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Hello again Magosányi Árpád,<br>
<br>
This is a postscript to my previous email, because you are on such a
tight schedule.<br>
<br>
Appearances can be deceiving and the important thing for you as an
adviser is to make people aware of the realities, make what of them
as they will.<br>
<br>
Many electoral reformers think that party list systems, especially a
hybrid system like the German Mixed Member Proportional system is
the wave of the future. I think that’s still the sort of system in
Hungary, isn’t it?<br>
But there are some academic straws in the wind, coming from Europe
itself that suggest change. Namely the peer-reviewed research into
strategic voting in party list systems, as recently studied by
Annika Freden.<br>
Eventually, maybe not in my lifetime, because I am old, Europe is
going to rediscover that the inventor of proportional
representation, the Danish mathematician Carl Andrae was right in
appreciating that preference voting is a corollary of proportional
counting.<br>
Evidently, there is a good chance that Scotland will go over
completely to this system, also developed by Thomas Hare, which he
called the Single Transferable Vote. STV was recommended to replace
MMP (called the Additional Member System there) by the Richard
report for the Welsh assembly.)<br>
<br>
In my book, Scientific Method of Elections, I explain how STV is,
essentially speaking, How To Do It. By contrast, it so happens that
MMP is How Not To Do It.<br>
If elections are not to be sham contests: Political contestants
cannot be their own referees.<br>
<br>
from<br>
Richard Lung.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Hello Magosányi Árpád,<br>
My father came from your part of the world (annexed by Romania after
WW1) but my out-look on election method is a world away from yours
and this election methods group, which usually over-looks my posts!
These views of mine are essentially in the tradition of John Stuart
Mill. Nevertheless, I hope wou will look at my book, "Scientific
Method of Elections, or the simpler "Peace-making Power-sharing"
which starts with the Canadian Citizens Assemblies. Not to mention
the less methodical and more theoretical: Science is Ethics as
Electics.<br>
They are linked from my "Democracy Science" page.<br>
<br>
Richard Lung.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 04/07/2017 10:53, Magosányi Árpád wrote:
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cite="mid:CAMFGaWeRf1nHYr7T1Qp-wHGDrizcLcWmX-xOhiGyU5r1o4x53Q@mail.gmail.com"
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<div>Hi,<br>
<br>
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Please help, it is really important!<br>
<br>
</div>
We are in the process of designing the new
election system of Hungary. A strong
movement is emerging for that purpose, and
there is a high chance that even if we
fail at first, everything we say will be
influental for the future of our election
system.<br>
<br>
</div>
Our team have came out with a proposal as a
basis of discussion between the parties
(most of them will be participating). It is
designed to be not too shockingly new. My
role is to propose an ideal system, for the
following tactical communication reasons:<br>
</div>
- show how the current system is fscked up
compared to an ideal one<br>
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- pressure politicians to agree on something in
which they could be successful based on their
instinctive behaviour<br>
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Andt he long term communication goal is of course
to put good election methods on the political
agenda. In case of the ruling party not accepting
the compromise proposal of parties (almost
certain), most probably sizeable factions of the
resistance will nominate the ideal system as the
core issue we are fighting for.<br>
<br>
</div>
Our proposal as basis of discussion is a purely
party list system, with proportional representation
and no entry threshold.<br>
<br>
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I would like to propose something within this
framework as the ideal system, with the same results
from the game theory standpoint, as preferential
Condorcet for a commitee:<br>
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<div>- The winnig strategy for candidates is
collaboration<br>
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<div>- The winning strategy for voters is honest voting<br>
</div>
<div>- In the long run there is no two-party system<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Also, I would like to have easy ballots.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
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What I have came up with, and why:<br>
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<div>Each voter can nominate one party for the election.
Nomination needs active participation from the voter
(phisically walking in to a government office), to make
strategic nomination hard. The 20 parties with the highest
number of nominations will be in the ballot.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>There is a ballot for parties, and there is a ballot for
candidates of each party.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>The party ballot is a cumulative voting ballot, where six
votes can be allocated, and at most 3 can be given to one
party.<br>
<br>
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<div>The candidate ballot is also a kind of cumulative one: the
voter can indicate at most 10 approvals, and at most 5
disapprovals (for a 200-member list).<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>The results from candidate ballots are computed using
shulze method, and ties are broken using the order of names
(the preference indicated by the nominating party).<br>
<br>
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<div>The result from party list ballot is computed by first
creating a pairwise defeat table, where<br>
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<div>- the cell in the row of the party will contain the number
of wins over the other candidate<br>
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<div>- in case of tie, both cells receive +0,5<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>The sums of each row are computed, and seats are allocated
based on them.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>Regarding the candidate list, it is a condorcet method,
with a bit more constrained ballot, but based on the size of
the constituency (10M) and human behaviour, I think that the
constraint should not change anything.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>My understanding is that the party list method is somewhere
between range voting and condorcet, with a very simplified
ballot. As condorcet comes with the above game theory results,
and in range voting majority condorcet is strategically
forced, I feel that this method should also have the same game
theory results.<br>
<br>
</div>
<div>But I don't want to base such a proposal on feelings, but
rather on mathematical proof.<br>
</div>
<div>Please advise me on how to work it out: what are the
results I can build my proof on?<br>
</div>
<div>If there are flaws in this system, what sould be the
alternative?<br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
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<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com">http://www.voting.ukscientists.com</a>
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085">https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085</a>
E-books in epub format:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience">https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience</a>
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