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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 21/05/2019 8:07 am, steve bosworth
wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><font size="2"><span
style="font-size:11pt">Firstly, please correct me if I am
mistaken but currently I am assuming that� we all would
ideally want the Best Single-Winner Method:<br>
<br>
� 1.� To be simple enough so voters� can both use it and
understand how it is counted;<br>
� 2.� To minimize the wasting of citizens? votes (see
below),� and<br>
� 3.� To guarantee that the winner among 3 or more
candidates is the candidate most supported by at least 50%
plus one (an absolute majority) of all the citizens voting,
and<br>
� 4.� To offer as few incentives and possibilities for
voting tactical.</span></font></blockquote>
<br>
Steve,<br>
Re. your point 1, yes.�� Although I consider the first part to be
a bit more important than the second. If all the acknowledged
"unbiased" experts all agree<br>
that the way the votes are counted is fair it's not a huge problem
if some of the voters don't understand it.<br>
<br>
Re. your point 2, yes.<br>
<br>
Re. your point 3, that isn't possible. And I'm wary of
standards/criteria that refer to some fraction of "all the
citizens voting", because they are<br>
vulnerable to Irrelevant Ballots.� But yes, we can approach this
by requiring that the method meet say "Mutual Relevant Majority".<br>
<br>
Re. your point 4, yes.<br>
<br>
That does not encompass my full list of highly desirable or
essential properties.� The method shouldn't needlessly have the
feature that adding or</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">removing a few ballots that express
complete indifference among the remotely viable candidates should
change the winner, as does MJ and Bucklin.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"><font size="2"><span
style="font-size:11pt">Given these desires, currently I see
Majority Judgment (MJ) as superior to all of the above
methods on each of these counts.</span></font></blockquote>
<br>
Re. your point 1, second part, I don't think MJ does very well.��
I don't completely understand it.� Bucklin is similar and much
simpler, and IBIFA is<br>
much better and not less simple.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
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<div id="divRplyFwdMsg" dir="ltr"><font size="2"><span
style="font-size:11pt">�� 1. Re: re Burlington (Richard
Lung)<br>
</span></font></div>
<div class="BodyFragment"><font size="2"><span
style="font-size:11pt">
<div class="PlainText">�� 2. Re: Best Single-Winner Method
(steve bosworth)<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 1<br>
Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 19:52:59 +0100<br>
From: Richard Lung <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com"><voting@ukscientists.com></a><br>
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a>,
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">election-methods@electorama.com</a><br>
Message-ID:
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:fa1b4ce8-c66f-c381-ec15-c13c3dce944c@ukscientists.com"><fa1b4ce8-c66f-c381-ec15-c13c3dce944c@ukscientists.com></a><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8";
Format="flowed"<br>
<br>
Richard Lung quoted the following:</div>
<div class="PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class="PlainText">"But it is only Condorcet that
elects the candidate that is explicitly
<br>
preferred by voters over every other candidate."<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class="PlainText">However, if my claims in the next
contribution listed are correct, it is only Majority
Judgment that guarantees the election of the candidate,
whom by implication, is the one most preferred by at
least 50% plus one of all the citizens voting.� Also,
their is not always even a Condorcet winner even by a
plurality.� What do you think.� I'm I mistaken?</div>
<div class="PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class="PlainText">Steve</div>
<div class="PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class="PlainText"><br>
</div>
<div class="PlainText">------------------------------<br>
</div>
<div class="PlainText"><br>
Message: 2<br>
Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 19:46:51 +0000<br>
From: steve bosworth <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:stevebosworth@hotmail.com"><stevebosworth@hotmail.com></a><br>
To: EM list <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com"><election-methods@electorama.com></a><br>
Subject: Re: [EM] Best Single-Winner Method<br>
Message-ID:<br>
�������
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:AM6PR06MB5795BF1BA275EFCFD1300EDDB6060@AM6PR06MB5795.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com"><AM6PR06MB5795BF1BA275EFCFD1300EDDB6060@AM6PR06MB5795.eurprd06.prod.outlook.com></a><br>
������� <br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="windows-1252"<br>
<br>
Re: Best Single- Winner Method<br>
<br>
<br>
Sennet Williams,� Forest Simmons, Robert
Bristow-Johnson, Abd dul Raman Lomax, and Chris Benham
have recently addressed each others? claims about IRV,
3-slot Methods, IBIFA, and Asset.� This discussion
prompts me to request some help later, after I have
clarified several issues.<br>
<br>
Firstly, please correct me if I am mistaken but
currently I am assuming that� we all would ideally want
the Best Single-Winner Method:<br>
<br>
� 1.� To be simple enough so voters� can both use it and
understand how it is counted;<br>
� 2.� To minimize the wasting of citizens? votes (see
below),� and<br>
� 3.� To guarantee that the winner among 3 or more
candidates is the candidate most supported by at least
50% plus one (an absolute majority) of all the citizens
voting, and<br>
� 4.� To offer as few incentives and possibilities for
voting tactical.<br>
<br>
Given these desires, currently I see Majority Judgment
(MJ) as superior to all of the above methods on each of
these counts.� However, since the above discussions have
not mentioned MJ, I assume that many contributors would
reject this claim for MJ.� This is why I would very much
appreciate receiving any of your clarifications or
explanations of how my claim for MJ cannot be
sustained.� What important flaws to you see in MJ?<br>
<br>
To help you to marshal your criticisms of MJ, please let
me explain more full my own understandings and reasons
for favoring MJ.� Firstly, I see a citizen?s vote as
being wasted quantitatively to the degree that it fails
equally to help one of their most trusted candidates to
win.� A citizen?s vote is wasted qualitatively to the
degree that it instead helps to elect a candidate whom
they judge less fit for office, rather than an available
candidate judged to be more fit.<br>
<br>
Other than in MJ, such waste is present in all the
existing methods, whether they ask voters to rank,
score, or approve as many of the candidates as they
might wish.� Of course, most dramatic is the waste
provided by plurality or First-Past-The-Post voting.<br>
<br>
To counter qualitative waste, Balinski and Laraki
(Majority Judgment, 2010 MIT) argue that our capacity
for judging qualities of human behavior can be most
meaningfully expressed in an election by each voter
grading each candidate?s suitability for office as
either Excellent (ideal), Very Good, Good, Acceptable,
Poor, or ?Reject? (entirely unsuitable).� These grades
are more discerning, meaningful, and informative than
merely expressing preferences or using numeric
scores[MOU1] , X?s or ticks.� Such grading makes it more
likely that the highest quality candidate will be
elected in the eyes of the electorate.<br>
<br>
Each candidate who is not explicitly graded is counted
as ?Reject? by that voter.� As a result, all the
candidates will receiv the same number of evaluations,
but a different set of grades from the voters.� The
Majority Judgment (MJ) winner is the one who has
received grades from an absolute majority of all the
voters that are equal to, or higher than, the highest
median-grade given to any candidate. This median-grade
is found as follows:<br>
<br>
� *�� Place all the grades, high to low, top to bottom,
in side-by-side columns, the name of each candidate at
the top of each of these columns.<br>
� *�� The median-grade for each candidate is the grade
located half way down each column, i.e. in the middle if
there is an odd number of voters, the lower middle if
the number is even.<br>
<br>
If more than one candidate has the same highest
median-grade, the MJ winner is discovered by removing
(one-by-one) any grades equal in value to the current
highest median grade from each tied candidate?s total
until only one of the previously tied candidates
currently has the highest remaining median-grade.<br>
<br>
Also, in contrast to the alternatives, Balinski�
explains how MJ reduces by almost half, both the
incentives and opportunities for effective tactical
voting.� Thus, each voter has every appropriate
incentive, not only to vote but to reveal their honest
evaluations of each candidate.<br>
<br>
Thus, to me, using MJ should be simpler and more
satisfying because grading many candidates is both
easier and more meaningful than ranking or scoring
them.� Also, finding and comparing the median-grades of
all the candidate is quite simple.� Unlike MJ, IRV,
Condorcet methods, and Scoring do not guarantee the
election of the candidate most preferred by at least 50%
plus one of all the citizens voting.� Unlike IRV but
like Condorcet methods and Score, MJ does not eliminate
any candidate until the winner is discovered.<br>
<br>
Finally, I would favor the following Asset option to be
added at the bottom of each MJ ballot:� Any citizen who
currently feels that they do not yet know enough about
any of the candidates to grade them, can instead give
their proxy vote to the Register Elector who will do
this for them.� They could do this� by WRITING-IN the
published code of that Registered Elector.<br>
<br>
I look forward to your comments.<br>
<br>
Steve<br>
________________________________<br>
<br>
�[MOU1]Numerical scores<br>
<br>
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