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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">I would add Modified D21 to the list.<br>
D21 is genially simplifies the ballot for human use compared to
preferential voting. The voters give (partial) preferences, which
can be evaluated using Condorcet. (I have found at least one
inconsistency and one factual error about the evaluation method in
the D21 paper. While I think the method is actually better than
Majority (not a big feat in itself), that undermines the claims of
the paper significantly.)<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">What does "Chicken Resistant" mean?
Google failed to give me any relevant results.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/20/19 12:10 AM, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAP29oncLAXha=7kX2iQexe8oSNCkOSti4Z+1BOOrPvnfhuem=Q@mail.gmail.com">
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<div>There are various ways to enhance a given method to make it
Condorcet compliant:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>1. One can elect the ballot CW if there is one, and
otherwise fall back on the given method.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>2. One can apply the given method to the Smith set.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>3. One can use the given method winner as the starting
point in a seamless process that leads to a member of the
Smith Set (or better).</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Here is such a process:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>First, create a directed graph whose vertices are the
candidate names as follows:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>For each covered candidate X, draw an arrow to that
candidate Y (among those that cover X) which is ranked or
rated strictly below X on the fewest number of ballots.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>To enhance the winner A of any method, start at candidate A
and follow the arrows as far as possible in the directed
graph. The enhanced winner W' is the one at the end of the
directed path.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>This W' covers W, but is itself uncovered (a member of the
Landau Set), and so also a member of Smith.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>If the original method elects monotonically, then so does
the enhanced method.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>If the original method satisfies the FBC or in any case
lacks vulnerability to compromise, then the enhanced method
gives little incentive for burying Favorite because when there
is an arrow from Favorite to Y, candidate Y is already the
natural compromise candidate for the supporters of Favorite,
the one that is rated strictly below Favorite on the fewest
ballots among those that cover Favorite.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Suggestions:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>A. Enhanced Approval.</div>
<div>B. Enhanced Majority Judgment</div>
<div>C. Enhanced Random Ballot</div>
<div>D. Enhanced Asset Voting (different possible versions)</div>
<div>E. Enhanced Chiastic Approval</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Other versions?<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>If method M is Chicken Resistant, does it follow that the
Enhanced version of Method M also Chicken Resistant?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Other thoughts?<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
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