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<div>Hi Chris,</div><div><br></div>
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Le dimanche 9 juin 2019 à 21:20:34 UTC−5, C.Benham <cbenham@adam.com.au> a écrit :
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<div style="font-size: 13px;">>Kevin,</div><div style="font-size: 13px;">></div><div style="font-size: 13px;">>So to be clear the possible "complaint" some voters might have
(and you think we should take seriously) is "We lied </div><div style="font-size: 13px;">>and the
voting method</div><div style="font-size: 13px;">>(instead of somehow reading our minds) believed us".</div><div style=""><div id="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953" style=""><div style=""><p style=""></p><div style=""><font size="3">A burial strategy has two scenarios that could give rise to a complaint. One is where burial succeeds. In that case the voters who complain aren't the ones who buried. The other scenario is where burial backfires. In that case it is, I guess, possible that actually *all* voters were using burial. So you may argue that they don't have a valid complaint. But implicit to my concerns is the premise that the voters are behaving rationally under the incentives of the method. If a method produces arbitrary results given rational voters then it will be hard to retain it. I think if it happens even once it will be a problem.</font></div><div style="font-size: 13px;"><br></div><span style="font-size: 13px;">
></span><br clear="none"><div style="font-size: 13px;">>So therefore it is good to have a less expressive ballot because
that reduces the voter's opportunities to tell stupid </div><div style="font-size: 13px;">>lies and if
the method</div><div style="font-size: 13px;">>is simple enough then maybe also the temptation for them to do so.</div><div style="font-size: 13px;"><br></div><div style=""><font size="3">You're making it sound as though a simpler ballot just tricks people into not lying. Expressiveness isn't the point. The reason three-slot C//A (or implicit etc.) deters burial is that there is far more risk in trying it. It is highly likely to backfire no matter what other voters do. "Low expressiveness" of the ballot doesn't guarantee this and isn't a prerequisite for it either.</font></div><div><span style="font-size: 13px;"><br></span></div><span style="font-size: 13px;">
></span><br clear="none"><div style="font-size: 13px;">>But I've thought of a patch to address your issue. We could have
a rule which says that if the winner's approval </div><div style="font-size: 13px;">>score is below
some fixed </div><div style="font-size: 13px;">>fraction of that of the most approved candidate, then a
second-round runoff is triggered between those two </div><div style="font-size: 13px;">>candidates.
What do you</div><div><span style="font-size: 13px;">>think of that? What do you think that fraction should be?</span></div><div><span style="font-size: 13px;"><br></span></div><div><font size="3">I think there is some confusion here between what my issue is, and the voter complaints you asked about. While I think voters will be unhappy with a ruined election, ruining it is what reduces the burial incentive. If the risk outweighs the benefit then people won't do it. (That's an assumption.) This patch seems to remove the risk while leaving the benefit unchanged. </font><span style="font-size: medium;">Burial will ultimately do nothing, except to sometimes move the win from the CW to the AW. But that makes the potential gain even clearer: If the voted CW turns out to not be your candidate, you would have had a second chance at the win by voting instead to deny CW status to that candidate. If the voted CW *is* your candidate, then you're no worse off for using burial.</span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"><br></span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;">Kevin</span></div><div><span style="font-size: medium;"> </span></div>
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<div class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953yqt1633905774" id="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953yqt46183" style="font-size: 13px;"><div class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953moz-cite-prefix">On 10/06/2019 9:57 am, Kevin Venzke
wrote:<br clear="none">
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<blockquote type="cite">
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<div>Hi Chris,</div>
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<blockquote type="cite" style="margin:0px;padding:8px;color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">>>I don't think
it's ideal if burying X under Y (both disapproved) can
only backfire when Y is made the CW.
<div>>></div>
</blockquote>
<span style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">>Why
is that? </span></div>
<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;"><br clear="none">
</span></div>
<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">Because I
think if voters decide to attempt to prevent another
candidate from being CW, via insincerity, there should
be risks to doing that. Of course there is already some
risk. But if you "knew" that a given candidate had no
chance of being CW then there would be nothing to lose
in using that candidate in a burial strategy.</span></div>
<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;"><br clear="none">
</span></div>
<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">>The
post-election complaint (by any of the voters) would be
.. what?</span></div>
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<div>For either a successful burial strategy, or one that
backfires and elects an arbitrary candidate, I think the
possible complaints are clear. Maybe someone would argue
that a backfiring strategy proves the method's incentives
are just fine. But that wouldn't be how I see it. I think
if, in actual practice, it ever happens that voters
calculate that a strategy is worthwhile, and it completely
backfires to the point that everyone would like the
results discarded, then that method will probably get
repealed.</div>
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<div>><br clear="none" style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">
<span style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">>If
you don't allow voters to rank among their unapproved
candidates then arguably you are not even trying to
elect the sincere CW.</span><br clear="none" style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">
<span style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">>Instead
you are just modifying Approval to make it a lot more
Condorcet-ish. </span></div>
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<div>Not an unfair statement. If you require voters to have
that much expressiveness then you can't use implicit.</div>
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<div>To me, the motivation for three-slot C//A(implicit) is
partly about burial, partly about method simplicity,
partly about ballot simplicity. C//A(explicit) retains 1
of 3. (Arguably slightly less for the Smith version.)
Possibly it has its own merits, but they will largely be
different ones.</div>
<div><br clear="none" style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">
><br clear="none" style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">
<span style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">>A lot
of voters like relatively expressive ballots. I think
that is one of the reasons why Approval seems to be a
lot less popular than IRV.</span><br clear="none" style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">
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<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;"><br clear="none">
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<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">I have no
*inherent* complaints about the ballot format of explicit
approval plus full ranking.</span></div>
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<div><span style="color:rgb(38, 40, 42);font-family:Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;">Kevin</span></div>
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<div> Le jeudi 6 juin 2019 à 21:03:19 UTC−5, C.Benham
<a shape="rect" class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a> a écrit : </div>
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<p>Kevin,<br clear="none">
</p>
<blockquote type="cite">Specifically should "positional
dominance" have the same meaning whether or not the
method has approval in it?</blockquote>
<br clear="none">
If the voters all choose to approve all the candidates
they rank, then yes. (For a while I was wrongly
assuming that Forest's suggested<br clear="none">
default approval was for all ranked-above-bottom
candidates, but then I noticed that he specified that it
was only for top voted candidates).<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
One of my tired examples:<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
25: A>B<br clear="none">
26: B>C<br clear="none">
23: C>A<br clear="none">
26: C<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Assuming all the ranked candidates are approved, C is by
far the most approved and the most top-voted candidate.
<br clear="none">
Normal Winning Votes (and your idea 2 in this example)
elect B.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
<blockquote type="cite">I will go easy on these methods
over failing MD, because it happens when some of the
majority don't approve their common candidate.</blockquote>
<br clear="none">
For me this this type of ballot avoids the Minimal
Defense versus Chicken Dilemma dilemma, rendering those
criteria inapplicable.<br clear="none">
<p>48: A<br clear="none">
27: B>C<br clear="none">
25: C<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
The problem has been that we don't know whether the
B>C voters are thinking "I am ranking C because
above all I don't want that evil A<br clear="none">
to win" or "My C>A preference isn't all that
strong, and I think that my favourite could well be
the sincere CW, and if C's supporters rank<br clear="none">
B above A then B has a good chance to win. But if they
if they create a cycle by truncating I'm not having
them steal it".<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
With the voters able to express explicit approval we
no longer have to guess which it is.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"> I don't think it's ideal if
burying X under Y (both disapproved) can only backfire
when Y is made the CW.
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
</blockquote>
Why is that? The post-election complaint (by any of the
voters) would be .. what?<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
If you don't allow voters to rank among their unapproved
candidates then arguably you are not even trying to
elect the sincere CW.<br clear="none">
Instead you are just modifying Approval to make it a lot
more Condorcet-ish. <br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
A lot of voters like relatively expressive ballots. I
think that is one of the reasons why Approval seems to
be a lot less popular than IRV.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Chris Benham<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
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<div class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751moz-cite-prefix">On
6/06/2019 5:34 pm, Kevin Venzke wrote:<br clear="none">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"> </blockquote>
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<div>Hi Chris,</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I've been short on time so I don't actually
have much thought on any of the methods, even my
own.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I suppose Idea 2 is the same as
Schwartz-limited MinMax(WV) if nobody submits
disapproved rankings. I'm not sure if it makes
sense to reject the method over that. Specifically
should "positional dominance" have the same
meaning whether or not the method has approval in
it? As a comparison, I will go easy on these
methods over failing MD, because it happens when
some of the majority don't approve their common
candidate.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I would have liked to simplify Idea 2, but
actually Forest's eventual proposal wasn't all
that simple either. As I wrote, if you add "elect
a CW if there is one" it can become much simpler,
so that it isn't really distinct from Idea 1. I
actually tried pretty hard to present three
"Ideas" in that post, but kept having that
problem.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I posted those ideas because I thought Forest
posed an interesting challenge, and I thought I
perceived that he was trying to fix a problem with
CD. That said, I am not a fan of
Smith//Approval(explicit). If all these methods
are basically the same then I probably won't end
up liking any of them. I don't think it's ideal if
burying X under Y (both disapproved) can only
backfire when Y is made the CW.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Kevin</div>
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<div style="font-family:'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;font-size:13px;color:#26282a;">
<div> Le mercredi 5 juin 2019 à 21:26:23 UTC−5,
C.Benham <a shape="rect" class="ydp7d1d2e83yiv7139577953ydpb6a32dd9yiv8583323751moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"><cbenham@adam.com.au></a>
a écrit : </div>
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<div>Kevin,<br clear="none">
</div>
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<p>I didn't comment earlier on your "idea
2". <br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
If there no "disapproved rankings" (i.e.
if the voters all approve the candidates
they rank above bottom),<br clear="none">
then your suggested method is simply
normal Winning Votes, which I don't like
because the winner can<br clear="none">
be uncovered and positionally dominant or
pairwise-beaten and positionally dominated
by a single other<br clear="none">
candidate.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
On top of that I don't think it really
fills the bill as "simple". Approval
Margins (using Sort or Smith//MinMax<br clear="none">
or equivalent or almost equivalent
algorithm) would be no more complex and in
my opinion would be better.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
I would also prefer the still more simple
Smith//Approval.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
What did you think of my suggestion for a
way to implement your idea 1? </p>
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Chris <br clear="none">
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