propose the less than satisfactory Condorcet
                    methods?</p>
                  <p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
                    0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
                    0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
                    font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
                    font-size:11pt"> <span style="">Finally, you have
                      also said that you do not understand MJ's
                      procedure for breaking ties. <span style=""> </span><span
                        style=""> </span>Please let me try to clarify
                      this again:</span></p>
                  <p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
                    0px;margin-top:0px; margin-bottom:0px; margin:0in
                    0in 10pt; line-height:115%;
                    font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;
                    font-size:11pt; margin-bottom:19.5pt;
                    line-height:normal; background:white"> <span
                      style="font-size:12.0pt">In a single-office
                      election, the Majority Judgment (MJ) winner is the
                      one who has received grades from an absolute
                      majority of all the voters that are equal to, or
                      higher than, the highest <i>median-grade</i>
                      given to any candidate. This median-grade is found
                      as follows:</span></p>
                  <ul style="margin-bottom:0in">
                    <li><span style="">Place all the grades, high to
                        low, top to bottom, in side-by-side columns, the
                        name of each candidate at the top of each of
                        these columns.</span></li>
                    <li><span style="">The median-grade for each
                        candidate is the grade located half way down
                        each column, i.e. in the middle if there is an
                        odd number of voters, the lower middle if the
                        number is even.</span><br>
                      <br>
                      <span style="font-size:12.0pt; line-height:115%">If
                        more than one candidate has the same highest
                        median-grade, the MJ winner is discovered by
                        temporarily removing (one-by-one) any grades
                        equal in value to the current highest median
                        grade from each tied candidate’s total until
                        only one of the previously tied candidates
                        currently has the highest remaining
                        median-grade.</span><br>
                      <br>
                      What do you think?<span style="">  </span>What
                      telling criticism of MJ can be made?<br>
                      <br>
                      <span style="">I look forward to the next step in
                        our dialogue.</span><br>
                      <br>
                      <span style="">Steve</span></li>
                  </ul>
                  <br>
                </span></div>
            </blockquote>
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