<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>Condorcet compliance is valuable if it is based on *persistent
preference.* I.e,. if a Condorcet winner as expressed on the
ballots survives to the next phase, then the method can be
Condorcet compliant, even if later voter decisions choose someone
else. Problem is when we have a large candidate set, that
"Condorcet winner" may be approved for election by only a
minority, and it could even be a small minority. Most voting
systems analysis completely neglects ballot placement, and, as
well, the problem that Dodgson identified, most voters not having
enough information to rank many candidates.</p>
<p>Majority approval of an election is a basic democratic
requirement, necessary in NGOs, generally, but badly neglected in
public elections. IRV produces a fake majority by ballot
exclusion, too often. I've suggested using a Score ballot,
defining a scoring level as "approved for election in place of an
additional poll" -- probably midrange -- and then considering
these rules:</p>
<p>1. The primary cannot complete with an election unless the winner
is approved by a majority.</p>
<p>2. If a Condorcet winner exists, this candidate must not be
eliminated from the next round (and write-in votes should always
be allowed; doing otherwise creates fake majorities).</p>
<p>3. Likewise a Range winner cannot be eliminated.</p>
<p>Whether or not a Condorect winner loses if there is a different
Approval winner is an issue of balance. Yes, the voters will have
approved a different winner -- and the voters should have the
power to disregard their own preference in order to complete an
election. But it is possible that this is based on misinformation
about the true possible voting. So maybe a conflict here would
require a second election. I have no strong position on this. This
issue is resolved by Asset.<br>
</p>
<p>4. It is possible that Asset could always find a winner even
with only one round general election. In this case, the
preferences to be considered are the preferences of the chosen
electors. They may use many, many rounds, in their process, and
single-winner, a majority of electoral votes would be required. I
prefer, instead, though, electing an Assembly and the Assembly
elects officers (i.e., what single-winner elections are used for)
or makes other Yes/No decisions, which may be amended and iterated
many, many times, by being a deliberative body with immediate
voting.</p>
<p>Without Asset, my sense is that using an advanced voting system,
such as the hybrids proposed, unless candidacies multiply because
of improved systems, will produce a majority-approved result
usually in the first round, and failure in a second round would be
very rare, and the failure might be by such a narrow social
utility margin that little harm is done by electing the "wrong"
candidate. We only toss a coin with exact vote equality, but from
a social utility point of view, not a great deal of harm is done
by electing a candidate with 49.9% of the vote. Or a third round
could be required, how important is it?</p>
<p>Problematic systems will elect a minority-approved candidate
under much more harmful conditions than that!</p>
<p>However, this is also what I expect. An advanced system will show
the true support for minority candidates, and this will encourage
the multiplication of candidacies, which then runs into the
problem that Asset was designed to address. All roads lead to
Asset, and what amazes me is that Asset is simply very basic
democracy, simply representative instead of direct.</p>
<p>What we have called "representative" democracy does not represent
the voters, but districts, leading to a horrible mess that nobody
thinks can be fixed.<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/19/2019 7:10 PM, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAP29oncLAXha=7kX2iQexe8oSNCkOSti4Z+1BOOrPvnfhuem=Q@mail.gmail.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>There are various ways to enhance a given method to make it
Condorcet compliant:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>1. One can elect the ballot CW if there is one, and
otherwise fall back on the given method.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>2. One can apply the given method to the Smith set.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>3. One can use the given method winner as the starting
point in a seamless process that leads to a member of the
Smith Set (or better).</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Here is such a process:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>First, create a directed graph whose vertices are the
candidate names as follows:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>For each covered candidate X, draw an arrow to that
candidate Y (among those that cover X) which is ranked or
rated strictly below X on the fewest number of ballots.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>To enhance the winner A of any method, start at candidate A
and follow the arrows as far as possible in the directed
graph. The enhanced winner W' is the one at the end of the
directed path.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>This W' covers W, but is itself uncovered (a member of the
Landau Set), and so also a member of Smith.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>If the original method elects monotonically, then so does
the enhanced method.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>If the original method satisfies the FBC or in any case
lacks vulnerability to compromise, then the enhanced method
gives little incentive for burying Favorite because when there
is an arrow from Favorite to Y, candidate Y is already the
natural compromise candidate for the supporters of Favorite,
the one that is rated strictly below Favorite on the fewest
ballots among those that cover Favorite.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Suggestions:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>A. Enhanced Approval.</div>
<div>B. Enhanced Majority Judgment</div>
<div>C. Enhanced Random Ballot</div>
<div>D. Enhanced Asset Voting (different possible versions)</div>
<div>E. Enhanced Chiastic Approval</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Other versions?<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>If method M is Chicken Resistant, does it follow that the
Enhanced version of Method M also Chicken Resistant?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Other thoughts?<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://electorama.com/em">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
</pre>
</blockquote>
</body>
</html>