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<p>Kevin,<br>
<br>
When I wrote my last message I was probably under-estimating the
chance of the burial strategy<br>
succeeding even when all those who prefer the target candidate to
the buriers' candidate place<br>
their approval cutoffs between them. So I only had in mind the
scenario where two big factions<br>
both use (rank but not approve) the same presumed sure loser to
bury against each other.<br>
<br>
You didn't address my question as how big you think that fraction
should be. Forest suggested it<br>
should only be 1/2.<br>
<br>
I still think that the chance that burial strategy will either
succeed or disastrously backfire is very<br>
small. My idea is to have the runoff triggered only in very bad
situations which might otherwise<br>
have people calling for the method to be scrapped, so that buriers
don't often have an easy option<br>
to repair the damage caused by their strategy backfiring.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><span style="font-size: medium;"> If the
voted CW turns out to not be your candidate, you would have
had a second chance at the win by voting instead to deny CW
status to that candidate.</span></blockquote>
<br>
Only if the voted CW is less than half as approved as the AW and
only if the AW is your candidate, plus you have the "penalty" of
having to vote again.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/06/2019 10:00 am, Kevin Venzke
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:1613942517.2737016.1560299416374@mail.yahoo.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div class="ydp6c183f3eyahoo-style-wrap"
style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial,
sans-serif;font-size:16px;">
<div>Hi Chris,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div id="ydp7d1d2e83yahoo_quoted_0606643543"
class="ydp7d1d2e83yahoo_quoted">
<div style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial,
sans-serif; color: rgb(38, 40, 42);">
<div style="font-size: 13px;"> Le dimanche 9 juin 2019 à
21:20:34 UTC−5, C.Benham <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a> a écrit
: </div>
<div style="font-size: 13px;">>Kevin,</div>
<div style="font-size: 13px;">></div>
<div style="font-size: 13px;">>So to be clear the possible
"complaint" some voters might have (and you think we should
take seriously) is "We lied </div>
<div style="font-size: 13px;">>and the voting method</div>
<div style="font-size: 13px;">>(instead of somehow reading
our minds) believed us".</div>
<div style="">
<div id="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953" style="">
<div style="">
<div style=""><font size="3">A burial strategy has two
scenarios that could give rise to a complaint. One
is where burial succeeds. In that case the voters
who complain aren't the ones who buried. The other
scenario is where burial backfires. In that case it
is, I guess, possible that actually *all* voters
were using burial. So you may argue that they don't
have a valid complaint. But implicit to my concerns
is the premise that the voters are behaving
rationally under the incentives of the method. If a
method produces arbitrary results given rational
voters then it will be hard to retain it. I think if
it happens even once it will be a problem.</font></div>
<div style="font-size: 13px;"><br>
</div>
<span style="font-size: 13px;"> ></span><br
clear="none">
<div style="font-size: 13px;">>So therefore it is
good to have a less expressive ballot because that
reduces the voter's opportunities to tell stupid </div>
<div style="font-size: 13px;">>lies and if the method</div>
<div style="font-size: 13px;">>is simple enough then
maybe also the temptation for them to do so.</div>
<div style="font-size: 13px;"><br>
</div>
<div style=""><font size="3">You're making it sound as
though a simpler ballot just tricks people into not
lying. Expressiveness isn't the point. The reason
three-slot C//A (or implicit etc.) deters burial is
that there is far more risk in trying it. It is
highly likely to backfire no matter what other
voters do. "Low expressiveness" of the ballot
doesn't guarantee this and isn't a prerequisite for
it either.</font></div>
<div><span style="font-size: 13px;"><br>
</span></div>
<span style="font-size: 13px;"> ></span><br
clear="none">
<div style="font-size: 13px;">>But I've thought of a
patch to address your issue. We could have a rule
which says that if the winner's approval </div>
<div style="font-size: 13px;">>score is below some
fixed </div>
<div style="font-size: 13px;">>fraction of that of
the most approved candidate, then a second-round
runoff is triggered between those two </div>
<div style="font-size: 13px;">>candidates. What do
you</div>
<div><span style="font-size: 13px;">>think of that?
What do you think that fraction should be?</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size: 13px;"><br>
</span></div>
<div><font size="3">I think there is some confusion here
between what my issue is, and the voter complaints
you asked about. While I think voters will be
unhappy with a ruined election, ruining it is what
reduces the burial incentive. If the risk outweighs
the benefit then people won't do it. (That's an
assumption.) This patch seems to remove the risk
while leaving the benefit unchanged. </font><span
style="font-size: medium;">Burial will ultimately do
nothing, except to sometimes move the win from the
CW to the AW. But that makes the potential gain even
clearer: If the voted CW turns out to not be your
candidate, you would have had a second chance at the
win by voting instead to deny CW status to that
candidate. If the voted CW *is* your candidate, then
you're no worse off for using burial.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size: medium;"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size: medium;">Kevin</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div>
<br clear="none">
<div class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953yqt1633905774"
id="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953yqt46183"
style="font-size: 13px;">
<div class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953moz-cite-prefix">On
10/06/2019 9:57 am, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br
clear="none">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"> </blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953yqt1633905774"
id="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953yqt09108" style="font-size:
13px;">
<div>
<div
class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydp8f615ceyahoo-style-wrap"
style="font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial,
sans-serif;font-size:16px;">
<div>Hi Chris,</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<blockquote type="cite"
style="margin:0px;padding:8px;color:rgb(38,
40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue,
Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">>>I
don't think it's ideal if burying X under Y
(both disapproved) can only backfire when Y
is made the CW.
<div>>></div>
</blockquote>
<span style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;">>Why is that? </span></div>
<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;"><br clear="none">
</span></div>
<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;">Because I think if
voters decide to attempt to prevent another
candidate from being CW, via insincerity,
there should be risks to doing that. Of
course there is already some risk. But if
you "knew" that a given candidate had no
chance of being CW then there would be
nothing to lose in using that candidate in a
burial strategy.</span></div>
<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;"><br clear="none">
</span></div>
<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;">>The post-election
complaint (by any of the voters) would be ..
what?</span></div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>For either a successful burial strategy, or
one that backfires and elects an arbitrary
candidate, I think the possible complaints are
clear. Maybe someone would argue that a
backfiring strategy proves the method's
incentives are just fine. But that wouldn't be
how I see it. I think if, in actual practice,
it ever happens that voters calculate that a
strategy is worthwhile, and it completely
backfires to the point that everyone would
like the results discarded, then that method
will probably get repealed.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>><br style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;" clear="none">
<span style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;">>If you don't allow
voters to rank among their unapproved
candidates then arguably you are not even
trying to elect the sincere CW.</span><br
style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;" clear="none">
<span style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;">>Instead you are just
modifying Approval to make it a lot more
Condorcet-ish. </span></div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Not an unfair statement. If you require
voters to have that much expressiveness then
you can't use implicit.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>To me, the motivation for three-slot
C//A(implicit) is partly about burial, partly
about method simplicity, partly about ballot
simplicity. C//A(explicit) retains 1 of 3.
(Arguably slightly less for the Smith
version.) Possibly it has its own merits, but
they will largely be different ones.</div>
<div><br style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;" clear="none">
><br style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;" clear="none">
<span style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;">>A lot of voters like
relatively expressive ballots. I think that
is one of the reasons why Approval seems to
be a lot less popular than IRV.</span><br
style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;" clear="none">
</div>
</div>
<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;"><br clear="none">
</span></div>
<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;">I have no *inherent*
complaints about the ballot format of explicit
approval plus full ranking.</span></div>
<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;"><br clear="none">
</span></div>
<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40,
42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;">Kevin</span></div>
<br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
<div
class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yahoo_quoted"
id="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yahoo_quoted_0445501564">
<div style="font-family:'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica,
Arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#26282a;">
<div> Le jeudi 6 juin 2019 à 21:03:19 UTC−5,
C.Benham <a shape="rect"
class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"
rel="nofollow" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a>
a écrit : </div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>
<div
id="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751">
<div>
<p>Kevin,<br clear="none">
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">Specifically should
"positional dominance" have the same
meaning whether or not the method has
approval in it?</blockquote>
<br clear="none">
If the voters all choose to approve all the
candidates they rank, then yes. (For a
while I was wrongly assuming that Forest's
suggested<br clear="none">
default approval was for all
ranked-above-bottom candidates, but then I
noticed that he specified that it was only
for top voted candidates).<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
One of my tired examples:<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
25: A>B<br clear="none">
26: B>C<br clear="none">
23: C>A<br clear="none">
26: C<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Assuming all the ranked candidates are
approved, C is by far the most approved and
the most top-voted candidate. <br
clear="none">
Normal Winning Votes (and your idea 2 in
this example) elect B.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
<blockquote type="cite">I will go easy on
these methods over failing MD, because it
happens when some of the majority don't
approve their common candidate.</blockquote>
<br clear="none">
For me this this type of ballot avoids the
Minimal Defense versus Chicken Dilemma
dilemma, rendering those criteria
inapplicable.<br clear="none">
<p>48: A<br clear="none">
27: B>C<br clear="none">
25: C<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
The problem has been that we don't know
whether the B>C voters are thinking "I
am ranking C because above all I don't
want that evil A<br clear="none">
to win" or "My C>A preference isn't
all that strong, and I think that my
favourite could well be the sincere CW,
and if C's supporters rank<br
clear="none">
B above A then B has a good chance to win.
But if they if they create a cycle by
truncating I'm not having them steal it".<br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
With the voters able to express explicit
approval we no longer have to guess which
it is.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"> I don't think it's
ideal if burying X under Y (both
disapproved) can only backfire when Y is
made the CW.
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
</blockquote>
Why is that? The post-election complaint
(by any of the voters) would be .. what?<br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
If you don't allow voters to rank among
their unapproved candidates then arguably
you are not even trying to elect the sincere
CW.<br clear="none">
Instead you are just modifying Approval to
make it a lot more Condorcet-ish. <br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
A lot of voters like relatively expressive
ballots. I think that is one of the reasons
why Approval seems to be a lot less popular
than IRV.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Chris Benham<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
<div
class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751yqt8593146214"
id="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751yqt96283">
<div
class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751moz-cite-prefix">On
6/06/2019 5:34 pm, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br
clear="none">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"> </blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<div
class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751yqt8593146214"
id="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751yqt32286">
<div>
<div
class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751ydpe4c7db39yahoo-style-wrap"
style="font-family:Helvetica Neue,
Helvetica, Arial,
sans-serif;font-size:16px;">
<div>Hi Chris,</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I've been short on time so I don't
actually have much thought on any of
the methods, even my own.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I suppose Idea 2 is the same as
Schwartz-limited MinMax(WV) if nobody
submits disapproved rankings. I'm not
sure if it makes sense to reject the
method over that. Specifically should
"positional dominance" have the same
meaning whether or not the method has
approval in it? As a comparison, I
will go easy on these methods over
failing MD, because it happens when
some of the majority don't approve
their common candidate.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I would have liked to simplify Idea
2, but actually Forest's eventual
proposal wasn't all that simple
either. As I wrote, if you add "elect
a CW if there is one" it can become
much simpler, so that it isn't really
distinct from Idea 1. I actually tried
pretty hard to present three "Ideas"
in that post, but kept having that
problem.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I posted those ideas because I
thought Forest posed an interesting
challenge, and I thought I perceived
that he was trying to fix a problem
with CD. That said, I am not a fan of
Smith//Approval(explicit). If all
these methods are basically the same
then I probably won't end up liking
any of them. I don't think it's ideal
if burying X under Y (both
disapproved) can only backfire when Y
is made the CW.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Kevin</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
<div
class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751ydp50d5cd69yahoo_quoted"
id="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751ydp50d5cd69yahoo_quoted_0454840046">
<div style="font-family:'Helvetica
Neue', Helvetica, Arial,
sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#26282a;">
<div> Le mercredi 5 juin 2019 à
21:26:23 UTC−5, C.Benham <a
shape="rect"
class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au"
rel="nofollow" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a>
a écrit : </div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Kevin,<br clear="none">
</div>
<div>
<div
id="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751ydp50d5cd69yiv9085021920">
<div>
<p>I didn't comment earlier on
your "idea 2". <br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
If there no "disapproved
rankings" (i.e. if the voters
all approve the candidates
they rank above bottom),<br
clear="none">
then your suggested method is
simply normal Winning Votes,
which I don't like because the
winner can<br clear="none">
be uncovered and positionally
dominant or pairwise-beaten
and positionally dominated by
a single other<br clear="none">
candidate.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
On top of that I don't think
it really fills the bill as
"simple". Approval Margins
(using Sort or Smith//MinMax<br
clear="none">
or equivalent or almost
equivalent algorithm) would be
no more complex and in my
opinion would be better.<br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
I would also prefer the still
more simple Smith//Approval.<br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
What did you think of my
suggestion for a way to
implement your idea 1? </p>
<div
class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751ydp50d5cd69yiv9085021920yqt3873327189"
id="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751ydp50d5cd69yiv9085021920yqtfd25173"><br
clear="none">
Chris <br clear="none">
</div>
<div
class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751ydp50d5cd69yiv9085021920yqt3873327189"
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</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
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