<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=us-ascii"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" class=""><div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On 05 Mar 2019, at 07:45, Chris Benham <a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" class="">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a> [ApprovalVoting] <<a href="mailto:ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com" class="">ApprovalVoting@yahoogroups.com</a>> wrote:</div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><p class="">Robert,</p></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">in a ranked ballot, what defines an
"approved" candidate? all unranked candidates are tied for last
place on a ballot. is any candidate that is ranked at all
"approved"?</blockquote>
Yes.<br class="">
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">that would change and
complicate the meaning of the ranked ballot.</blockquote><div class=""><br class="webkit-block-placeholder"></div><p class="">Arguably "change" somewhat but I don't see how (overly)
"complicate". Allowing voters to rank among unapproved<br class="">
candidates makes the method more vulnerable to strategy and a lot
more complicated.<br class=""></p></div></div></blockquote><div>One might face problems sooner with sincere voting than with strategic voting.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>First preferences could be as follows.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>30: far-left</div><div>21: left</div><div>19: right</div><div>30: far-right</div><div><br class=""></div><div>If we assume that left hates right, and right hates left, the natural approval limit would be between the left wing and right wing parties. We would get mostly votes that rank only left wing or only right wing candidates. And the winner would be with good probability the far-left candidate, not the expected Condorcet winner (left).</div><div><br class=""></div><div>The problem with "implicit approval cutoff after the ranked candidates" is that voters would be encouraged not to rank all the major candidates. Not good for Condorcet. That would remove some important information. In this example the sincere Condorcet winner could not be identified anymore.</div><div><br class=""></div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><p class="">46 A<br class="">
44 B>C<br class="">
10 C<br class="">
</p><p class="">A>B 46-44 (margin=2) B>C 44-10 (margin=34) C>A
54-46 (margin=8)<br class="">
<br class="">
Now Margins elects B, rewarding the outrageous Burial strategy.<br class="">
<br class="">
I can't tolerate any method that elects B in this scenario. Even
assuming that all the votes are sincere,<br class="">
B is clearly the weakest candidate (the least "approved" and
positionally dominated and pairwise-beaten<br class="">
by A.)<br class=""></p></div></div></blockquote><div>Also here you assume that there is an implicit approval cutoff after the ranked candidates. What if the votes are sincere and there is no implicit approval cutoff?</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Juho</div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div>P.S. I think the STV-BTR method that Robert proposed could make a lot of sense in societies where IRV way of thinking is strong.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>P.P.S. Limiting the number of ranking levels or number of ranked candidates could make sense when the number of candidates is very high, or just to keep things simple for the vote counting process, or to keep things simple enough for the voters (not to frighten them with the idea of ranking all 100 candidates). I.e. not theoretically ideal, but in practical situations ranking some candidates may be much better than ranking only one, or not bothering to vote at all.</div></div><style type="text/css" class="">
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