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<p>Robert,<br>
<br>
I am strongly of the view that voters should be allowed to
bullet-vote<br>
or rank every single candidate or anything in between.<br>
<br>
(For IRV and my suggested IRV-Condorcet hybrid I am opposed to
allowing<br>
above-bottom equal-ranking without a relatively complicated
mechanism<br>
I invented.)<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"> i think that it is reasonable for the law
to assign a fixed number of ranking levels, but it should be
more than 3. </blockquote>
<br>
What is "reasonable" about it? There is no such restriction in
elections for the President of Ireland or seats in<br>
the legislature of the Australian state of New South Wales and
other places.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">"..eliminating all-at-once all but the top
two candidates."<br>
<br>
i dunno what that means.</blockquote>
<br>
In other words I support the Alternative Vote and not what is
called the "Contingent Vote" or "Top-Two IRV".<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingent_vote">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingent_vote</a><br>
<blockquote type="cite"><font size="+2"><span style="color:
rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 14px;
font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal;
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing:
normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2;
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-style:
initial; text-decoration-color: initial; display: inline
!important; float: none;">The contingent vote differs from
the<span> </span></span><a
href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting"
title="Instant-runoff voting" style="text-decoration: none;
color: rgb(11, 0, 128); background: none rgb(255, 255, 255);
font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 14px; font-style:
normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps:
normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans:
2; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform:
none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;
-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;">alternative vote</a><span
style="color: rgb(34, 34, 34); font-family: sans-serif;
font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures:
normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400;
letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: start;
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width:
0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);
text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-color:
initial; display: inline !important; float: none;"><span> </span>which
allows for many rounds of counting, eliminating only one
weakest candidate each round.</span></font></blockquote>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">in a ranked ballot, what defines an
"approved" candidate? all unranked candidates are tied for last
place on a ballot. is any candidate that is ranked at all
"approved"?</blockquote>
Yes.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">that would change and
complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.</blockquote>
</p>
<p>Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly)
"complicate". Allowing voters to rank among unapproved<br>
candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot
more complicated.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">i still see no advantage of any method
that is not Condorcet compliant over one that is.</blockquote>
<br>
All Condorcet methods are vulnerable to Burial strategy and fail
the Favorite Betrayal Criterion.<br>
<br>
As has been pointed out to you on this list before, Margins is
especially vulnerable to Burial.<br>
</p>
<p>Suppose sincere is: <br>
<br>
46 A<br>
44 B<br>
10 C<br>
<br>
<br>
I hope we are clear that if everyone bullet-votes like this then A
is the Condorcet (and every other<br>
type of) winner.<br>
<br>
Supposing this scenario is accurately reflected in the
pre-election polls, and so the B voters (perhaps<br>
following advice from their party) decide "It looks like we are
going to lose to A, maybe something good<br>
will happen if we rank C" and so the votes cast are:<br>
<br>
46 A<br>
44 B>C<br>
10 C<br>
</p>
<p>A>B 46-44 (margin=2) B>C 44-10 (margin=34) C>A
54-46 (margin=8)<br>
<br>
Now Margins elects B, rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy.<br>
<br>
I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this scenario. Even
assuming that all the votes are sincere,<br>
B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and
positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten<br>
by A.)<br>
<br>
IRV and the IRV-Condorcet method I like elects A.<br>
</p>
<p>The Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval methods I like elect
C. The B voters "approved" C and they got C.<br>
<br>
If you think it is "reasonable" to restrict the number of "ranking
levels" and you want to allow voters to equal-rank<br>
and presumably also skip ranking levels, then in my book you are
talking about ratings rather than rankings<br>
and you have something that stuffs up IRV or anything similar.<br>
<br>
But it is fine for Condorcet//Approval or Smith//Approval or
Smith//Top Ratings and several other voting methods<br>
I like.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/03/2019 10:02 am, robert
bristow-johnson wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:76e51183fcdb8044d350dc4ae1cb0a44.squirrel@webmail04.register.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<p><br>
<br>
---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] The IRV-Disease has reached my town.<br>
From: "Chris Benham" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au"><cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au></a><br>
Date: Mon, March 4, 2019 7:41 am<br>
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">election-methods@lists.electorama.com</a><br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
> I think voting reform activists in the US should welcome
IRV and push to<br>
> make sure that there are<br>
> no abominable "details" like restricted ranking or
eliminating<br>
> all-at-once all but the top two candidates.<br>
<br>
i dunno what that means.<br>
<br>
> Voters must be able to strictly rank from the top however
many<br>
> candidates they wish, and the eliminations<br>
> must be one-at-a-time.<br>
<br>
then you need tougher ballot access restrictions. SF had more
than a dozen candidates but only 3 levels of ranking. i think
that it is reasonable for the law to assign a fixed number of
ranking levels, but it should be more than 3. then the number
of signatures required to get a
candidate's name on the ballot should be increased high enough
that *typically* the number of candidates is no more than the
number of ranking levels. in Burlington Vermont, we had 5
levels and rarely more than 5 candidates on the ballot for
mayor.<br>
<br>
> In my judgement this is better than Approval (or something<br>
> strategically equivalent that uses ratings ballots<br>
> with more than 2 slots) because it doesn't have any
annoying defection<br>
> incentive and properly meets<br>
> "Mutual Relative Majority".</p>
<p>the problem with both Approval and Score Voting is that the
voter must make a tactical decision about how high to score (or
whether to approve) their second-choice. it is inherently
flawed in that manner.</p>
<p><br>
> If you are a fan of the Condorcet criterion, then I think
it is fine to<br>
> modify IRV by before each elimination<br>
> we check for a Condorcet winner (among the so far remaining
candidates)<br>
> and when we find one we stop<br>
> and declare that candidate the winner.</p>
<p>one way to do this is STV-BTR ("Bottom Two Runoff"). so it's
just like IRV, except when a candidate needs to be eliminated,
it is not simply the guy on the bottom (of first-choice votes),
the two bottom candidates are runoff
against each other, counting only how voters rank them relative
to each other (like in the IRV final round), only the winner of
that Bottom Runoff advances to the next round. this STV-BTR is
Condorcet compliant.</p>
<p><br>
> If you want something more simple then I think
Condorcet//Approval is<br>
> acceptable.<br>
><br>
> Voters simply rank the candidates they approve.
Equal-ranking should<br>
> preferably be allowed.</p>
<p>Yes!</p>
<p>> A candidate that pairwise beats all the others wins. If
there is no such<br>
> candidate then the most approved candidate wins.</p>
<p>in a ranked ballot, what defines an "approved" candidate? all
unranked candidates are tied for last place on a ballot. is any
candidate that is ranked at all "approved"? that would change
and
complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.</p>
<p><br>
> A bit better, but equivalent in 3-candidate elections and
harder to<br>
> explain, are Smith//Approval and (one of<br>
> my favourites) Max Covered Approval.</p>
<p>i still think that Tideman RP using margins is the simplest
meaningful method that elects the same candidate that Schulze
(based on margins) elects when there are 3 in the Smith set.<br>
<br>
both the rules and meaning for marking the ballots (Ranking
Candidate A above Candidate B only means that if the election
were held between only those two candidates, your vote is for
Candidate A) and the decision algorithm (If more voters mark
their ballots preferring Candidate A over Candidate B
than the number of voters marking their ballots to the contrary,
then Candidate B is not elected)m should be simple for everyone
to understand. as simple as possible.</p>
<p>i still see no advantage of any method that is not Condorcet
compliant over one that is.</p>
<p>--<br>
<br>
r b-j <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
<br>
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br>
</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<br>
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