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Going back to the original dispute between Condorcet and Borda,
someone no less than Laplace decided to adjudicate. (Rated one of
the half dozen most respected mathematicians in human history.)
I've read the discussion by JFS Ross (himself an engineer) in
Elections and Electors. He doesn't go into details but the jist
seems to be, that in the mathematical proof of Laplace, Borda was
to be prefered, because he takes into account the relative weight
or importance of each order of preference, whereas Condorcet
treats them as all of equal weight.<br>
<br>
However, since then, weighted Condorcet pairing was introduced. I
don't know how much difference it makes. Tho, I found, from an
actual example, that it agreed with Borda, in an election
contrived to make 5 voting systems disagree. This contradicted von
Paulos: Beyond Numeracy, justifying theorem Arrow. Hence, I
acknowledge the information value of weighted Condorcet pairing.
But it was not the method I decided to specialise in (which is a
criticism). <br>
Since then, Borda also has been superseded by the Gregory method
of weighting.<br>
<br>
The simplest way round the Condorcet paradox with IRV is that it
is less of a problem with STV in multi-member constituencies,
which are more representative. <br>
More-over, I have invented a method that does away with premature
exclusion of candidates altogether. (Binomial STV.) <br>
<br>
Richard Lung.<br>
<br>
On 09/10/2017 07:21, robert bristow-johnson wrote:<br>
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<br>
---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] The tree is known by its fruits.<br>
From: "Kristofer Munsterhjelm" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de"><km_elmet@t-online.de></a><br>
Date: Sun, October 8, 2017 8:21 am<br>
To: "Richard Lung" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com"><voting@ukscientists.com></a><br>
"EM" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"><election-methods@lists.electorama.com></a><br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
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> On 10/08/2017 01:26 PM, Richard Lung wrote:<br>
>><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> The tree is known by its fruits.<br>
>><br>
>> So, election methods cannot be perfect. Whoever said
they could?</p>
<p>...<br>
><br>
> This all seems to be a matter of politics, as it were. The
imperfection<br>
> of voting methods mean that you have to choose which is
best based on<br>
> what behavior and criteria you value.<br>
></p>
<p>one important criterion for an election system for public
office is transparency in the process (which, in my opinion,
requires precinct-summability but there *could* be a klunky way
to have an equivalent transparency with STV or IRV, which is not
really precinct summable).</p>
<p>another important criterion for an election system for public
office is enough simplicity in the tabulation procedure and the
manner the winner is decided. this is where i disagree with Rob
Richie and FairVote about IRV (which now they have appropriated
the term "Ranked-Choice Voting" (RCV) for IRV, which bothers
me). I assert that Condorcet (which Condorcet is a secondary
issue) is simpler than IRV and is more simply extends the most
fundamental principles that voters expect to keep from the
familiar FPTP elections, which is equal voting weight for every
voter ("one person one vote") and in the expected result of a
Condorcet Winner, resolving the election exactly as would happen
between the winner and *any* of the losers.</p>
<p>IRV will decide an election the same as Condorcet if the CW
gets to the final round (is either in 1st or 2nd place in
first-preference votes). IRV will successful avoid IIA (a
spoiled election) if the spoiler really had no chance winning
(but gets enough votes in a close election to change the winner
among other candidates). but when there are three candidate,
all roughly equal in support before the election, where the
outcome of the election could plausibly go any of three (or
more) ways, the IRV fails. In Burlington 2009, one candidate
was the initial Plurality Winner, another was the Condorcet
Winner, another was the IRV winner. but the Plurality Winner
was the spoiler. it was the conservative minority in the city
that experiences the failed promise that "they could vote for
the candidate the principally want without worry of helping
elect the candidate they hate the most." IRV was repealed but
if it hadn't, these conservatives would have to tell themselves
that they must choose between "Liberal" and "More Liberal",
because if they vote #1 for the candidate they really like, then
More Liberal gets elected. now we're back to FPTP with a 40%
minimum.</p>
<p>my major harping or critique i have with FairVote is not
recognizing the damage to the cause of election reform when the
method they push so hard to get some jurisdiction to consider
and adopt, that if the method suffers a major failure soon after
adoption (for Burlington it was the second IRV election after
adoption) and gets promptly repealed, that it will set back
election reform for at least a generation (you gotta get some of
the people who were screwed by the IRV screwup to die or move
away for a bunch of fresh voters to consider reform). so we
really should push the better ranked-choice voting method than
IRV.</p>
<p>i s'pose with some, i am preaching to the choir, but i am also
pragmatic and i think that *pragmatically* Condorcet is a better
sell than IRV.</p>
<p>it turns out that Santa Fe is struggling to get RCV implemented
(the voters adopted it nearly a decade ago, but it hasn't been
implemented) and FairVote is advocating in this case, and Rob
was very disappointed in me when an op-ed i wrote for them to be
a little wary about terminology and what they mean by "RCV".
the op-ed is
here: <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://www.santafenewmexican.com/opinion/my_view/looking-in-the-differences-in-ranked-choice-voting/article_77d7e472-6876-529b-acc9-ca7fffdcc896.html">http://www.santafenewmexican.com/opinion/my_view/looking-in-the-differences-in-ranked-choice-voting/article_77d7e472-6876-529b-acc9-ca7fffdcc896.html</a>
.</p>
<p>i dunno, do you think that i helped the cause or hurt the cause
of election reform with that piece?</p>
<p>--</p>
<p>r b-j <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a></p>
<p>"Imagination is more important than knowledge."</p>
<br>
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<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com">http://www.voting.ukscientists.com</a>
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
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E-books in epub format:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience">https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience</a>
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