<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">Compared to a rankings ballot, a ratings ballot contains more information about a voter's preference or utility for the available choices.</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">I can say</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">A > B > C > D</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">or I can say with more detail</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">A = 1.0; B = 0.9; C = 0.1; D = 0.0</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">If there is more information available, it is possible for an election algorithm to use that information and more accurately represent the voters and find the greater global utility winner.</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">If we had a specially insightful rational bayesian voting populace we might ask them for their confidence interval of how sure they are are about each choice and get more information still.</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">A = 1.0 (e=.3); B = 0.9 (e=.1), C = 0.1 (e=0.5), D = 0.0 (e=0.1)</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">And then we'd work out an election algorithm to maximize the expected value of the global utility over the known voter utility distributions.</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:47 PM, Richard Lung <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com" target="_blank">voting@ukscientists.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<br>
Brian Olson,<br>
<br>
Where we differ is that I do not see ranked choice as a constraint.
Single order choice, the x-vote is the constraint on ranked voting
as a multiple-order choice. <br>
The problem with election methods, practical and theoretical is that
they impose constraints on the voters freedom of choice, in one way
or another, and so are that much less true election methods.<br>
(A minor example, the classic objections to cumulative voting seem
to apply to some apprently modern versions or variations.)<br>
<br>
When Condorcet and Borda, disagreed on the best way to conduct a
count of preference voting, Laplace decided in favor of Borda. (I
grant you that Condorcet has information value, when weighted. But I
am not well informed on this approach and know of no convincing
reason why it should be adopted or how you would persuade the public
of that.) JFS Ross explained that Laplace favored Method Borda
because higher preferences were more important and should count
more. The Gregory method removes the objection to Borda of "later
harm." This is the direction I have followed (weighted count of
ranked choice), following on from where Meek method STV leaves off.
<br><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
<br>
Richard Lung</font></span><div><div class="h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
On 22/06/2017 15:01, Brian Olson wrote:
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">I kinda don't accept this paradox. Just to
compare the form of a election method paradox statement:
Arrow's theorem was that given a set of desired properties and
the constraint of rankings ballots, those set of desirable
properties could not all be simultaneously fulfilled. One can
almost trivially step outside of that paradox by eliminating
the constraint of the rankings ballot.</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">My model of understanding people and elections is
a utilitarian one. A person derives some amount of utility
from the outcome of an election and everyone is apportioned
the same share of utility which we might count as 0..1 or
-1..1 . These model persons can be summed up and and a global
social utility calculated. The ideal election method perfectly
knows every person and elects the true global social utility
maximizing candidate. This sounds an awful lot like score
voting. But then we have to start to complicate the model with
imperfect knowledge of a voter's utility, the imperfect
expression of that on a ballot, strategic ballot casting
rather than honest, messy computation and practical
administration issues of running an election in the real
world, and so on. So we might wind up with a best practical
method that isn't just simple score voting.</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">But I still believe there is a pragmatic 'best'
method, we have techniques for evaluating that, and we should
do this and put something up in the real world. Personally
I'll take a rankings ballot that's Condorcet counted with any
cycle resolution method as 'good enough' and practically
applicable; and tinkering around the edges for a slightly
better method is fun mathematical curiosity but I'd also like
to get some laws passed.</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">What do you think of my model statement?</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif">Is there a more formal statement of limitations
you were heading towards?</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:times new roman,serif"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Jun 22, 2017 at 2:30 AM,
Richard Lung <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:voting@ukscientists.com" target="_blank">voting@ukscientists.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"> <br>
<br>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>The election methods
trade-off paradox/impossibility theorems paradox.<br>
</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>For the sake of argument,
suppose a trade-off theory of elections that there is
no consistently democratic electoral system: the
impossibility supposition.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>That supposition implies some
conception (albeit non-existent) of a consistently
derived right election result.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>If there is no such measure,
then there is no standard even to judge that there is
a trade-off between electoral systems.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>Suppose there is a consistent
theory of choice, setting a standard by which
electoral systems can be judged for their democratic
consistency.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>It follows that the election
result will only be as consistent as the electoral
system, and there is no pre-conceivably right election
result, because that presupposes a perfection not
given to science as a progressive pursuit.<span class="m_1002364532082318285HOEnZb"></span></span></p>
<span class="m_1002364532082318285HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"> <span></span></font></span><span class="m_1002364532082318285HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"> <br>
<br>
<pre class="m_1002364532082318285m_2969095498426562027moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com" target="_blank">http://www.voting.ukscientists<wbr>.com</a>
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
<a href="https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085E-books" target="_blank">https://plus.google.com/106191<wbr>200795605365085
E-books</a> in epub format:
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</pre>
</font></span></div>
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</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<pre class="m_1002364532082318285moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a class="m_1002364532082318285moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com" target="_blank">http://www.voting.<wbr>ukscientists.com</a>
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
<a class="m_1002364532082318285moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085" target="_blank">https://plus.google.com/<wbr>106191200795605365085</a>
E-books in epub format:
<a class="m_1002364532082318285moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience" target="_blank">https://www.smashwords.com/<wbr>profile/view/democracyscience</a>
</pre>
</div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>