<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<br>
<big> To all.</big><br>
<br>
<big>Of election method, the founders came up with two (more)
options: for counting ranked choice: Condorcet and Borda. <br>
As previously explained, both ways have information value. This
group talks much about the Condorcet route. I chose the Borda
route, as refined by JB Gregory for multi-member PR. My invention
of Binomial STV progresses on that path. BTV does not have the
information-loss problems from irregularities in the count, as
discussed in terms of opportunities for strategic voting.<br>
I would say that BTV short-comings, which it no doubt has, are to
do with the recognised limitations of traditional statistics, more
than anything else. But BTV underlines that elections really are
statistical exercises of the voters indeterminate support for
candidates. Altho some election results are obvious enough. In
general, results are not of the deductive kind: this is the right
result. Rather, this more or less probably is the balance of
voters judgment.</big><br>
<br>
from<br>
Richard Lung.<br>
<br>
<br>
On 02/06/2017 08:23, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:8a51d33d-5f7f-31cf-1b52-e30585e26c6d@t-online.de"
type="cite">On 05/22/2017 08:18 PM, VoteFair wrote:
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">On 5/21/2017 7:10 PM, Armando wrote:
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Meanwhile I’ll be thankful for any
advice of further readings if you
<br>
have.
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
You, and we, are exploring frontier territory, so there's not a
lot of
<br>
formal writing about "proportional multi-winner Condorcet"
methods
<br>
beyond what we've told you about.
<br>
<br>
If you, or anyone, has specific questions about what I wrote
regarding
<br>
this topic in "Ending The Hidden Unfairness In U.S. Elections",
just ask.
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
It's not even all that clear what "proportional multi-winner
Condorcet" means, independent of actual implementations. The lower
bar is "reduces to Condorcet when there's only one winner", but
how could we generalize Condorcet beyond that point? Hard to tell.
<br>
----
<br>
Election-Methods mailing list - see <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://electorama.com/em">http://electorama.com/em</a> for
list info
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Richard Lung.
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.voting.ukscientists.com">http://www.voting.ukscientists.com</a>
Democracy Science series 3 free e-books in pdf:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085">https://plus.google.com/106191200795605365085</a>
E-books in epub format:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience">https://www.smashwords.com/profile/view/democracyscience</a>
</pre>
</body>
</html>