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"someone who voted their heart's select which included none of the
real contenders will feel disenfranchised when they found out that
the contender they hated the most wins and they didn't vote for
the second-place finisher to oppose that hated winner."<br>
<br>
The system, I invented, Binomial STV has bidirectional preference
(two way choice). [The voter does not have to rely on voting for
"buffer" candidates to keep out an undesired contender.] From the
total number of candidates, say twenty, you can number the most
hated candidate twenty, and it will count (weigh in the form of an
exclusion keep value) against that candidate, and the next most
hated candidate, 19, etc. That is because Binomial STV has an
exclusion count, as well as an election count. The exclusion count
keep values are inverted to give "second opinion" election keep
values. The two sets of keep values, election and inverted
exclusion, are then averaged with the geometric mean, to give a
more representative result than either. (The geometric mean is one
of four averages, to FAB STV, to minimise the possibility of rogue
results.) An election count thus simply combined with an exclusion
count is first order binomial STV, (There are higher orders, or
more qualified counts.)<br>
<br>
from <br>
Richard Lung.<br>
<br>
On 14/08/2018 07:39, robert bristow-johnson wrote:<br>
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<br>
---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] A simpler approval based way of replacing the
CA jungle primary<br>
From: "Rob Lanphier" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:robla@robla.net"><robla@robla.net></a><br>
Date: Tue, August 14, 2018 12:36 am<br>
To: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de"><km_elmet@t-online.de></a><br>
Cc: "Election Methods" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"><election-methods@lists.electorama.com></a><br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
> On Sat, Aug 11, 2018 at 1:50 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm<br>
> <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de"><km_elmet@t-online.de></a>
wrote:<br>
>> I also happened across the following draft paper by
James Green-Armytage<br>
>> on the question of how to select candidates for a
top-two runoff:<br>
>> <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://jamesgreenarmytage.com/runoff.pdf">http://jamesgreenarmytage.com/runoff.pdf</a><br>
><br>
> Thanks for reviving this thread, Kristofer! Also, thanks
for pointing<br>
> out the Green-Armytage/Tideman paper. I'll queue that up on
my<br>
> reading list, and I'll be in a better position to respond
to your full<br>
> mail. Just in my initial skim, it looks like they make some
of the<br>
> points that match my intuition on the subject. In
particular (to<br>
> quote the paper):<br>
><br>
>> Thus, one function of a [primary election selecting two
candidates]<br>
>> is to concentrate the attention of citizens on the
relative merits of<br>
>> the two finalists. When citizens know who these
finalists are, they have<br>
>> greater motivation to acquire information about them,
ensuring that the<br>
>> eventual winner will undergo close scrutiny during the
campaign.<br>
><br>
> This is the reason why I dislike arguments that discount
the value of<br>
> primary elections. If structured correctly, a primary
election<br>
> followed by a general election allows us to balance two
competing<br>
> needs:<br>
> a. we want elections with liberal ballot access as the
most<br>
> democratic way to ensure a diverse selection of
candidates.<br>
> b. we don't want to overwhelm the electorate (and the
press, and our<br>
> public debates) with too many candidates<br>
><br>
> A well-structured primary/general pairing can allow us to
have both.<br>
> Primary voters can vet a wide field of candidates, and give
us a sane<br>
> general election cycle. With a more sophisticated voting
system than<br>
> FPTP, it seems possible to have a field with more than 2
candidates<br>
> (e.g. 3, 4 or maybe even 5 candidates). More than 5
candidates<br>
> becomes kind of a clown show, as evidenced by the 2008-2016
Republican<br>
> on-stage U.S. presidential debates, and the 2004-2008
Democratic<br>
> counterparts. When the field narrows to 2-3 viable
candidates, the<br>
> policy discussions can get interesting<br>
></p>
<p>personally, i really dislike the California primary system that
can potentially lock out a party from the general. in fact,
even though i dislike two-party hegemony as we have in the U.S.,
i actually believe that parties in politics can be and are a
good thing (this doesn't mean that there aren't bad parties or
bad leadership in any particular party). parties serve a useful
purpose and, in my opinion, ballot access in the general
election should depend solely on getting enough signatures and
the state should recognize parties only to the extent of
contract law to keep some faction in a party from
undemocratically screwing the rest of their party. but every
party should be able to get candidates on the General Election
ballot, providing they get enough valid signatures on the ballot
petition. i don't think the General should be just between two
candidates.</p>
<p>and both the Primary and General Election should be decided
with Ranked-Choice Voting using a Condorcet-compliant method
(either Ranked-Pairs or Schulze) for the single-winner races.
STV or IRV is still sucky.</p>
<p>for Ranked-Choice voting, the number of candidates appearing on
the ballot should not greatly exceed the number of ranking
levels. when San Francisco has 20 candidates and 3 ranking
levels, someone who voted their heart's select which included
none of the real contenders will feel disenfranchised when they
found out that the contender they hated the most wins and they
didn't vote for the second-place finisher to oppose that hated
winner. but the way to make this happen is not to put in 20
ranking levels, what is needed is sufficiently strict ballot
access law that makes it harder to get on the ballot. but not
so hard that only one or two can meet that requirement.</p>
<p>and, i think that the law should allow a candidate that loses
in a primary or caucus to have some time after the primary to
gather signatures to run as an independent candidate.</p>
<p>what i am still unsure of is what New York does. New York
allows a single candidate to be nominated by more than one party
and have that candidate's name appear multiple places on the
ballot (associated with each party that nominated him/her) and
then to *total* the votes for that candidate from all of the
parties that he/she appears with on the ballot. George Pataki
did this with the GOP and the Conservative Party nominations.
it can't be fair to the other candidates when one of them
appears on the ballot more than one place.</p>
<p>ballot access is weird. in Vermont, because lawmakers didn't
anticipate this problem, a 14-year-old kid is running for
governor and appears on the Dem party primary ballot. ya gotta
be at least 18 to vote, but you need not be that to run. ain't
that weird?</p>
<p><br>
--<br>
<br>
r b-j <a
class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a><br>
<br>
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br>
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