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<p>Juho,<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<p class="">46 A<br class="">
44 B>C<br class="">
10 C<br class="">
</p>
<p class="">A>B 46-44 (margin=2)���� B>C 44-10
(margin=34)�� C>A 54-46 (margin=8)<br class="">
<br class="">
Now Margins elects B,� rewarding the outrageous Burial
strategy.<br class="">
<br class="">
I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this
scenario. Even assuming that all the votes are sincere,<br
class="">
B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved"
and positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten<br
class="">
by A.)<br class="">
</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>Also here you assume that there is an implicit approval
cutoff after the ranked candidates. What if the votes are
sincere and there is no implicit approval cutoff?</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
</blockquote>
No, I'm only "assuming" that positional information is more
meaningful than which candidate is "closer" to being the Condorcet
winner<br>
according to Margins or which candidate needs the fewest
additional bullet-votes to become the CW.<br>
<br>
Given that Margins is very vulnerable to Burial strategy the
argument that it's worth putting up with that because with sincere
votes B<br>
in this scenario is the best (or a good or even acceptable)
candidate is .. what??<br>
<br>
Or to put it another way, assuming the votes are sincere, you
arguments against electing A or C are what?<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>One might face problems sooner with sincere voting than
with strategic voting.</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>First preferences could be as follows.</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>30: far-left</div>
<div>21: left</div>
<div>19: right</div>
<div>30: far-right</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>If we assume that left hates right, and right hates left,
the natural approval limit would be between the left wing and
right wing parties. We would get mostly votes that rank only
left wing or only right wing candidates. And the winner would
be with good probability the far-left candidate, not the
expected Condorcet winner (left).</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
That doesn't bother me much because (a) far-left may be higher
"Social Utility" than left and (b) probably enough right voters
would <br>
be aware that the result is unlikely to be decided by Approval and
so they would not be taking a huge risk by sincerely ranking left<br>
over far-left.<br>
<br>
But having said that, Smith//Approval using ballots that� allow
voters to rank among candidates they don't approve would not be <br>
in my book too bad (and much better than Margins).<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that
Robert proposed could make a lot of sense in societies where IRV
way of thinking is strong.</blockquote>
That method doesn't have good criterion compliances. It's just a
gimmick to smuggle Condorcet compliance past IRV enthusiasts.<br>
The alternative of just checking for a CW (among remaining
candidates) before each elimination is much better.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking
levels or number of ranked candidates could make sense when the
number of candidates is very high, or just to keep things simple
for the vote counting process, or to keep things simple enough
for the voters (not to frighten them with the idea of ranking
all 100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically ideal, but in
practical situations ranking some candidates may be much better
than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all.</blockquote>
<br>
Limiting the number of candidates the voter is allowed to rank
makes no sense. What has happened to your concern<br>
about "removing information" on who the sincere/ "expected" CW is?<br>
<br>
There would be nothing "frightening" about ranking all the
candidates if doing so is purely optional. But voters who wish<br>
to vote a full ranking should be allowed to. <br>
<br>
Chris� Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/03/2019 6:42 pm, Juho Laatu wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:4716BB51-8459-4791-AB04-F93B76B8637B@gmail.com">
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charset=windows-1252">
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<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On 05 Mar 2019, at 07:45, Chris Benham <a
href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" class=""
moz-do-not-send="true">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>
[ApprovalVoting] <<a
href="mailto:ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com" class=""
moz-do-not-send="true">ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<p class="">Robert,</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">in a ranked ballot, what
defines an "approved" candidate?� all unranked
candidates are tied for last place on a ballot.� is any
candidate that is ranked at all "approved"?</blockquote>
Yes.<br class="">
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">that would change and
complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="webkit-block-placeholder">
</div>
<p class="">Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how
(overly) "complicate". Allowing voters to rank among
unapproved<br class="">
candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy
and a lot more complicated.<br class="">
</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>One might face problems sooner with sincere voting than
with strategic voting.</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>First preferences could be as follows.</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>30: far-left</div>
<div>21: left</div>
<div>19: right</div>
<div>30: far-right</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>If we assume that left hates right, and right hates left,
the natural approval limit would be between the left wing and
right wing parties. We would get mostly votes that rank only
left wing or only right wing candidates. And the winner would
be with good probability the far-left candidate, not the
expected Condorcet winner (left).</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>The problem with "implicit approval cutoff after the ranked
candidates" is that voters would be encouraged not to rank all
the major candidates. Not good for Condorcet. That would
remove some important information. In this example the sincere
Condorcet winner could not be identified anymore.</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<p class="">46 A<br class="">
44 B>C<br class="">
10 C<br class="">
</p>
<p class="">A>B 46-44 (margin=2)���� B>C 44-10
(margin=34)�� C>A 54-46 (margin=8)<br class="">
<br class="">
Now Margins elects B,� rewarding the outrageous Burial
strategy.<br class="">
<br class="">
I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this
scenario. Even assuming that all the votes are sincere,<br
class="">
B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved"
and positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten<br
class="">
by A.)<br class="">
</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>Also here you assume that there is an implicit approval
cutoff after the ranked candidates. What if the votes are
sincere and there is no implicit approval cutoff?</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>Juho</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could
make a lot of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is
strong.</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of
ranked candidates could make sense when the number of
candidates is very high, or just to keep things simple for the
vote counting process, or to keep things simple enough for the
voters (not to frighten them with the idea of ranking all 100
candidates). I.e. not theoretically ideal, but in practical
situations ranking some candidates may be much better than
ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all.</div>
</div>
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