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<big>"i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about."<br>
<br>
At least he recognised the necessity of ranked choices.<br>
Simply from the point of view of scientific measurement, there is
no question that both order (in the vote) and proportion (in the
count) are essential to an accurate electoral system. They are
indeed essential in the arts and sciences and civilised society in
general. (Of which politics is but dubiously a part.)<br>
<br>
<br>
Richard Lung.<br>
<br>
</big><br>
<br>
On 25/06/2017 00:12, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:0cf8279853ce5fb2b7331db99b992ea0.squirrel@webmail04.register.com"
type="cite">
<p><br>
<br>
---------------------------- Original Message
----------------------------<br>
Subject: Re: [EM] The election methods trade-off
paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.<br>
From: "Toby Pereira" <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk"><tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk></a><br>
Date: Sat, June 24, 2017 2:10 pm<br>
To: <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">"rbj@audioimagination.com"</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com"><rbj@audioimagination.com></a><br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">"election-methods@electorama.com"</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E"
href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com"><election-methods@electorama.com></a><br>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
> Given the possibility of a Condorcet paradox, the will of
the majority becomes an incoherent notion. If A is preferred by
a majority to B, then in a two-candidate election, then A should
win under a majority system. But introduce candidate C, and B
could end up winning, even though by majority logic, A is a
better candidate than B.<br>
> Obviously you know all about Condorcet paradoxes, but if
you think that the majority criterion is some sort of absolute,
then you are left with no option but to say that in some
elections, A is a better winner than B, B a better winner than
C, and C a better winner than A. And this makes no sense.</p>
<p>of course a cycle is a paradox. i am also convinced that
cycles will be rare. but they *could* happen on a rare occasion
and we need rules set down in advance for how to deal with that
contingency.</p>
<p><br>
> You can also end up with winners hardly anyone wants. If
there are two polarising candidates each with strong support and
a complete unknown, you could have the following ballots:<br>
> 49 voters: A>C>B<br>
> 49 voters: B>C>A<br>
> 2 voters: C>A>B</p>
<p><br>
> It could be that the score ballots (out of 10) would be:<br>
> 49: A=10, C=1, B=0<br>
> 49: B=10, C=1, A=0<br>
> 2: C=2, A=1, B=0<br>
<br>
big unrealistic assumptions made here (more likely the 2 voters
on the bottom will jack their C preference up to 10 rather than
throw away their vote - this is why i am unpersuaded by
simulations or hypotheticals dreamed up like this). how do
voters know how to quantify the degree of their preference?<br>
<br>
> C is the Condorcet winner.</p>
<p>as he/she/ should be (ignoring the hypothesized ratings and
looking at just the rankings). it's exaggerated, but this is
very similar to the Burlington 2009 election that had a clear
Condorcet winner whom was not elected with IRV. lot's of
people, both Republican on the right and Progressive on the
left, felt that the Democrat candidate was an acceptable
compromise candidate (and marked their ballots as such) and many
(but not enough) Democrats preferred the Democrat candidate over
the other two.</p>
<p><br>
> There's no way I'd accept that a C victory is the best
result because of blind adherence to some sort of majority
principle under all circumstances.</p>
<p>why not? 51% think that C is better than B and 51% think that
C is better than A. <br>
it's a close election, but even if it's close, we still award
the victory to the candidate most preferred, even if preferred
by a small margin.</p>
<p>>This is not to say that Condorcet methods are necessarily
bad, but just that there are elections when they would produce
what I would consider to be the wrong result.</p>
<p>so will IRV. so will FPTP. so do multi-winner elections
picking the highest "vote-getters".</p>
<p>i presume that Arrow knew what he was writing about.<br>
<br>
> And in this situation, very wrong.</p>
<p>nope.<br>
<br>
--</p>
<p>r b-j <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:rbj@audioimagination.com">rbj@audioimagination.com</a></p>
<p>"Imagination is more important than knowledge."</p>
<br>
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</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com">http://www.voting.ukscientists.com</a>
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085">https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085</a>
E-books in epub format:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience">https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience</a>
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