<p><br />
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---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------<br />
Subject: Re: [EM] smith/schwartz/landau<br />
From: "Curt" <accounts@museworld.com><br />
Date: Sat, March 24, 2018 11:30 pm<br />
To: "election-methods@lists.electorama.com" <election-methods@lists.electorama.com><br />
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> Yes, I’ve used the same kind of argument. If, in a two-candidate democratic election, A has more votes than B, should A be the winner? I would argue yes.<br />
><br />
> If, in a 99-voter democratic election, A has 50 votes and B has 49, should A be the winner? I would argue yes.<br />
><br />
> If, in a 99-voter democratic election, A has 50 unenthusiastic votes and B has 49 wildly enthusiastic votes, should A be the winner? I would argue yes. There are others that argue no, that B has more social utility. I would say this is a difference of opinion that rests not on logic or voting
criteria, but personal values. The two camps can respectfully disagree with each other. Call it the “Majority” versus “Utility” disagreement. I also think there are election types (private organizations, clubs, whatever) where the “Utility” direction might be more
appropriate than the “Majority” direction. That’s fine.<br />><br />
> But, for those elections where we believe that A should be the winner in that scenario -- the “Majority” believers -- that is what leads us to the Condorcet camp, as opposed to Borda, score, range, etc.<br />
><br />
> And expanding to multiple candidates, if Candidate A would beat all other candidates head to head, then A should be the winner. A is the Condorcet Winner, just the same as if A is the Condorcet Winner if he has more votes in a two-candidate election.<br />
><br />
> (In your final paragraphs, I am not sure if you are talking about a candidate other than the Condorcet Winner, or, a candidate from a multi-candidate Smith Set that would (in the case of a cycle) by definition have another candidate that is preferred over it.)<br />
><br />
> But yes, I definitely agree that there should be a bright line between methods that<br />
> A: “elect a Condorcet Winner if one exists”<br />
> and methods that might<br />
> B: “elect a winner other than the Condorcet Winner”.<br />
><br />
> For us “Majority” believers, we are in violent agreement that group A is superior to group B.<br />
><br />
> But I also believe that there should be a bright line between methods that<br />
> C: identify a “candidate or candidates that would defeat all other candidates head to head”<br />
> and methods that might<br />
> D: “elect a single winner that is not a Condorcet Winner if a CW does not exist”.<br />
><br />
> Group C stops with the identification of the Condorcet Winner, or the Smith Set if the CW does not exist. (Or, Group C might stop with the identification of the Weak Condorcet Winner, or the Schwartz Set if the WCW does not exist, *if* beats-or-ties is deemed allowable.)<br />
><br />
> Group D contains ranked-pairs, beatpaths, etc.<br />
><br />
> The reason I believe in the distinction is because D fails criteria that C does not. And if C and D are conflated, it does a disservice to C. When in large elections with a limited number of candidates, a CW is much more probable than a cycle. It does Condorcet proponents no favors to have
Condorcet Methods described as “flawed” in the way group D is.<br />><br />
> Group D is “decisive” where Group C is not. In these cases I would argue decisiveness is overvalued.<br />
<br />
well, organizations and governments have to move on. they *need* answers and elections are held to provide answers.<br />
<br />
for a single-seat (usually executive) office, what would you suggest? a runoff?<br />
<br />
><br />
> What do you believe the Smith Set signifies? Is it meaningless to you other than something from which a winner should be algorithmically selected?<br />
</p><p>it's not meaningless. it just need not be a concept coded in election law. remember (i am not sure you got this point), Ranked-Pairs and Schulze do **not** select a winner from the Smith set. RP and Schulze select a winner from the entire field of candidates using a
consistent rule and, it turns out, that the winner selected by RP or Schulze **is** the CW if a CW exists. that's in Group A.<br /><br />
"Group A" is a crappy term. as bad as "turnip". so here's a quite abridged taxonomy:<br />
<br />
Mark-Only-One ballot:<br />
1. FPTP (plurality. decisive)<br />
2. FPTP runoff if no majority<br />
<br />
Mark as many as you want:<br />
3. Approval</p><p>Mark ballot scoring candidates:<br />
4. Score voting or Range voting<br />
<br />
Ranked-choice ballot:<br />
5. Bucklin<br />
6. Borda<br />
7. IRV<br />
8. Ranked Pairs (let's say based on margins)<br />
9. Schulze (margins)<br />
10. Min/Max<br />
11. IRV-BTR<br />
<br />
then there are all of these esoteric methods that are promoted by some people in this group.</p><p>what should be the term that differentiates 8, 9, 10, 11 from 5, 6, 7?</p><p>--<br />
<br />
r b-j rbj@audioimagination.com<br />
<br />
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."<br />
</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p>