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<div>Hi Rob,</div><div><br></div>
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Le lundi 19 mars 2018 à 00:44:35 UTC−5, Rob Lanphier <robla@robla.net> a écrit :
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<div style="font-size: 13px;">> One way that it could work: the *overall* approval vote winner is<br></div><div style=""><div dir="ltr" style="font-size: 13px;">> automatically on the ballot (regardless of whether they the winning<br clear="none">> party or not). But then, the top vote getting party would have the<br clear="none">> opportunity to put a candidate on the ballot if their voters made a<br clear="none">> different choice. Let me try tweaking my example. Once again, 100<br clear="none">> people voting. I'll propose a tweak to my example ballot:</div><div dir="ltr" style="font-size: 13px;"><br></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><font size="3">Well, what bothers me is that it can happen that a Democrat is the overall approval</font></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">winner while the Democratic party list is the party list winner, simply because their</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">rivals are divided a bit. If you have only Democrats advance in that scenario then it</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">seems like the two rounds have less purpose.</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;"><br></span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">I think the design should make sure that the same voters can't supply both finalists,</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">but without raising the question of whether a party can do "so well" that we have to</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">forcibly take one of the selections away from them.</span></div><div dir="ltr" style="font-size: 13px;"><br clear="none">>I suspect that a much simpler version that doesn't involve parties at<br clear="none">>all might be superior. Kevin's earlier suggestion looks really<br clear="none">>appealing:<br clear="none">>> 1. Round one is an approval ballot. Advance the approval winner, against the<br clear="none">>> candidate with max AO against him. That is, remove the ballots approving the<br clear="none">>> winner and advance, as challenger, whoever is the new approval winner. This<br clear="none">>> doesn't require a first-round auto-win rule (but could support one too, I guess).<br clear="none">><br clear="none">>The thing I like about this first system Kevin proposes is that it<br clear="none">>seems reasonably likely to satisfy this criteria: two candidates for<br clear="none">>whom the largest proportion of voters approves of at least one of the<br clear="none">>two candidates. Kevin's system #1 has the benefit of simplicity. A<br clear="none">>potential downside of that system is that having a popular leading<br clear="none">>candidate means that many fewer voters are involved in choosing the<br clear="none">>runner up (e.g. if the top candidate gets 85% approval, then the<br clear="none">>runner up is chosen by the 15% that didn't like the top candidate).</div><div dir="ltr" style="font-size: 13px;"><br></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><font size="3">Yes, though if it's 85% I think the unfortunate thing might be that we would have</font></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><font size="3">to go </font>on to have <span style="font-size: medium;">a second round at all. I think if a candidate can get majority </span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">approval </span><span style="font-size: medium;">(especially </span><span style="font-size: medium;">on a ballot without ranks) the biggest concern is addressed.</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><br></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><font size="3">Maybe stating the obvious but you could if you want directly advance the two</font></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><font size="3">candidates who maximize the number of voters who approved at least one. </font>A <span style="font-size: medium;">major</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">downside of doing that would be that the overall approval winner isn't </span><span style="font-size: medium;">guaranteed</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">to be one of the finalists.</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><font size="3"><br></font></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><font size="3">There are some interesting questions about what we're trying to do when picking</font></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><font size="3">finalists. The overall approval winner is a good estimate for the best overall </font></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><font size="3">candidate, so it seems bad to omit him. The two candidates who "maximize</font></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><font size="3">participation" (let's say) is more like an estimate of who the voters think </font><span style="font-size: medium;">are </span><span style="font-size: medium;">the </span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">main contenders.</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;"><br></span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">Regarding the 85%/15% scenario I almost want to say "use proportional </span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">approval voting so the 85% can contribute somewhat in picking the second finalist as</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">well." </span><span style="font-size: medium;">That would probably give you a more competitive second round</span><span style="font-size: medium;">.</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;"><br></span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">Without getting into proportionality (which isn't directly related to the goal of the</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">first round) one could probably come up with an equation that balances each</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">candidate's likelihood of being able to beat the approval winner pairwise, with</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">their likelihood of simply being a clone of the approval winner.</span></div><div dir="ltr" style=""><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>> I wonder if such a system would be "stable," as in, have general acceptance.</span><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>> A party in the position of wanting to forfeit their seats because of rogue</span><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>> candidates trying to piggyback, I can imagine would start to argue for a</span><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>> change in the rules. On the other hand if a seat is forfeited it's</span><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>> presumably lose-lose for the party, voters, and the candidate. So maybe it's</span><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>> a threat that would never actually happen.</span><br clear="none">><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>An example of where the party could decide to forfeit could be a</span><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>situation similar to the one Republicans face in Illinois:</span><br clear="none">><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>That particular example is one where the Republicans claim they want</span><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>to jettison the candidate, but don't have the means to do it.</span><br clear="none">><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>One thing that I think makes my system resilient against a party</span><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>forfeiting a popular candidate is that the party could be held to</span><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>account in a subsequent election. Forfeiting a popular candidate</span><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>would make it far less likely for the voters who voted for that party</span><br clear="none"><span style="font-size: 13px;">>to vote for that party again.</span><div class="ydp14ebe375yqt5220812937" id="ydp14ebe375yqtfd88504" style="font-size: 13px;"><br></div><div class="ydp14ebe375yqt5220812937" id="ydp14ebe375yqtfd88504" style=""><font size="3">I would only see forfeits occurring if the party views the candidate's supporters</font></div><div class="ydp14ebe375yqt5220812937" id="ydp14ebe375yqtfd88504" style=""><font size="3">as "invasive" in the first place, so they wouldn't be concerned about losing the</font></div><div class="ydp14ebe375yqt5220812937" id="ydp14ebe375yqtfd88504" style=""><font size="3">support. I can't see a party forfeiting any candidate who is at least somewhat </font></div><div class="ydp14ebe375yqt5220812937" id="ydp14ebe375yqtfd88504" style=""><font size="3">appropriate </font><span style="font-size: medium;">for the list.</span></div><div class="ydp14ebe375yqt5220812937" id="ydp14ebe375yqtfd88504" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;"><br></span></div><div class="ydp14ebe375yqt5220812937" id="ydp14ebe375yqtfd88504" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;">Kevin</span></div><div class="ydp14ebe375yqt5220812937" id="ydp14ebe375yqtfd88504" style=""><span style="font-size: medium;"><br></span></div></div></div>
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