<div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr">Hi Rob,<div><br></div><div>The thread I was referring to was actually one that included the following comment, which introduced a complementary approval candidate similar to your own:</div><div><br></div><div><a href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-November/000991.html">http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-November/000991.html</a><br></div><div><br></div><div>But my later suggestion was related, so no problem.</div><div><br></div><div>Regarding your modification suggestion, I'm not sure that you fixed anything. Including everyone above 50% approval potentially creates an over-crowded ballot. However, as Chris Benham states in the included post above, Approval Winner plus complementary (or, as I like to call it, <i>excluded</i>) approval winner could lead to Condorcet violation.</div><div><br></div><div>Let's imagine a Condorcet-like election with a score ballot with more than two ratings, so it's not just approval. Say 0 to 3, with any score above zero indicating approval.</div><div><br></div><div>Infer rankings from the ratings (higher score ranks above lower score), and tabulate the pairwise array.</div><div><br></div><div>Then advance the following candidates to the general election: the Smith set, plus the Approval winner, plus the AW-complement. This group is guaranteed to include the Condorcet winner, plus at least one other candidate. If desired, according to your criterion above, you could also include the AW-runner-up.</div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr">On Thu, Nov 22, 2018 at 1:12 AM Rob Lanphier <<a href="mailto:robla@robla.net" target="_blank">robla@robla.net</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Ted,<br>
<br>
Hmm....I have a tweak to the proposal to run by you. More below...<br>
<br>
On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 5:31 PM Ted Stern <<a href="mailto:dodecatheon@gmail.com" target="_blank">dodecatheon@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> I like the MAF proposal. I've posted in favor of PR approval based runoff methods before, almost exactly 2 years ago, in fact.<br>
<br>
Thanks! My proposal comes with a bit of naivety about prior<br>
proposals. In the past, I've sent an "oh, I have an idea" post it to<br>
this list, and then someone replies "you mean Coombs?" and I ask<br>
"what's Coombs?" and then someone (possibly after emitting a heavy<br>
sigh) composes a very educational email detailing what Coombs is.<br>
<br>
I'm assuming the proposal you're talking about is this one:<br>
<a href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-November/001054.html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-November/001054.html</a><br>
<br>
I just read it, and I concur. Applying proportional-style approval<br>
voting to electoral college selection is a neat idea. The MAF step 2<br>
in my proposal seems to use a very similar mechanism to the one you<br>
describe. My proposal below might be even more similar...<br>
<br>
> My only caveat would be that there is a theoretical possibility that including everyone who gets more than 50% approval could introduce a clone crowding effect. Do you want any limits on the number?<br>
<br>
The clone problem has been in the back of my mind for a while; I'm<br>
glad you brought it up. A solution that just occurred to me: what if<br>
we generalized the MAF step 2 mechanism. So, here's the MAF rules in<br>
my blog post yesterday (er...make that Tuesday):<br>
1. The candidate who receives the highest approval rating qualifies<br>
for the general election<br>
2. If less than 75% approve of the leading candidate, then a second<br>
candidate (the “complementary candidate”), who maximizes the approval<br>
of the electorate, also qualifies<br>
3. All candidates who receive over 50% approval also qualify for the<br>
general election<br>
<br>
For a dominant party like the Democratic Party in California in 2018,<br>
under this system, their motivation would be to run as many Democrats<br>
as possible, and hope they all make it to the general election.<br>
<br>
What if instead, for all candidates who qualify via step 1 or step 3<br>
(getting between 50% and 75% of the vote), an opposition candidate is<br>
chosen? If the left-wing/right-wing model persists for a while, it<br>
basically means that every Democrat/Green/PeaceAndFreedom candidate<br>
who advances by getting 50% approval, there could be a<br>
Republican/Libertarian/AmericanIndependent who also advances. If the<br>
Republican and Democratic parties remain dominant, there would<br>
probably be an R for every D, but of course, once people start getting<br>
comfortable approving an army of clones, it could be that clone<br>
coalitions form that bring in these third parties. For reference,<br>
here's the certified political parties in California:<br>
<a href="https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/political-parties/qualified-political-parties/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/political-parties/qualified-political-parties/</a><br>
<br>
(and don't hold me to my assessment that<br>
"Democrat/Green/PeaceAndFreedom" == "left" and<br>
"Republican/Libertarian/AmericanIndependent == "right"...I'm a little<br>
uninformed about the nuances of our third parties, and also realize<br>
that, for example, Libertarians would balk at being called "right<br>
wing" in the left/right model)<br>
<br>
Advancing an army of clones invites an army of complementary<br>
candidates, so I suspect that would motivate partisan voters to be<br>
stingy about approving an army of clones, and to motivate<br>
parties/coalitions to thin their ranks a little before the primary and<br>
publish focused endorsements, and to motivate candidates to drop out<br>
before the primary if the field is too crowded.<br>
<br>
Perhaps a way of formalizing this mechanism would be to change to this<br>
set of rules:<br>
1. Select the candidate who receives the highest approval rating.<br>
This is the "top candidate" and qualifies for the ballot<br>
1a. If the top candidate (and any other candidate) receives greater<br>
than 75% approval, add these candidates to the "highly-approved<br>
candidate pool"<br>
1b. If the top candidate receives less than 75% approval, add the top<br>
candidate to the "majority candidate pool"<br>
2. If the top candidate has been added to the "majority candidate<br>
pool", also add a candidate to the “opposition candidate pool”. To be<br>
added, this candidate must be the candidate which maximizes the<br>
"majority/opposition ballot satisfaction". "ballot satisfaction"<br>
generally means voters approve of at least one candidate on a given<br>
ballot. "majority/opposition ballot satisfaction" is for a ballot<br>
that only contains the "majority candidate pool" and the "opposition<br>
candidate pool".<br>
3. For each candidate who receives over 50% approval, but less than<br>
75% approval:<br>
3a. Add this candidate to the "majority candidate pool"<br>
3b. Add a candidate to the "opposition candidate pool" who maximizes<br>
the "majority/opposition ballot satisfaction" of the electorate (as in<br>
step 2)<br>
4. Eliminate all candidates from the "opposition candidate pool" who<br>
have an overall approval rating under 25%<br>
5. All candidates remaining in the "highly-approved candidate pool",<br>
the "majority candidate pool" and the "opposition candidate pool"<br>
advance to the general election.<br>
<br>
In the original MAF proposal, the "opposition candidate pool" (i.e.<br>
the "complementary candidate") is no more than one candidate. In this<br>
proposal, the opposition candidate pool could grow to two candidates<br>
if two candidates are added to the majority candidate pool..<br>
<br>
This doesn't seem like a radical departure from the rules I described<br>
in my Tuesday blog post. The added complexity bothers me, but this<br>
seems to solve a problem with the original proposal. In the old<br>
proposal, the single complementary candidate is chosen as an<br>
alternative to the leading candidate, even if a third candidate is<br>
also added. In this proposal, it would seem rare to advance just<br>
three candidates; either there's one candidate in each pool ("highly<br>
approved", "majority", "opposition") or there as a candidate pruned<br>
from the "opposition candidate pool" for being under 25% approval.<br>
<br>
My hunch: it would take at least 2-3 election cycles before more than<br>
two candidates advance to the general. I suspect bullet voting would<br>
be common in early elections, and it would take a while before<br>
sophisticated campaign strategies emerge (e.g. like candidates<br>
endorsing each other, holding joint events, and advertising for one<br>
another). Most elections would result in a single "majority"<br>
candidate, and an "opposition" candidate.<br>
<br>
I came up with the set of rules above as I was composing this email,<br>
because I wanted to make the rules fit the examples below. My first<br>
draft had rules ensuring that if the majority candidate pool had N<br>
candidates, the opposition candidate pool would only have N-1<br>
candidates. In this version, it's possible for the opposition<br>
candidate pool to have just as many candidates as the majority<br>
candidate pool. But it didn't match my examples below, and I liked my<br>
examples better than I liked my draft rules, so I rewrote the rules.<br>
Now that I have rules I like, I've tweaked my example scenarios to fit<br>
the rules:<br>
<br>
Test scenario #1: Let's say that seven candidates qualify to advance,<br>
and the top candidate only receives 55% approval. It seems that the<br>
order that the primary candidates should enter their respective pools<br>
should be like this:<br>
#1 - Top candidate - first in majority candidate pool<br>
#2 - first in opposition candidate pool (complementing the top<br>
candidate in the majority pool)<br>
#3 - second in majority candidate pool (with 54% approval)<br>
#4 - second in opposition candidate pool (complementing the candidates<br>
above in the majority pool)<br>
#5 - third in majority candidate pool (with 53% approval)<br>
#6 - third in opposition candidate pool (complementing the candidates<br>
above in the majority pool)<br>
#7 - fourth in majority candidate pool (with 52% approval)<br>
#8 - fourth in opposition candidate pool (complementing the candidates<br>
above in the majority pool)<br>
<br>
In my original draft, the candidate with the lowest overall approval<br>
score would be eliminated from the opposition pool so that the<br>
majority pool had four candidates, and the opposition pool only had<br>
three, and thus only seven candidates advanced. In my current rules,<br>
it's possible for eight candidates to qualify, but my new rule #4<br>
above ("Eliminate all candidates from the opposition candidate pool<br>
who have an overall approval rating under 25%") could knock it down to<br>
seven. Or six, Or even four.<br>
<br>
Test scenario #2: Let's say the top candidate gets greater than 75%<br>
approval. That's a pretty strong indication that the top candidate is<br>
the median candidate. But if three other candidates also get greater<br>
than 50% approval, it only seems fair to give them a hearing in the<br>
general election. Thus, when the top candidate gets greater than 75%<br>
approval, it seems the order should go like this:<br>
1 - Top candidate - first in highly-approved candidate pool<br>
2 - first in majority candidate pool<br>
3 - first in opposition candidate pool (complementing the first<br>
candidate in the majority candidate pool)<br>
4 - second in majority candidate pool<br>
5 - second in opposition candidate pool (complementing the candidates<br>
above in the majority candidate pool)<br>
6 - third in majority candidate pool<br>
7 - third in opposition candidate pool (complementing the candidates<br>
above in the majority candidate pool)<br>
<br>
I originally wrote "I'm pretty sure it'd be possible to write a set of<br>
rules to achieve this. I'm just not going to do it tonight". I<br>
*think* I pulled it off. That's why I didn't send this mail a couple<br>
hours ago. Now I really should send this email. :-)<br>
<br>
Rob<br>
p.s for those of you who prefer reading blog stuff on Medium (or feel<br>
like clicking on the applause link), here's the Medium version of this<br>
proposal:<br>
<a href="https://medium.com/@robla/replacing-the-jungle-primary-c1e844a5333b" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://medium.com/@robla/replacing-the-jungle-primary-c1e844a5333b</a><br>
</blockquote></div>