<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=windows-1252"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" class=""><br class=""><div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On 05 Mar 2019, at 23:07, Chris Benham <a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" class="">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a> [RangeVoting] <<a href="mailto:RangeVoting@yahoogroups.com" class="">RangeVoting@yahoogroups.com</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div class="">
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<!-- |**|begin egp html banner|**| -->
<br class=""><br class="">
<!-- |**|end egp html banner|**| --><p class="">46 A<br class="">
44 B>C<br class="">
10 C<br class="">
<br class="">
The positional information is on the ballots.� You can throw it
away by refusing to look at anything but a pairwise<br class="">
matrix, in this case� A>B 46-44,� B>C 44-10, C>A 54-46
and then say "oh well, I suppose we just have to break this<br class="">
cycle at its weakest link".<br class=""></p></div></div></blockquote><div>I guess the basic assumption is that ranked methods are based on rankings. I used also the actual ballots when trying to explain what would be a natural outcome with those votes (although the method was expected to use only rankings / the matrix). I didn't assume any approvals or positional information to be extracted from the ballots.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>I btw don't favour the approach of "breaking a cycle" since that approach seems to assume that there is something wrong with having a cycle, and that they should be eliminated to form a preference order without cycles. I rather tend to think that one should just elect the best candidate (no need to assume that cycles should be somehow broken or removed in the process).</div><div><br class=""></div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><p class="">
<br class="">
A is voted in top position, which in the case of ranked ballots I
would interpret as being ranked below no other<br class="">
candidate, in this case strictly above all other candidates, on
more ballots than B is ranked above bottom on any<br class="">
ballots. <br class=""></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div>Ok, that's some additional "positional information" that you may extract from the ballots. My default assumption in ranked methods is that vote X>A>B>C (where A is not in top position) would be the same as A>B>C if X is a totally irrelevant candidate. But of course, also additional information (other than rankings) can be included in the method if one so wants.</div><div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><p class="">
<br class="">
Plus of course A pairwise beats B.�� Given that A is so obviously
dominant over B, the contention that "B might be<br class="">
an ok winner" is absurd and not serious.� What shred of sane
common-sense explanation could you possibly give<br class="">
to the post-election complaining A supporters as to why their
candidate should have been beaten by B ??!<br class=""></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div>I tried to address this from one point of view in my previous post.</div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><p class="">
<br class="">
</p><blockquote type="cite" class="">does the "positional information" maybe
refer to some Borda like rating information? (or maybe implicit
ratings) </blockquote>
<br class="">
I infer some rating from rankings thus: candidates ranked above at
least one candidate and below no candidate are<br class="">
voted in the "top (or first) position", candidates not in the top
position but also ranked above at least one other candidate<br class="">
and below no candidate except those in top position are voted in
the "second-from-the-top position" and so on<br class="">
down to those candidates who are voted above no other candidate
are in the "bottom position".<br class="">
<br class="">
I consider that A "positionally dominates" B if A� has more first
position votes and more first plus second position votes<br class="">
and so on down to more above bottom votes.<br class="">
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">If A wins, B and C supporters (54,
majority) clearly think that C would have been a better choice
(and 44 voters would prefer B).</blockquote>
In the scenario as I described it the B voters don't really care
about C, they were just using C to benefit from Margins' gross
failure<br class="">
of the Later-no-Help criterion.<br class=""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div>Yes, you presented a strategic scenario, but my question was, what should we do if those same votes were sincere votes. In that case the method should pick the best candidate under the assumption that the votes are sincere. There could thus be another election with exactly similar votes, but where the votes are sincere.</div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<br class="">
The A supporters have an undeniable complaint against B but not
C.� <br class="">
<br class="">
The B supporters also have no reasonable complaint against C. They
all voted (above bottom) for C and C is voted above bottom<br class="">
on more ballots than B (or A) and C� has a beatpath to B.� They
can't claim to have been stung by a failure of Later-no-Harm <br class="">
because clearly if they had� truncated then A would have won.<br class="">
<br class="">
The C supporters have some� possible (relatively weak) complaint
against A. But you want to elect the only candidate whose <br class="">
supporters can have no remotely reasonable complaint against the
election of either of the other candidates.<br class="">
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">It is for example possible that there is
an election with 5 serious candidates (based on some good
polling information) and 50 other candidates with no chances to
win. In that situation it would not be a big problem to limit
the number of ranked candidates to say 7</blockquote>
If I sincerely prefer 7 minor candidates before any of the
"serious" ones, how is this method better for me than plurality?�
I will either<br class="">
have to vote insincerely or put up with my vote having no effect
on the result.<br class=""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div>In that case you should understand that ranking only the 7 minor candidates is not a good idea in that method. You should satisfy with ranking only 3 minor candidates.</div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<br class="">
If Ireland and Australia have no problem allowing voters to fully
rank then why should the US?<br class=""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div>Yes, I'm sure there are many elections where allowing full rankings is the best approach. (I have no knowledge of the US scenario.)</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Juho</div><div><br class=""></div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<br class="">
Chris Benham<br class=""><div class=""><br class="webkit-block-placeholder"></div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 6/03/2019 4:31 am, Juho Laatu wrote:<br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:2AE3F757-D372-484B-9B12-FACA6442E9A8@gmail.com" class="">
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<div class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On 05 Mar 2019, at 16:04, Chris Benham <a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>
[ApprovalVoting] <<a href="mailto:ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<div class="moz-forward-container">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">Also here you assume that there is an
implicit approval cutoff after the ranked
candidates. What if the votes are sincere and there
is no implicit approval cutoff?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
</blockquote>
No, I'm only "assuming" that positional information is
more meaningful than which candidate is "closer" to
being the Condorcet winner<br class="">
according to Margins or which candidate needs the fewest
additional bullet-votes to become the CW.<br class="">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">If the added implicit information is not approval of all
the ranked candidates, does the "positional information" maybe
refer to some Borda like rating information? (or maybe
implicit ratings) (I don't really like Borda ratings as
additional information either because of the associated
nomination related problems.)<br class="">
<br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<div class="moz-forward-container"> <br class="">
Given that Margins is very vulnerable to Burial strategy
the argument that it's worth putting up with that
because with sincere votes B<br class="">
in this scenario is the best (or a good or even
acceptable) candidate is .. what??</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<div class="moz-forward-container"> <br class="">
Or to put it another way, assuming the votes are
sincere, you arguments against electing A or C are what?<br class="">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I just thought that B might be ok if we take the votes to
be plain rankings (= pairwise preferences) with no additional
approval or positional information assumed. The mentioned
votes are of course very extreme (only three kind if voters),
so they are not a typical set of votes form a real life
election.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">46 A<br class="">
44 B>C<br class="">
10 C</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">One could think that A is a left wing candidate, C is
moderate right, and B is far right (because there are 44
voters that rank them in such linear order). A voters don't
seem to care which one of the right wing candidates wins (they
are tied in every single vote). The B voters have a clear and
understandable position, with full rankings. The C voters have
not ranked B. Maybe they are so centrist that A and B are
equally good to them.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Condorcet methods can be said to elect a compromise
candidate that is not too bad for anyone (sometimes the
Condorcet winner might have no first preference votes). I
therefore try to find an explanation to why B might win, from
this point of view (= elect he best compromise (that is not
very disliked)).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Since the A voters did not rank C above B, we must assume
that they are perfectly ok with electing B, if A does not win.
Same with C voters. B voters have a clear preference C>A
(if B can not win).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">If A wins, B and C supporters (54, majority) clearly think
that C would have been a better choice (and 44 voters would
prefer B). If C wins, 46 voters would prefer A, and 44 voters
would prefer B. If B wins, 46 voters would prefer A, and 10
voters would prefer C. B doesn't look too bad in this
comparison. B might be a better compromise than A or C. I.e.
less complaints and rebellions after the election.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">(I tried to avoid the "few votes short of being a Condorcet
winner" argument since you might not appreciate it.)</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<div class="moz-forward-container"> <br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">One might face problems sooner with
sincere voting than with strategic voting.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">First preferences could be as follows.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">30: far-left</div>
<div class="">21: left</div>
<div class="">19: right</div>
<div class="">30: far-right</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">If we assume that left hates right, and
right hates left, the natural approval limit would
be between the left wing and right wing parties. We
would get mostly votes that rank only left wing or
only right wing candidates. And the winner would be
with good probability the far-left candidate, not
the expected Condorcet winner (left).</div>
</blockquote>
<br class="">
That doesn't bother me much because (a) far-left may be
higher "Social Utility" than left </div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I don't know what "Social Utility" means here. I guess any
of the candidates could have that. It might not show up in
rankings nor in approvals.</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<div class="moz-forward-container">and (b) probably enough
right voters would <br class="">
be aware that the result is unlikely to be decided by
Approval and so they would not be taking a huge risk by
sincerely ranking left<br class="">
over far-left.<br class="">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I guess this depends on the method. I can't tell if all
"ranking + implicit approval" methods would behave well in
this respect. I also don't like very much the idea of voters
having to cast strategic votes instead of sincere votes (i.e.
implicit approvals in the ballots would not mean that the
voter would approve the candidate, but something strategic
instead).</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<div class="moz-forward-container"> <br class="">
But having said that, Smith//Approval using ballots
that� allow voters to rank among candidates they don't
approve would not be <br class="">
in my book too bad (and much better than Margins).<br class="">
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">P.S. I think the
STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a lot
of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is
strong.</blockquote>
That method doesn't have good criterion compliances.
It's just a gimmick to smuggle Condorcet compliance past
IRV enthusiasts.<br class="">
The alternative of just checking for a CW (among
remaining candidates) before each elimination is much
better.<br class="">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I'm not a big believer in criterion compliance in real life
election methods. In theoretical studies different criteria
are excellent measurement tools, but in real life elections
nobody cares if the method performs well in some theoretical
situations. Often slightly modified (heuristic style, not
necessarily "mathematically clean") methods are close enough
to meeting those criteria on practice anyway. Also my
theoretically ideal "maximally strategy resistant method"
might be one that fails to meet most of the named criteria,
but does so intentionally in order to violate each one (or
many) of them just a little bit, so that it can maximise
resistance against all kind of strategies (and keep its worst
vulnerability least bad).</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<div class="moz-forward-container"> <br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">P.P.S. Limiting the
number of ranking levels or number of ranked
candidates could make sense when the number of
candidates is very high, or just to keep things simple
for the vote counting process, or to keep things
simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them
with the idea of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not
theoretically ideal, but in practical situations
ranking some candidates may be much better than
ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all.</blockquote>
<br class="">
Limiting the number of candidates the voter is allowed
to rank makes no sense. What has happened to your
concern<br class="">
about "removing information" on who the sincere/
"expected" CW is?<br class="">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Typically the intention is not to limit the number of
candidates that can be ranked (when compared to the situation
before he change) but to make that number higher, while
allowing it not to be very high. I am still worried about
removing information, but I can accept some limitations
sometimes (when full ranking is not feasible, or when most
voters would not rank all candidates anyway, or when other
solutions are not politically possible). The limits should be
such that they probably do not lead to not electing the
sincere Condorcet winner (or the best candidate when there is
no Condorcet winner).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">It is for example possible that there is an election with 5
serious candidates (based on some good polling information)
and 50 other candidates with no chances to win. In that
situation it would not be a big problem to limit the number of
ranked candidates to say 7. The ballots could be simpler that
way, and voting would not be too tedious. I would not mind
someone starting even from 3, if that is an improvement e.g.
to the earlier FPTP.</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<div class="moz-forward-container"> <br class="">
There would be nothing "frightening" about ranking all
the candidates if doing so is purely optional. But
voters who wish<br class="">
to vote a full ranking should be allowed to. <br class="">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">That is possible, and a positive thing to do, but I do
understand that sometimes also less perfect methods can be
"perfect" or "sufficient" for the current real life situation.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Juho</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<div class="moz-forward-container"> <br class="">
Chris� Benham<br class="">
<br class="">
<br class="">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/03/2019 6:42 pm, Juho
Laatu wrote:<br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:4716BB51-8459-4791-AB04-F93B76B8637B@gmail.com" class="">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=windows-1252" class="">
<div class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On 05 Mar 2019, at 07:45, Chris
Benham <a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>
[ApprovalVoting] <<a href="mailto:ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><p class="">Robert,</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">in a ranked
ballot, what defines an "approved"
candidate?� all unranked candidates are
tied for last place on a ballot.� is any
candidate that is ranked at all "approved"?</blockquote>
Yes.<br class="">
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">that would
change and complicate the meaning of the
ranked ballot.</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="webkit-block-placeholder">
</div><p class="">Arguably "change" somewhat but I
don't see how (overly) "complicate".
Allowing voters to rank among unapproved<br class="">
candidates makes the method more vulnerable
to strategy and a lot more complicated.<br class="">
</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">One might face problems sooner with
sincere voting than with strategic voting.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">First preferences could be as follows.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">30: far-left</div>
<div class="">21: left</div>
<div class="">19: right</div>
<div class="">30: far-right</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">If we assume that left hates right,
and right hates left, the natural approval limit
would be between the left wing and right wing
parties. We would get mostly votes that rank only
left wing or only right wing candidates. And the
winner would be with good probability the far-left
candidate, not the expected Condorcet winner
(left).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The problem with "implicit approval
cutoff after the ranked candidates" is that voters
would be encouraged not to rank all the major
candidates. Not good for Condorcet. That would
remove some important information. In this example
the sincere Condorcet winner could not be
identified anymore.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><p class="">46 A<br class="">
44 B>C<br class="">
10 C<br class="">
</p><p class="">A>B 46-44
(margin=2)���� B>C 44-10
(margin=34)�� C>A 54-46 (margin=8)<br class="">
<br class="">
Now Margins elects B,� rewarding the
outrageous Burial strategy.<br class="">
<br class="">
I can't tolerate any method that elects B in
this scenario. Even assuming that all the
votes are sincere,<br class="">
B is clearly the weakest candidate (the
least "approved" and positionally dominated
and pairwise-beaten<br class="">
by A.)<br class="">
</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">Also here you assume that there is an
implicit approval cutoff after the ranked
candidates. What if the votes are sincere and
there is no implicit approval cutoff?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Juho</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that
Robert proposed could make a lot of sense in
societies where IRV way of thinking is strong.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking
levels or number of ranked candidates could make
sense when the number of candidates is very high,
or just to keep things simple for the vote
counting process, or to keep things simple enough
for the voters (not to frighten them with the idea
of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not
theoretically ideal, but in practical situations
ranking some candidates may be much better than
ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all.</div>
</div>
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<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">----
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://electorama.com/em">https://electorama.com/em</a> for list info
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