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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Hello Robert and all,</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">I wasn't sure what I meant but I think
now what I'm getting at is that a Condorcet winner may not
necessarily have reached an adequate level of support, in terms of
a quota requirement. (Another message seems to touch on a similar
point.) <br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Proving adequate support would imply
over-coming something like a NOTA option, tho I don't think that
should be an explicit option on the ballot paper, because it
amounts to privileging one preference permutation out of many
(which is also what is inequitable about party list systems).
However, I believe all preference abstentions should be counted
(using all the preference information, not just some of it).</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">I assume that objections to IRV are
based on its "premature exclusion" of candidates, which undermines
its credibility as a quota count. This is less true in
multi-member constituencies, where there are equitably
transferable votes to elect more than one representative.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">However, the objection can be
completely over-come, if premature exclusion is replaced by a
rational count of votes in order of the least prefered candidates.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Previously mentioned, I have worked out
how to do this in a coherent new electoral system.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">from</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Richard Lung.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 20/05/2019 21:12, robert
bristow-johnson wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:a55b999cb943e106b7db7e7239394399.squirrel@webmail04.register.com">
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<p><br>
<br>
---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] re Burlington<br>
From: "Richard Lung" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com"><voting@ukscientists.com></a><br>
Date: Mon, May 20, 2019 11:52 am<br>
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">election-methods@electorama.com</a><br>
Cc: "Sennet Williams" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:sennetwilliams@yahoo.com"><sennetwilliams@yahoo.com></a><br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
> "But it is only Condorcet that elects the candidate that is
explicitly<br>
> preferred by voters over every other candidate."<br>
><br>
> I wonder tho, whether that satisfies the requiremant for
one candidate<br>
> (of their number) to be preferred over a whole range of
candidates?<br>
></p>
<p>i am not sure exactly what you mean, here, Richard.</p>
<p>if there are more than two candidates, while it might be
possible for a single candidate to be preferred over the union
of all the other candidates, that this single candidate has a
*majority* of the vote, more first-choice votes
than the sum of first-choice votes of all other candidates,
while it may happen (and if it does happen, that single
candidate must surely be elected given **any** deterministic
voting system), but i don't expect in a 3-way or 4-way race (or
more) for that any candidate will satisfy that
criterion.</p>
<p>is that what you're asking about?</p>
<p>but the Condorcet criterion simply proposes that if more voters
mark their ballots preferring Candidate A to Candidate B than
the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary, then
Candidate B is not elected.</p>
<p>i like to compare
it to a mathematical proof by contradiction: If a Condorcet
Winner exists and your election method does not elect the CW,
then who did you elect? You elected someone when more voters
explicitly marked their ballots that they preferred some other
**specific** candidate. How can that be an
expression of the will of the electorate? That's the problem
with IRV or Borda or Bucklin (or some other RCV that someone
cooks up). Most of the time it may elect the CW. Then great!
No one is complaining. But when it doesn't, how possibly can
the winner claim to have
the democratic support of the electorate (even though we don't
demand a majority of first-choice votes, since that demand is
unrealistic in a 3-way or 4-way race) when the voters explicitly
say "Give us this other candidate that we like better!" ??</p>
<p>it's sorta like this stupid
Electoral College thing we have in the U.S. if the Electoral
College elects the same candidate as the Popular Vote does, we
say that the E.C. does a pretty good job. but when it *doesn't*
elect the winner of the popular vote, it **never** brings
legitimacy to the elected president and
vice-president.</p>
<p>L8r,</p>
<p>r b-j</p>
<p><br>
><br>
> On 19/05/2019 01:30, robert bristow-johnson wrote:<br>
>><br>
>> okay, Sennet, I am posting this to the EM mailing list.<br>
>><br>
>> ---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------<br>
>> Subject: Re: re Burlington<br>
>><br>
From: "Sennet Williams" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:sennetwilliams@yahoo.com"><sennetwilliams@yahoo.com></a><br>
>> Date: Sat, May 18, 2019 12:50 pm<br>
>> To: "robert bristow-johnson"
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com"><rbj@audioimagination.com></a><br>
>>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
>><br>
>> > yes, I meant to put that in the email. you are
free to post it to<br>
>> the list.<br>
>> > As I probably typed before, the problem with
Condorcet is that it<br>
>> would be "practically" impossible to count by hand.<br>
>><br>
>> No, Sennet, it isn't. It's straight forward, but
laborious. If doing<br>
>> this by hand, you would need a team of 4 (2 callers and
2 counters)<br>
>> for each pair combination of candidates. If you had 2
candidates,<br>
>> that's one pair (and it's just like FPTP).. If you had
3 candidates,<br>
>> it's 3 pairs. If you had 4 candidates, it's 6 pairs.
If you had 5<br>
>> candidates, it's 10 pairs. The counting could be done
simultaneously<br>
>> if you had sufficient people or serially, in turn, if
you don't have<br>
>> more enough for simultaneous counting. all ballots
would be handled<br>
>> by each counting team once. and it is precinct
summable so the burden<br>
>> can be distributed to many precinct locations. unlike
IRV, the<br>
>> counting need not be done at a single central location.<br>
>><br>
>> but for a lot of candidates, like a dozen, IRV would be
faster to do<br>
>> by hand, but still practical.<br>
>><br>
>> > In real elections, IRV, and Condorcet will have
the same results: <br>
>> The winning candidate will be the one who has the
broadest preferred<br>
>> support.<br>
>><br>
>> No, Sennet, that is decidedly false. This is why i
asked you if you<br>
>> really "understand what the difference is between IRV
and Condorcet?" <br>
>> When you make claims like that, it makes me wonder.
It's simply a<br>
>> demonstrably false assertion.<br>
>><br>
>> The Burlington mayoral election in 2009 was a "real
election". Someone<br>
>> **really** got elected to office in that election.<br>
>><br>
>> And IRV and Condorcet would have clearly gotten
different results in<br>
>> that real election. The IRV elected Bob Kiss. And
Condorcet would<br>
>> have elected Andy Montroll. (And plurality of
first-choice votes<br>
>> would have elected Kurt Wright.) But it is only
Condorcet that elects<br>
>> the candidate that is explicitly preferred by voters
over every other<br>
>> candidate.<br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> ><br>
>> > On Friday, May 17, 2019, 11:40:35 AM PDT, robert
bristow-johnson<br>
>> <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com"><rbj@audioimagination.com></a> wrote:<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> > hi Sennet,<br>
>> ><br>
>> > can we post this to the list? i didn't wanna do
that without your<br>
>> consent. it's just that maybe we can get someone else
besides the two<br>
>> of us to pipe in on the conversation.<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> > ---------------------------- Original Message<br>
>> ----------------------------<br>
>> > Subject: re Burlington<br>
>> ><br>
>><br>
From: "Sennet Williams" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:sennetwilliams@yahoo.com"><sennetwilliams@yahoo.com></a><br>
>> > Date: Thu, May 16, 2019 8:54 pm<br>
>> > To: <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">"rbj@audioimagination.com"</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com"><rbj@audioimagination.com></a><br>
>> ><br>
>>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
>> ><br>
>> >> well, I have no idea what IRV system
Burlington used.<br>
>> ><br>
>> > it's the same IRV as in every other governmental
RCV election except<br>
>> we had 5 ranking levels and 5 candidates. so no one
was<br>
>> "disenfranchised". you could have ranked the
candidates in opposite<br>
>> order of their expost facto popularity, and you would
still be able to<br>
>> weigh in on the IRV final round that actually selects
the mayor.<br>
>> ><br>
>> > here is an analysis of what went<br>
>> wrong: <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://rangevoting.org/Burlington.html">https://rangevoting.org/Burlington.html</a><br>
>> ><br>
>> > here's<br>
>>
another: <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://bolson.org/~bolson/2009/20090303_burlington_vt_mayor.html">http://bolson.org/~bolson/2009/20090303_burlington_vt_mayor.html</a><br>
>> ><br>
>> > essentially, we had 4 strong candidates going in.
3 were all<br>
>> plausible winners. the GOP candidate had the
Plurality, the Prog<br>
>> candidate wonthe IRV, and the Dem candidate was the
pairwise<br>
>> champion. the Dem would have beaten **any** other
candidate in the<br>
>> IRV final round had he been able to advance to the
final round. that<br>
>> IRV eliminated him in the semi-final round was the
execution of this<br>
>> inherent flaw of IRV.<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> >> The problem we have had in SF, Berkeley and
Oakland is that each<br>
>> voter can only select three candidates, and the number
of exhausted<br>
>> ballots exceeded the winning margin in at least several
elections.<br>
>> ><br>
>> > yes, that's a known problem with **any** RCV if
the number of<br>
>> candidates on the ballotexceeds the number of ranking
levels. you<br>
>> need more ranking levels than 3 and you need stronger
(or stricter)<br>
>> ballot access requirements so that fewer candidates get
on the ballot<br>
>> and only those that are plausible winners. i think 5
levels is<br>
>> enough, and the number of signatures on apetition
needed to get on the<br>
>> ballot can be adjusted by law in response to the usual
number of<br>
>> candidates that make it onto the ballot. if there are
consistently<br>
>> more names than ranking levels, the legislative body
has the<br>
>> information and the authority necessary to increase the
number<br>
>> ofrequired signatures to have candidate access to the
ballot.<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> >> Most clearly in the Kaplan/Quan/Perata mayor's
contest (Oakland''s<br>
>> 1st IRV election) There were also six "minor"
candidates. Kaplan<br>
>> was almost surely the most preferred, but Quan gamed
the system by<br>
>> mortgaging her house and spending a lot asking casual
voters to"make<br>
>> me 2nd. The winning margin over Kaplan was very narrow
but the number<br>
>> of exhausted ballots was very large because most of the
minor<br>
>> candidates were black while none of the big three
were. A lot of<br>
>> people blamed the IRV system for electing Quan, who was<br>
>> basicallyincompetent, but there has been no serious
attempt to repeal IRV.<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> > Ranked-Choice Voting will not stop bad politicians
that are good<br>
>> salespersons from winning office. But it is intended
to stop spoiler<br>
>> candidates from preventing the candidate with the
actual popular<br>
>> supportfrom winning.<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> >> When CA gets statewide IRV, we would
presumably Maine's system and<br>
>> all counties will be given new equipment so all
candidates can be ranked.<br>
>> ><br>
>> > In Burlington we didn't need new equipment. just
new software. the<br>
>> optical-scan machines were the same machines, but they
had to<br>
>> beprogrammed slightly differently.<br>
>> ><br>
>> > Sennet, do you understand what the difference is
between IRV and<br>
>> Condorcet? What it is that we on the list bitch about
regarding IRV.<br>
>> ><br>
>> > Our issue is not that we don't like RCV, we
**want** Ranked-Choice<br>
>> Voting, we just want the rules reformed so thatthe
pairwise champion<br>
>> is always elected. IRV will do that *most* of the
time, but it does<br>
>> not always do that. and like the Electoral College,
when IRV fails to<br>
>> elect who we all know should have been elected, it
never brings<br>
>> legitimacy to the election. failure to elect the
pairwisechampion<br>
>> will only harm voting system reform.<br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> ><br>
>> > --<br>
>> ><br>
>> > r b-j
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
>> ><br>
>> > "Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br>
>> ></p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<br>
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<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">----
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</pre>
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