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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 1/4/2019 2:47 PM, Curt wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
Hi, I was wondering what you all thought of the following reasoning.
1) Start with the assumption that for a single-winner election, if one candidate would defeat all others head-to-head, that candidate must be the winner. This requires the method to be Condorcet-compliant, and, I believe, disregards the later-no-harm criterion.</pre>
</blockquote>
<p>Actually, you are starting with a prior assumption, perhaps
several of them. You assume a deterministic voting system, you
assume a fixed candidate list. Then "must be the winner" may allow
a candidate to win without being specifically approved for that by
a majority of the electorate, which is a basic principle of
democracy for *any decision binding on the membership.* It's where
democracy begins. <br>
</p>
<p>I have never seen a study of when and where this was abandoned.
It is still followed in deliberative bodies</p>
<p>LNH is a voting system criterion, that, if passed, disallows
compromise. Imagine neighbors voting to decide what colors to
paint fences. Neighbor A has a favorite. The voting system they
use satisfies LNH. LNH compliant systems must hide all lower
preferences from consideration until the first preference is
actually eliminated. Then and only then can another color be voted
for. In fact, neighbors will probably use an ancient system,
negotiation, and will seek supermajority, not mere majority.
Majority is a fall-back position, but if majority decisions are
not at least accepted at some level, the neighborhood will be in
trouble.</p>
<p>People will agree, in real situations, that such a winner is not
always the best choice. And this points to a possible fundamental
voting system criterion: can the system distinguish preference
level from acceptance, which is binary, and there is a simple way
to do this with score voting, which is to define a particular
score or above as the minimum acceptance level.</p>
<p>In promoting Approval Voting, votes have been called, no
surprise, "approvals." "Do you approve of candidate A?" That is an
ontological error, where "approve" has a narrow meaning, different
from the emotional reaction. In a runoff voting system (which I
argue is fundamentally necessary), approval means "do you prefer
the election of this candidate over the election being repeated?"
That is a binary choice.<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
2) Acknowledge the “one-person one-vote” principle that means that if, in a two-candidate election, candidate A has 50 votes and candidate B has 49 votes, then candidate A *must* win, even if B’s voters are wildly more enthusiastic.</pre>
</blockquote>
<p>Which, of course, makes sense only because we are accustomed to
voting systems that don't consider preference strength, except in
one way: turnout. Turnout is biased in some election by the level
of preference the voter actually holds. "Wildly more enthusiastic"
does not encompass the possibilities. How about "49 people are
ready to destroy the organization if the candidate mildly
preferred by 50 is elected?" Preference strength matters. Only if
the two factions are similarly "enthusiastic" would choosing a
bare majority candidate make sense. In reality, the probability is
high that the best person for the office was not on the ballot. A
simple vote-for-one ballot seems simple, but does not collect
enough information to allow better social choices to be made.\</p>
<p>So, then, should B win? No, of course not, not just with that
information. However, I suggest this basic principle, to make *and
continue* any decision, majority approval is required. This can be
expressed as a ratification or the lack of a motion for
reconsideration. <br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">3) Acknowledge that score or range voting *does* have an advantage in recognizing overall utility society when taking into account voter enthusiasm - *if* the enthusiasm is scored/recorded honestly.</pre>
</blockquote>
<p>This issue of "honesty" vastly distorts the reality. Voting is
like tossing weights on a balance. Score voting is just voting,
tossing weights on a balance. Generally, score systems do not
reward reversal of preference, optimal strategy will rank
candidates in order of preference, but, then, the decision of how
to rate those candidates (equally or not, or with what difference
in score) is made generally, and optimally,. according to the
voters' estimation of the effect of the vote. There may be such a
thing as absolute preference strength, but it's quite a complex
issue. To test it requires some kind of metric. Bottom line and in
practice, people have varying preference strength and it is
expressed according to probabilities, not according to absolutes.</p>
<p>When there is a real-world consequence, affecting the voter, that
leads the voter to make accept/reject choices, this can nail the
score votes to a minimum of three levels. Suppose there is a score
system allowing three ratings: Prefer, Accept, and Reject.
"Prefer" has an obvious meaning, Accept means "prefer the election
of this person to a repeated election," and Reject again has an
obvious meaning: "I prefer another election." <br>
</p>
<p>Ballots, I suggest, as far as is practical, should collect
preference information and acceptance information. So I would have
a score ballot with enough rating resolution to allow meaningful
preferences to be expressed. Below a certain level of preference
strength, votes are not particularly meaningful. My general sense
is that ratings of 0-9 would be quite adequate. Then 5 could
represent acceptance. Because equal rating would be allowed, the
voter would still have 4 acceptance levels and 6 rejection levels.</p>
<p>But such systems require very substantial voter knowledge and
participation. There is a far easier solution that hybridizes
voting with represented voting, first suggested by Charles Dodgson
(Lewis Carroll) in the 1880s, for use with Single Transferable
Vote, now called Asset Voting, the term invented, if I'm correct,
by Warren Smith. More about that below.<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">4) Acknowledge the occasional (and probably rare) phenomenon of A->B->C->A loops in Condorcet-style voting, which must be resolved somehow.</pre>
</blockquote>
<p>Once we accept that an election can fail, which is standard
democratic process in voluntary organizations, there is no "must
be resolved." Does the voting system allow explicit acceptance, in
addition to mere preference? If so, that is a possible resolution.
This is approached and possibly implied by the use of a score
ballot. This would be handled in a ranked ballot by having a dummy
candidate called "Repeat the election," which the voter would rank
at the appropriate position in the list of candidates.</p>
<p>And compared to Asset, it's all unnecessary complication, that
perpetuates the isolation between voters and the collective. Asset
creates public voters (I call them electors) and the collection of
electors fully represents the entire voting electorate. The
electors then make the necessary compromises, etc,. on behalf of
the electorate. Contrary to what is often assumed, these are not
necessarily "candidates" for the office. This is like the original
U.S. electoral college, but the writers of the Constitution punted
on voting system. It's clear that the intention was not, however,
"pledged electors, from a slate pledged, and not even named on the
ballot." It became that because of a loophole in the Constitution,
allowing each state legislature to determine how the electors from
each state would be chosen. Thus, in fact, the Electoral College
ended up representing the States, not the voters. They did not
factor for the development of the party system.<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">5) Accept that the presence of such loops is not a “bug”, but instead the measurement of some level of indecisiveness among the electorate, such that further voter data is required.</pre>
</blockquote>
Indeed. What is missed is "a better list of candidates."<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
And end up with the following:
1) Present the ballots as score/range ballots</pre>
</blockquote>
Score ballots allow ranking. If the score resolution is limited, not
full ranking, but full ranking with small preference strength (or
donkey voting in systems that require full ranking, as in some
Australian elections) is largely meaningless. If there are as many
ratings as candidates, it allows full ranking. Such ballots would
collect valuable information, even if it is not used for the instant
election. It could, for example, provide for ballot eligibility, it
could affect campaign funding. I am opposed to public campaign
financing (but in favor of measures that would reduce or even
eliminate the need for major election spending, which are possible,
and Asset would do it), but if there is such financing, ratings
could affect it. At substantial cost and effort, information is
gathered from the voting electorate, but it's primitive, black and
white, unsophisticated.<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">2) When tabulating, use the scores/ranges to deduce an ordinal (ranked-choice) ranking for each ballot, ignoring the scores/ranges otherwise</pre>
</blockquote>
Yes, basic in designing a hybrid system. This was proposed long ago.<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">
3) Use the rankings to determine if there is a Condorcet Winner. If so, STOP HERE. This makes the voting method Condorcet-Compliant.</pre>
</blockquote>
<p>I would not stop there. I would require explicit approval. This
can be easily specific on a score ballot as a particular rating.
On a score 9 ballot, half rating would be 4.5 which can't be
expressed, so 5 becomes the accepted rating level. The actual
rules could be come quite sophisticated, with practice and
experience. I would "err" in the direction of repeated election
where there is doubt about the result.</p>
<p>I would have write-in votes be allowed in all elections (which is
standard practice in many places in the U.S.), including run-offs.
I would then use an "advanced ballot" for both a primary and a
runoff. The runoff ballot would then have at least two candidates
on it, plus write-in. Under some conditions, it might have three
on the ballot.</p>
<p>A Condorcet winner, if not winning directly, would be on the
runoff ballot, for sure. This is why "must win" is a Bad Idea. The
runoff will test preference strength! If you voted for the CW, but
it was a weak preference, you might not turn out to vote in
runoff, because *you don't care enough to spend the time.* So the
"enthusiastic" Score voting winner might well prevail. There are
indications from study of runoff election results to indicate that
this effect actually happens. A dark horse becomes the runner-up
in a primary and then goes on to win in the runoff. That rarely
happens with IRV.<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">4) If not, determine the Smith Set
5) Use the scores/ranges to determine the winner from within the Smith Set. This makes the method Smith-compliant.</pre>
</blockquote>
<p>The Score voting winner would also be on a runoff ballot. <br>
</p>
<p>If the Score winner is the same candidate as the Cordorcet
winner, and if a majority of the electorate has also approved of
the candidate, there is no runoff.</p>
<p>Then we start to deal with rarer situations: my view is that no
election should complete without majority approval. A point to
keep in mind, mentioned by Roberts' Rules of Order, is that
repeating the election would allow new nominations. In fixed
runoff systems, this is still respected by allowing write-in votes
in the runoff. (and it has happened that a write-in candidate won
a runoff.) Ah, but can a candidate win a runoff with a mere
plurality? This is at the edge of democracy, and it's hazardous to
discard the majority principle. But the example I know of, it was
very clear that the winner was the choice of the electorate, given
the obstacles she faced and overcame.</p>
<p>The runoff ballot should also allow multiple "accept" votes, in
addition to ranking. This would allow a write-in to also express
an opinion on the frontrunners.</p>
<p>Asset trumps all this complication. Asset shines with
proportional representation, with the entire assembly being a
single district, which, then allows flexible and full
representation. I would expect that electors would mostly be
elected locally, so they would, to that extent, represent
districts. And then the Assembly would elect officers, i.e,. a
parliamentary system, the officers serving at the pleasure of the
public, expressed through the Assembly, elected by the Electoral
College, each set representing a quota of votes, all traceable to
electors, and voters know whom they voted for.</p>
<p>However, the Electoral College could also elect officers,
single-winner. Simple. Ballots could even be vote-for-one,
majority required. But there is no reason to avoid more
sophisticated, more efficient ballot designs, expecially given
that the electors are public voters. So the standard result that a
decision can be moved for reconsideration by anyone who supported
it can function (with a secret ballot, there is no way to know). A
motion for reconsideration must be seconded and is then put to a
vote immediately. No debate, no discussion. Thus every election
must, in effect, be, at least, implicitly approved.<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">I am not well-versed in voting criteria, but it seems to me this bypasses the worst criticisms of score/range voting, while also taking in account some of their advantage. While score/range voting is susceptible to strategic voting, there should be little incentive for a voter to strategically adjust their scores *to the point of changing their ordinal ranking*, due to the emphasis on finding the Condorcet Winner first.</pre>
</blockquote>
Right. Equal ranking must be allowed, though. It means "no
*significant* preference.<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap=""> And so then, since people will be scoring/rating relatively honestly, greater social utility is met in the case where there is not a Condorcet Winner. Finally, we know that the winner is (ordinally) preferred over all other candidates outside of the Smith Set, making it Smith-compliant. Score/Range/Star voting are not Condorcet-compliant (nor Smith-compliant, I think), but this voting method is.</pre>
</blockquote>
<p>But it does not satisfy the generalized "negative majority
criterion" (for lack of a better name, "if a candidate does not
receive an acceptance vote from a majority of voters, the
candidate cannot win.". Even though this is standard practice in
deliberative bodies, voting systems theorists, designing voting
systems criteria, have apparently neglected it.</p>
<p>Task for a student: how did we end up in this fix?</p>
<p>The most advanced voting system in current practice in the U.S.
is runoff voting. It has a problem, for sure, center squeeze. Curt
should look at Bucklin voting, which was almost what he wants. A
Score ballot could be used for Bucklin. Bucklin was rejected, in
the end, because not many voters in primary elections still using
it, were adding additional approvals. It's obvious why. It was a
friggin' *primary*. It was replaced by runoff voting, if I'm
correct, instead of keeping the Bucklin ballot for the primary and
using it to feed a runoff if there was no majority winner, they
dropped the advanced ballot.</p>
<p>So FairVote is going around, killing the most advanced method in
use (runoff voting), in favor of the "instant" version that then
fails to allow flexibility in runoffs. Even with top-two runoff,
the runner-up in the primary often wins, about a third of the
time, whereas it is rare with "instant runoff." FairVote then
argues that this result is "unfair," because of lower turnout in
runoffs, which is a knee-jerk response that assumes there is
something wrong with low *voluntary* turnout.<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">I conjecture that if scores/rankings were measured for all other Condorcet methods (and then similarly ignored to deduce ordinal rankings), this method would offer greater social utility as measured by the scores, by definition. And, I believe this is superior to pure range/score/star voting *when* starting with the axiom that the voting method must be Condorcet-compliant.</pre>
</blockquote>
<p>The Condorcet criterion is intuitively satisfying only in a world
which does not consider *actual preference strength. The negative
majority criterion is more fundamental. I agree that hybrid
systems are the possible future of voting systems, but the fact is
that very primitive voting systems work with the negative majority
criterion respected.</p>
<p>For the present, the most obvious voting system reform is what I
call "<b>Count All the Votes</b>." This slogan or name for it
represents how simple the system is, it requires no ballot changes
except a changed instruction. This is what is more commonly called
Approval Voting, and it is a Score voting system, Score 1, i.e,
votes from 0-1, with 0 being assumed if the voter does not mark
the candidate. It is then a simple step to add more score levels,
Score 2 having obvious meaning, as stated above. (but I defined a
vote of 1 as being "accept." It could be neutral, an abstention,
which then would be more likely to require a runoff.)</p>
<p>Asset's slogan could then ride on this: "<b>Make All Votes Count</b>."
Asset wastes no votes, period.</p>
<p>Asset is radical, it would, my opinion, transform politics
entirely, into the science of how we communicate, collaborate, and
cooperate.</p>
<p>The system is the message.
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:689F4E80-C6E0-4D70-96FC-AD2472428AC8@museworld.com">
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