<html><head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head><body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">For what it's worth, the
CIVS PR method satisfies Droop proportionality, and it's getting used in
practice on a regular basis.<br>
<br>
For example, in one recent election to choose the winner of a book
award, the top 5 books were picked and they were #1, #2, #3, #4, and #17
(!) in the nonproportional Schulze ordering. This seemed initially
surprising but made sense because books #5-#16 all had at least one
author in common with #1-#4.<br>
<br>
-- Andrew<br>
<br>
<span>Toby Pereira wrote:</span><br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:%3C1499148914.3948314.1496683190385@mail.yahoo.com%3E"
type="cite">
<div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:Helvetica
Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:13px"><div
id="yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_12079" dir="ltr"><span
id="yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_12078">By the way, a sensible Hare
version of proportionality for solid coalitions would be that for a
faction to be guaranteed s seats, then they should need s - 0.5 Hare
quotas (or just over), rather than s Hare quotas. In the single-winner
case, this would translate to 50% of the vote. This is what Sainte-Laguë
guarantees.</span></div><div class="qtdSeparateBR"
id="yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_12071"><br><br></div><div
class="yahoo_quoted" id="yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_12067"
style="display: block;"> <div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_12066"
style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande,
sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> <div
id="yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_12065" style="font-family: HelveticaNeue,
Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, Sans-Serif; font-size:
16px;"> <div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_12064" dir="ltr"> <font
id="yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_12063" face="Arial" size="2"> <hr
size="1"> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">From:</span></b> Toby
Pereira <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk"><tdp201b@yahoo.co.uk></a><br> <b><span style="font-weight:
bold;">To:</span></b> Kristofer Munsterhjelm
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de"><km_elmet@t-online.de></a>; VoteFair
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:electionmethods@votefair.org"><electionmethods@votefair.org></a>;
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com">"election-methods@lists.electorama.com"</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"><election-methods@lists.electorama.com></a> <br> <b><span
style="font-weight: bold;">Sent:</span></b> Monday, 5 June 2017, 18:09<br>
<b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Subject:</span></b> Re: [EM]
Resume: Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods - guidelines?<br>
</font> </div>
<div class="moz-signature"><br><div id="yiv9320770773"><div
id="yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_12125"><div
id="yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_12124" style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);
font-family: Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande,
sans-serif; font-size: 13px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"><div><span></span></div><div
class="yiv9320770773qtdSeparateBR"
id="yiv9320770773yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_10847" dir="ltr">As I was
saying before, while Droop proportionality has gained a lot of currency
as a criterion, it's just a special case of proportionality for solid
coalitions. We could just as easily talk about Hare proportionality. For
example, the Sainte-Laguë party list method doesn't obey Droop
proportionality, but is seen as more mathematically proportional than
D'Hondt, which does obey it. But Sainte-Laguë does obey proportionality
for solid coalitions more generally. The point is that Droop
proportionality itself is not a deal breaker for a method, and I find it
slightly overused.<br clear="none"><br clear="none"></div><div
class="yiv9320770773yahoo_quoted"
id="yiv9320770773yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_10836" style="display:
block;"> <div id="yiv9320770773yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_10835"
style="font-family: Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande,
sans-serif; font-size: 13px;"> <div
id="yiv9320770773yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_10834" style="font-family:
HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande,
Sans-Serif; font-size: 16px;"> <div
id="yiv9320770773yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_10833" dir="ltr"> <font
id="yiv9320770773yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_10832" face="Arial" size="2">
</font><div class="yiv9320770773yqt4964028973"
id="yiv9320770773yqtfd88723"><hr
id="yiv9320770773yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_10846" size="1"> <b><span
style="font-weight: bold;">From:</span></b> Kristofer Munsterhjelm
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:km_elmet@t-online.de"><km_elmet@t-online.de></a><br clear="none"> <br
id="yiv9320770773yui_3_16_0_1_1496653143426_10844" clear="none"><br
clear="none">Perhaps Droop proportionality isn't the exact
proportionality measure <br clear="none">one would want - for instance,
for my Bucklin methods, I've tried to <br clear="none">base them on
divisor methods rather than on hard quotas - but I think <br
clear="none">the concept that "some voters who broadly agree on a group
of candidates <br clear="none">should see one of them elected" is a good
one. That is, that a group of <br clear="none">voters can have "their"
seat without having to agree on a strategy.<br>
</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>
</div></div></div></div>
</blockquote>
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