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<div><font size="2"><span style="font-size: 11pt;"><br>
>From Steve to Rob et al:</span></font></div>
<div><font size="2"><span style="font-size: 11pt;">In the light of the recent discussions about IRV, please not that the CA jungle primary could be most simply and democratically solved by not having any primaries at all. Instead, elect any single-winner
using Majority Judgment. From many candidates, MJ ensures that the one winner will be seen as the one candidate evaluated by an absolute majority of voting citizens to have at least the highest median grade of suitability for the office when compared with
any of the other candidates. Similarly, as explained by the previously posted published article, EPR would guarantee that each winner in a muliti-winner general election would be the one most highly regarded by his or her electorate, and no citizens would
be wasted in the senses defined by the 2nd paragraph of that article.</span></font></div>
<div><font size="2"><span style="font-size: 11pt;">If you disagree, please explain.</span></font></div>
<div><font size="2"><span style="font-size: 11pt;"><br>
</span></font></div>
<div><font size="2"><span style="font-size: 11pt;">Message: 1<br>
Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 15:26:21 -0700<br>
From: Rob Lanphier <robla@robla.net><br>
To: Election Methods <election-methods@lists.electorama.com><br>
Subject: [EM] A simpler approval based way of replacing the CA jungle<br>
primary<br>
Message-ID:<br>
<CAK9hOY=iJ41kh__=X39Pb6buXP8n7SH_hhbmuFZ7SXJ06MtWzw@mail.gmail.com><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"<br>
<br>
Hi folks,<br>
<br>
During the California jungle primary, it's become clear to many of my<br>
fellow activists that our top-two jungle primary doesn't make sense.<br>
A while back, I posted "Party-based top two with approval", which<br>
resulted in a great on-list conversation with Kevin Venzke. As I've<br>
been talking to folks, I've been afraid of bringing up my complicated<br>
rules or pushing my system via my blog/wherever.<br>
<br>
After mulling it over, I think this simple version could get traction.<br>
The rules, in a nutshell:<br>
<br>
a. All candidates who receive over 50% approval advance to the general election<br>
b. If less than two candidates get 50% approval, then advance the two<br>
candidates approved by the most number of voters<br>
<br>
There's some intentional ambiguity in that second bullet point. The<br>
goal would be to find two candidates for whom the largest portion of<br>
the electorate approves at least one of. So, let's say we have three<br>
candidates: A-left, B-center, and C-right. A-left and C-right are<br>
popular with their respective base voters, and B-center is a weak<br>
centrist. Let's the voters vote like this:<br>
<br>
25% - approve only A-left<br>
20% - approve A-left and B-center<br>
10% - approve only B-center<br>
20% - approve B-center and C-right<br>
25% - approve C-right<br>
<br>
This would result in the following approval scores for the individual<br>
candidates:<br>
<br>
A-left: 45%<br>
B-center: 50%<br>
C-right: 45%<br>
<br>
However, in this version of the rules, we look for the pair of<br>
candidates where at least one candidate meets with approval.<br>
<br>
AB (A-left and B-center): 75%<br>
BC (B-center and C-right): 75%<br>
AC (A-left and C-right): 90%<br>
<br>
Using the rules in this proposal, A-left and C-right would advance to<br>
the general election. It would be possible to layer some more<br>
slightly more complicated rules on top of this system to avoid this<br>
flavor of center squeeze. However, these rules dissuade candidates<br>
from relying on a "mushy middle" lesser-of-either-evil campaign, but<br>
instead, push candidates to earn the approval of either left or right<br>
base voters. Moreover, in this scenario, both A-left and C-right<br>
would be worried about the possibility of their ideological opposite<br>
getting 50% approval thus making it so that two candidates have the<br>
required 50%. Trying to divide the electorate rather than achieving<br>
50% approval would an extremely risky strategy.<br>
<br>
The slightly complicated additional rule could be a guarantee that the<br>
candidate that gets the highest approval rating automatically advances<br>
to the general election. However, as would happen in this example,<br>
that means that instead of 90% of voters having a candidate that they<br>
approve of in the general election, only 75% of primary voters like<br>
one of the choices that move on to the general election.<br>
<br>
The other suboptimal outcome with these rules would be if there were<br>
many, many clone candidates (say, A1-left, A2-left, .... , A500-left)<br>
that all managed to squeak through with 50% approval, creating a<br>
ballot with 501 candidates (including B-center), and still leaving 25%<br>
of voters without a choice they approve of. Or let's say that C-right<br>
still manages to also get 50% approval, which would mean that there<br>
are 502 candidates on the ballot.<br>
<br>
There are many ways of dealing with this:<br>
<br>
1. Only allow 2 candidates to advance, keeping with the spirit of<br>
"top two", and use simple plurality in the general election.<br>
2. Have higher limit (e.g. 5 candidates) and only allow the top 5<br>
approval getters to advance. Tally the general election using<br>
approval voting.<br>
3. Choose the 5 candidates for whom at least one is approved.<br>
Calculating this seems complicated, but the goal would be the 5<br>
finalists would be A1-left, A2-left, A3-left, B-center and C-right.<br>
Once again, tally the general election using approval voting.<br>
<br>
It seems to me it would be shocking to have 502 candidates (or even 5<br>
candidates) who are approved by at least 50% of the voters, and that<br>
having 3 or more seems like a good problem to have. My suspicion is<br>
that the more frequent problem would be that only one or zero<br>
candidates who achieve 50% approval when approval primaries are first<br>
implemented, and only when the electorate becomes less polarized would<br>
we see a lot of candidates getting the required name recognition for<br>
an approval vote.<br>
<br>
Has anyone else written up this variant somewhere already, or is this<br>
arguably the only writeup of the idea so far? Is this a reasonable<br>
set of rules?<br>
<br>
Rob<br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 2<br>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 01:37:43 +0200<br>
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de><br>
To: Rob Lanphier <robla@robla.net>, Election Methods<br>
<election-methods@lists.electorama.com><br>
Subject: Re: [EM] A simpler approval based way of replacing the CA<br>
jungle primary<br>
Message-ID: <7733a345-b5a9-3081-943a-8b14df2bc842@t-online.de><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed<br>
<br>
On 2018-07-19 00:26, Rob Lanphier wrote:<br>
> Hi folks,<br>
> <br>
> During the California jungle primary, it's become clear to many of my<br>
> fellow activists that our top-two jungle primary doesn't make sense.<br>
> A while back, I posted "Party-based top two with approval", which<br>
> resulted in a great on-list conversation with Kevin Venzke. As I've<br>
> been talking to folks, I've been afraid of bringing up my complicated<br>
> rules or pushing my system via my blog/wherever.<br>
> <br>
> After mulling it over, I think this simple version could get traction.<br>
> The rules, in a nutshell:<br>
> <br>
> a. All candidates who receive over 50% approval advance to the general election<br>
> b. If less than two candidates get 50% approval, then advance the two<br>
> candidates approved by the most number of voters<br>
> <br>
> There's some intentional ambiguity in that second bullet point. The<br>
> goal would be to find two candidates for whom the largest portion of<br>
> the electorate approves at least one of. So, let's say we have three<br>
> candidates: A-left, B-center, and C-right. A-left and C-right are<br>
> popular with their respective base voters, and B-center is a weak<br>
> centrist. Let's the voters vote like this:<br>
> <br>
> 25% - approve only A-left<br>
> 20% - approve A-left and B-center<br>
> 10% - approve only B-center<br>
> 20% - approve B-center and C-right<br>
> 25% - approve C-right<br>
> <br>
> This would result in the following approval scores for the individual<br>
> candidates:<br>
> <br>
> A-left: 45%<br>
> B-center: 50%<br>
> C-right: 45%<br>
> <br>
> However, in this version of the rules, we look for the pair of<br>
> candidates where at least one candidate meets with approval.<br>
> <br>
> AB (A-left and B-center): 75%<br>
> BC (B-center and C-right): 75%<br>
> AC (A-left and C-right): 90%<br>
> <br>
> Using the rules in this proposal, A-left and C-right would advance to<br>
> the general election. It would be possible to layer some more<br>
> slightly more complicated rules on top of this system to avoid this<br>
> flavor of center squeeze. However, these rules dissuade candidates<br>
> from relying on a "mushy middle" lesser-of-either-evil campaign, but<br>
> instead, push candidates to earn the approval of either left or right<br>
> base voters. Moreover, in this scenario, both A-left and C-right<br>
> would be worried about the possibility of their ideological opposite<br>
> getting 50% approval thus making it so that two candidates have the<br>
> required 50%. Trying to divide the electorate rather than achieving<br>
> 50% approval would an extremely risky strategy.<br>
<br>
This sounds like a combination of majoritarian and minmax Approval. I <br>
think that a two-round system should contain the winner of the first <br>
round so that if the first round is correct, the winner is preserved.<br>
<br>
So how about making that more explicit? Say something to the effect of:<br>
<br>
The Approval winner advances, and<br>
two other winners advance so as to maximize the number of ballots that <br>
approve of at least one of them.<br>
<br>
By having three instead of two, a center candidate won't bias the runoff <br>
towards either the left or right in an LCR situation. On the other hand, <br>
it's harder to justify once opinion space becomes multidimensional; and <br>
having three instead of two does lead to the Approval dilemma of whether <br>
to approve your favorite only or also approve your second best.<br>
<br>
You could run the second round with a ranked method, but that would make <br>
it a lot more complex. Letting two candidates pass instead of three <br>
would solve the problem, as you could use Plurality for the second <br>
stage, but any LCR situation would be biased: either it would be <br>
left-leaning (LC), right-leaning (RC), or miss the centrist (LR).<br>
<br>
From a design perspective, the best would probably be to have the <br>
Approval winner advance, and as many additional candidates as are needed <br>
to achieve proportional representation up to some set level (which would <br>
act as an effective threshold). That suggests using a house-monotone PR <br>
method to pick the candidates for the second round; but that would be <br>
anything but simple.<br>
<br>
> There are many ways of dealing with this:<br>
> <br>
> 1. Only allow 2 candidates to advance, keeping with the spirit of<br>
> "top two", and use simple plurality in the general election.<br>
> 2. Have higher limit (e.g. 5 candidates) and only allow the top 5<br>
> approval getters to advance. Tally the general election using<br>
> approval voting > 3. Choose the 5 candidates for whom at least one is approved.<br>
> Calculating this seems complicated, but the goal would be the 5<br>
> finalists would be A1-left, A2-left, A3-left, B-center and C-right.<br>
> Once again, tally the general election using approval voting.<br>
<br>
If I recall correctly, choosing the candidates to maximize the number of <br>
voters who approve of at least one of them is NP-hard for general n. See <br>
<a class="OWAAutoLink" id="LPlnk723640" href="https://nam01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FMaximum_coverage_problem&data=02%7C01%7C%7C4cdcb4a99f704762731d08d5ed541c28%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636675867857537071&sdata=wp6xBT%2FRURF9gk%2FGnOd4XzaPi7%2FkwU95Dpmm6%2F%2BdlMI%3D&reserved=0" previewremoved="true">https://nam01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FMaximum_coverage_problem&data=02%7C01%7C%7C4cdcb4a99f704762731d08d5ed541c28%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C636675867857537071&sdata=wp6xBT%2FRURF9gk%2FGnOd4XzaPi7%2FkwU95Dpmm6%2F%2BdlMI%3D&reserved=0</a>.<br>
<br>
The best you can do without P = NP is a very obvious greedy algorithm <br>
(successively pick the candidate that maximizes the number of additional <br>
voters covered by the set of candidates so far). The greedy algorithm <br>
makes it relatively easy to start with one or more candidates picked by <br>
other means (e.g. the Approval winner) and then filling in the rest.<br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 3<br>
Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 22:35:25 -0400<br>
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd@lomaxdesign.com><br>
To: Richard Lung <voting@ukscientists.com><br>
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV / RCv advances<br>
Message-ID: <83a9ce25-9cee-ab6a-3def-8ae83ae710b4@lomaxdesign.com><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed"<br>
<br>
I'm not getting my message across.<br>
<br>
On 7/18/2018 1:30 PM, Richard Lung wrote:<br>
><br>
> Thankyou for your discussion.<br>
> I just pick-up on two or three points. People often think of first, <br>
> second, third choices, in terms of a poor choice for a single vacancy, <br>
> so that their second choice, or even their first, is not someone they <br>
> really want. A fifth choice in a large multi-member constituency, <br>
> equitably elected, can be a better choice than a first choice for a <br>
> single vacancy.<br>
I'm encouraging looking at basic democratic process, as has been <br>
practiced in NGOs for centuries. NGOs, generally, don't allow members to <br>
name proxies (while share corporations uniformly do so). Most small <br>
organizations don't have any representative assembly. They may elect <br>
boards, and board members are more like officers than representatives <br>
(though multiwinner methods might be used).<br>
<br>
I'm pointing out that if I cannot choose my representative to an <br>
allegedly representative assembly, I am not represented. Rather, my <br>
district might be represented, i.e., a majority in my district, or some <br>
quota. Not me.<br>
<br>
Imagine this concept for choosing a representative assembly. Candidates <br>
are listed and people openly vote for them, and can change their votes <br>
at any time. When a quota of people choose a candidate, the candidate <br>
gains a seat. All seats, then, represent by choice the same number of <br>
people. (The system stops accepting votes for a candidate, when the <br>
candidate gains a quota).<br>
<br>
Then add this tweak: if candidates may still accept votes after reaching <br>
the quota, they may then transfer the votes to other candidates. This, <br>
then, becomes Asset. It is very close to direct choice of representation.<br>
<br>
It is simple, optimal voting strategy is totally obvious -- vote for <br>
your best choice -- and is then compatible with secret ballot in the <br>
primary election, which simply creates electors who then have so many <br>
votes to transfer to create seats, and who may serve to reassign votes <br>
as needed pending the next full election.<br>
<br>
The electoral college, then, represents the/entire electorate,/ by <br>
direct choice.<br>
<br>
I would have the Assembly formed decide its own rules, as is <br>
traditional. Because deliberative democracy is essential (not merely <br>
aggregative popular democracy), I would handle all officer elections in <br>
the Assembly, officers to serve at the pleasure of the Assembly. I.e., a <br>
parliamentary system.<br>
<br>
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------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 4<br>
Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 22:20:31 -0700<br>
From: Rob Lanphier <robla@robla.net><br>
To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de><br>
Cc: Election Methods <election-methods@lists.electorama.com><br>
Subject: Re: [EM] A simpler approval based way of replacing the CA<br>
jungle primary<br>
Message-ID:<br>
<CAK9hOYkxUnW3MRLH9UFV0o3eOBcfzwet9JQpVxfBQsh1djwDXQ@mail.gmail.com><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"<br>
<br>
Thanks for the quick response! I'll offer a quick response now, and<br>
maybe a more detailed response later.<br>
<br>
>From the perspective of coming up with a system that is a politically<br>
viable choice for California in the near-ish term, my bias is toward a<br>
system that picks exactly two candidates as a replacement for our<br>
current top two. Using your "LCR" notation, I'm mildly biased toward<br>
a system that errs on the side of selecting "LR" rather than "LC",<br>
since I think that a lot voters are more likely to find "LR" to be<br>
more fair than "LC", even though there will be some cases where "C"<br>
would be the winner of a one-round approval contest. My fear is that<br>
with "LC", the supporters of "R" are more likely to declare the system<br>
unfair, and push for a repeal.<br>
<br>
That said, you're right that it's best to allow three candidate to<br>
advance in the (hopefully) rare case that the two candidate set<br>
doesn't already include the approval winner. If this proposal is done<br>
as a replacement for the current top-two system, that just means we<br>
have a three-way plurality race. I haven't decided if it'd be viable<br>
to call for a change to approval voting for the general election as<br>
well. I'll save that for a future response (and please weigh in with<br>
your thoughts)<br>
<br>
I'll send a more detailed response later, I think...<br>
<br>
Rob<br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
<br>
Message: 5<br>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 10:46:09 +0200<br>
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet@t-online.de><br>
To: Rob Lanphier <robla@robla.net><br>
Cc: Election Methods <election-methods@lists.electorama.com><br>
Subject: Re: [EM] A simpler approval based way of replacing the CA<br>
jungle primary<br>
Message-ID: <7a0c024c-5ecf-a264-ece5-9bd294b85e86@t-online.de><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed<br>
<br>
On 2018-07-19 07:20, Rob Lanphier wrote:<br>
> Thanks for the quick response! I'll offer a quick response now, and<br>
> maybe a more detailed response later.<br>
> <br>
>>From the perspective of coming up with a system that is a politically<br>
> viable choice for California in the near-ish term, my bias is toward a<br>
> system that picks exactly two candidates as a replacement for our<br>
> current top two. Using your "LCR" notation, I'm mildly biased toward<br>
> a system that errs on the side of selecting "LR" rather than "LC",<br>
> since I think that a lot voters are more likely to find "LR" to be<br>
> more fair than "LC", even though there will be some cases where "C"<br>
> would be the winner of a one-round approval contest. My fear is that<br>
> with "LC", the supporters of "R" are more likely to declare the system<br>
> unfair, and push for a repeal.<br>
> <br>
> That said, you're right that it's best to allow three candidate to<br>
> advance in the (hopefully) rare case that the two candidate set<br>
> doesn't already include the approval winner. If this proposal is done<br>
> as a replacement for the current top-two system, that just means we<br>
> have a three-way plurality race. I haven't decided if it'd be viable<br>
> to call for a change to approval voting for the general election as<br>
> well. I'll save that for a future response (and please weigh in with<br>
> your thoughts)<br>
<br>
I'd imagine that the more polarized things are, the more important it <br>
would be to keep the centrist in the running, so that there's at least a <br>
possibility of getting back into a less polarized state of things. E.g. <br>
suppose L is quite far on the left and R is quite far on the right. But <br>
you're right; it's impossible to do that with only two candidates if L <br>
and R are strong enough, since any inclusion of the centrist would be <br>
biased towards whatever wing got included.<br>
<br>
If the second round method is plurality, and it's three-way, then the <br>
centrist would probably lose in any case.<br>
<br>
<br>
------------------------------<br>
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