<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 1:02 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><span class="m_8159334025011711641gmail-m_8200337669864418506gmail-m_-2225811730886542567gmail-m_-1617412154794455327gmail-m_8529514184220749409gmail-"></span><p>
but voters can skew that information quantitatively and, if they want to be tactical, insincerely.</p></blockquote><div><br></div><div>...and even when *everyone* votes tactically, rated systems still outperform ranked systems.<br><br><a href="http://electology.org/sites/default/files/comparing_voting_methods_simplicity_group_satisfaction.png" title="" target="_blank" style="">http://electology.org/sites/de<wbr>fault/files/comparing_voting_m<wbr>ethods_simplicity_group_satisf<wbr>action.png</a><br><br><a href="https://electology.github.io/vse-sim/vse.html" target="_blank">https://electology.github.io/v<wbr>se-sim/vse.html</a><br></div><div><br>"Tactical Score Voting may be, in practice, more likely to elect a Condorcet winner (when one exists) than real Condorcet methods." <a href="https://electology.org/tactical-voting-basics" target="_blank">https://electology.org/tactica<wbr>l-voting-basics</a><br><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><p>if
i really, really, really like Candidate A over Candidate B and you only
sorta like B
over A by just a little bit, it should not matter to what disparate
degree we like our candidates.</p></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Yes, it absolutely should. That's the fundamental flaw in ranked ballots: preference rankings can't be meaningfully compared between individuals. If there are 2 voters and 2 candidates, and the ballots are:<br><br>1: A > B<br>2: B > A<br><br></div><div>you can't tell who the winner should be, but if their true feelings are<br><br></div><div>1. loves A and hates B<br></div><div>2. loves B and likes A<br><br></div><div>the obviously correct winner is A.<br><br></div><div>The goal of a voting system is to choose the candidate who best represents the population / whose opinions are closest to the centroid of the population's opinions / who, winning, would maximize the happiness of the population. Ranked ballots destroy information that's needed to find this winner.<br></div></div><br></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 8:35 AM, Brian Olson wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div style="font-family:"times new roman",serif"></div><div style="font-family:"times new roman",serif">I
don't favor raw Score summation. It's strategy prone. For choices where
my honest vote might be [1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, 0.0] I should
probably vote strategically [1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0].</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>... in which case it devolves into Approval Voting, which... is still pretty good.<br><br>Anyway, this is only your optimal strategy if you know exactly what everyone else is voting. In reality, polls have uncertainty (e.g. November 2016), and ratings ballots allow you to hedge your bets based on the likelihood of different outcomes.<br><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div style="font-family:"times new roman",serif"></div><div style="font-family:"times new roman",serif">And if you don't like that and the varying vote power depending on how you vote: I have a system for you!</div><div style="font-family:"times new roman",serif">"Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings" (IRNR)</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Do you think this has a benefit over SRV/STAR?<br></div><div> <br></div></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 12:09 PM, robert bristow-johnson <span dir="ltr"></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><p>No,
we should not make the voters cook up that information. all we should
ask the voters is "whom do you prefer A or B?" and "if you can't get
your favorite, whom is your next
preference?"</p></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Utility information is the information that's naturally in voters' brains. Ranking ballots force them to "quantize" it into discrete steps which distort the underlying reality. If a voter's true feelings are:<br><br></div><div>A: Love<br></div><div>B: Like<br></div><div>C: Hate<br></div><div>D: Hate<br></div><div>E: Hate<br></div><div>F: Hate<br></div><div>G: Hate<br><br></div><div>a ranking ballot forces them to vote something like <br><br></div><div>A: 1<br></div><div>B: 2<br></div><div>C: 3<br></div><div>D: 4<br></div><div>E: 5<br></div><div>F: 6<br></div><div>G: 7<br><br></div><div>amplifying small preferences into large ones and making it look like they approve of C 5/7ths as much as they approve of A. When you combine this across many voters, C is going to get much more power than they actually deserve.<br><br>"The majority judgement experiment proves that the model on which the theory of social choice and voting is based is simply not true: voters do not have preference lists of candidates in their minds. Moreover, forcing voters to establish preference lists only leads to inconsistencies, impossibilities and incompatibilities." <a href="https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00243076" target="_blank">https://hal.archives-ouvertes.<wbr>fr/hal-00243076</a><br><br>"Thus, the discrimination forced by rankings lessened the validity of rankings among participants who did not freely differentiate between values. In other words, our findings indicate that ratings may have more predictive validity than rankings, perhaps because the latter force participants to sometimes make unimportant and/or inconsequential (and hence invalid) distinctions between similarly regarded values. ... value ranking forces people to make distinctions that they would not otherwise make" <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15324834basp1802_4" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/<wbr>s15324834basp1802_4</a><br><span class="m_8159334025011711641gmail-m_8200337669864418506gmail-m_-2225811730886542567gmail-m_-1617412154794455327gmail-m_8529514184220749409gmail-">
</span><br><span class="m_8159334025011711641gmail-m_8200337669864418506gmail-m_-2225811730886542567gmail-m_-1617412154794455327gmail-m_8529514184220749409gmail-">"cardinal (utility-based) preferences are embedded into the space of
ordinal preferences. This often gives rise to a distortion in the
preferences, and hence in the social welfare of the outcome." <a href="http://procaccia.info/papers/distortion.cia06.pdf" target="_blank">http://procaccia.info/papers/<wbr>distortion.cia06.pdf</a><br><br></span></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><p>no reason to use that over Condorcet (with a simple
method to deal with cycles, ranked-pairs is still a lot easier to
explain than Schulze and they pick the same winner if there are 3 in the
Smith set, so let's use the simpler method)</p></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Condorcet systems are too complicated for real-life use in governmental elections, and much simpler cardinal systems produce the same or better outcomes in practice. <br><br>(Though the goal should be to find the most-approved Utilitarian Winner, not the most-preferred Condorcet Winner, but they are the same in most cases. <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406815000518" target="_blank">http://www.sciencedirect.com/s<wbr>cience/article/pii/S0304406815<wbr>000518</a>)<br></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br> <br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 2:28 PM, Richard Lung wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<br>
I also have found it hard to believe that Score voting and Approval
voting are taken seriously. <br></div></blockquote><div><br><br></div><div>and I find it hard to believe that people are still seriously arguing about which ranked, majoritarian voting methods meet which mathematical criteria, when rated utilitarian voting methods exist, and are accepted to work just fine in every other context in which they are used.<br></div><br></div></div></div></div></div>