<html><head></head><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, Sans-Serif;font-size:13px"><div><span></span></div><div class="qtdSeparateBR" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7358" dir="ltr">Does the VoteFair method obey a specific proportionality property? For example, if you insist on electing the Condorcet winner, this is incompatible with Droop proportionality - e.g. <a id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7368" href="https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/electionscience/n__VhVgjJqg">https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/electionscience/n__VhVgjJqg</a></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7373"><br></div><div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7428"><br></div><div class="yahoo_quoted" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7163" style="display: block;"> <div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7162" style="font-family: HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, Sans-Serif; font-size: 13px;"> <div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7161" style="font-family: HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, Sans-Serif; font-size: 16px;"> <div id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7160" dir="ltr"> <font id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7164" face="Arial" size="2"> <hr size="1" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7222"> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">From:</span></b> VoteFair <electionmethods@votefair.org><br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">To:</span></b> "election-methods@lists.electorama.com" <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> <br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Sent:</span></b> Thursday, 23 February 2017, 17:54<br> <b id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7446"><span id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7445" style="font-weight: bold;">Subject:</span></b> Re: [EM] Proportional multi-winner ranked voting methods - guidelines?<br> </font> </div> <div class="y_msg_container" id="yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487865146510_7221"><br>On 2/22/2017 3:45 PM, Richard Lung wrote:<br clear="none"> ><br clear="none"> > Don't understand your remark about STV ...<br clear="none"> > ... for a single national constituency.<br clear="none"> > ...<br clear="none"> > The HG Wells formula is "Proportional representation by the single<br clear="none"> > transferable vote in large constituencies."<br clear="none"><br clear="none">I assume you are referring to this statement:<br clear="none"><br clear="none"> >> STV (the Single Transferable Vote) and similar methods(!) are designed<br clear="none"> >> for a small number of available seats, and it is a mistake to think<br clear="none"> >> that such a method can simply be used repeatedly to achieve fair<br clear="none"> >> results for a large number of available parliament seats.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">Although the designers think that they designed STV to handle a full <br clear="none">national legislature/parliament, the method has the same flaw as <br clear="none">instant-runoff voting (IRV), namely the method looks at each voter's <br clear="none">currently top choice (after any candidate eliminations), and that <br clear="none">approach -- of assuming the candidate with the most such "votes" is the <br clear="none">most popular (or the inverse, assuming that the candidate with the <br clear="none">fewest such votes is least popular) -- is extremely flawed.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">In other words, STV is like using single-mark ballots, except that when <br clear="none">a voter's marked candidate is eliminated, then the voter automatically <br clear="none">supplies an alternate single-mark ballot.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">In spite of that major unfairness/flaw, STV would provide reasonably <br clear="none">acceptable results if only two seats were being filled. And if a nation <br clear="none">has 3 equally dominant political parties, then filling 3 seats for each <br clear="none">district would work.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">However, as I stated before, STV would not provide fair results if it <br clear="none">were used for a full national legislature.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">Recently, in Canada, some people have been promoting the idea of using <br clear="none">STV to elect about 5 MPs (members of parliament) from each district <br clear="none">(which they call a "riding"). That would produce very unfair results! <br clear="none">That's what I had in mind when I referred to using STV repeatedly.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">Although Schulze-STV uses pairwise counting, it still has the same flaw <br clear="none">that it would not provide overall proportional results if it were used <br clear="none">repeatedly to fill more than 2 (or maybe 3) seats in each district. And <br clear="none">this method, and similar methods, would also provide flawed results if <br clear="none">it were used to fill all the seats in a national legislature (and those <br clear="none">reasons are explained in my book).<br clear="none"><br clear="none">So, OK, I was not clear about the meaning of the word "designed." I was <br clear="none">referring to the effect of the design rather than the intention of the <br clear="none">design.<br clear="none"><br clear="none">Richard Fobes<br clear="none"><br clear="none"><div class="yqt4758175872" id="yqtfd18682"><br clear="none">On 2/22/2017 3:45 PM, Richard Lung wrote:<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> Don't understand your remark about STV, the name given by Thomas Hare,<br clear="none">> who invented it for a single national constituency. (Tho Mill was<br clear="none">> prepared to be flexible about this, when he moved "Mr Hare's system" of<br clear="none">> Personal Representation in parliament.<br clear="none">> The HG Wells formula is "Proportional representation by the single<br clear="none">> transferable vote in large constituencies."<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> Agree with you about preference voting essential for fairness. Do you<br clear="none">> have any good source for your assertion that the lack of it in European<br clear="none">> party-proportional methods makes them especially vulnerable to moneied<br clear="none">> influence?<br clear="none">> You could say the same, for instance about the nuclear lobby in Britain<br clear="none">> (tho not Scotland).<br clear="none">><br clear="none">> from Richard Lung.<br clear="none">><br clear="none">><br clear="none">><br clear="none">> On 22/02/2017 00:24, VoteFair wrote:<br clear="none">>> On 2/20/2017 11:57 PM, Armando wrote:<br clear="none">>> > ...<br clear="none">>> > I am looking for multi-winner election with fair proportional<br clear="none">>> > representation.<br clear="none">>> > ...<br clear="none">>> > I would very appreciate if you can help me giving “guidelines”,<br clear="none">>> > explaining pros and cons, advising further readings. ...<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> I suggest that you look at VoteFair ranking, which is a method I<br clear="none">>> developed years ago, over a span of about a decade.<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> It is described in detail in my book "Ending The Hidden Unfairness In<br clear="none">>> U.S. Elections," which is available through multiple e-book reading<br clear="none">>> platforms. The book includes lots of illustrations to make the<br clear="none">>> concepts easier for "average" (non-math) readers to understand. (With<br clear="none">>> so many illustrations the file size is large and the low price<br clear="none">>> basically just covers the download fee.)<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> Near the end of the book I explain that the same system would work in<br clear="none">>> other nations simply by increasing the number of parliament members<br clear="none">>> who are elected using cross-district voting methods.<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> Based on your questions, here is what I think is the most important<br clear="none">>> concept for you to understand:<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> STV (the Single Transferable Vote) and similar methods(!) are designed<br clear="none">>> for a small number of available seats, and it is a mistake to think<br clear="none">>> that such a method can simply be used repeatedly to achieve fair<br clear="none">>> results for a large number of available parliament seats.<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> You seem to correctly understand that ranking candidates -- rather<br clear="none">>> than using single-mark ballots -- is essential for fair results. PR<br clear="none">>> (proportional representation) methods in Europe did not get this part<br clear="none">>> of PR correct. That's why it is easy for campaign contributions<br clear="none">>> (money) to easily control European politics.<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> With these concepts in mind, I suggest that you read the overview of<br clear="none">>> VoteFair ranking, which is here:<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> <a href="http://www.votefair.org/calculation_details.html" target="_blank" shape="rect">http://www.votefair.org/calculation_details.html</a><br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> Or, for your convenience, here is a copy of those words, but without<br clear="none">>> the links:<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> ........ begin quote ..........<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> VoteFair ranking is a calculation method that includes the following<br clear="none">>> components:<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> * VoteFair popularity ranking, which identifies the most popular<br clear="none">>> choice, the second-most popular choice, the third-most popular choice,<br clear="none">>> and so on down to the least popular choice. Here is a link to details<br clear="none">>> about VoteFair popularity ranking.<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> * VoteFair representation ranking, which identifies the<br clear="none">>> most-representative choice (which is the same as the most popular<br clear="none">>> choice according to VoteFair popularity ranking), the second-most<br clear="none">>> representative choice, and additional representation levels. The<br clear="none">>> second-most representative choice is identified after appropriately<br clear="none">>> reducing the influence of the voters who are well represented by the<br clear="none">>> most-popular (and most-representative) choice. Without this<br clear="none">>> adjustment the same voters who are well-represented by the most<br clear="none">>> popular choice could also determine the second-place winner. Here is<br clear="none">>> a link to details about VoteFair representation ranking.<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> * VoteFair party ranking, which identifies the most-popular political<br clear="none">>> party (which is the same as the most popular choice according to<br clear="none">>> VoteFair popularity ranking), the second-most popular political party<br clear="none">>> (which is the same as the second-most representative choice), and the<br clear="none">>> political party that deserves to be recognized as the third-most<br clear="none">>> popular political party. The third-most popular party is identified<br clear="none">>> after appropriately reducing the influence of the voters who are well<br clear="none">>> represented by the first-ranked and second-ranked political parties.<br clear="none">>> Without this adjustment the same voters who are well-represented by<br clear="none">>> one of the most popular parties could create a "shadow" party that<br clear="none">>> occupies the third position, which would block smaller parties from<br clear="none">>> that third position. Here is a link to details about VoteFair party<br clear="none">>> ranking.<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> * VoteFair partial-proportional ranking, which identifies candidates<br clear="none">>> who failed to win a legislative seat in their district, yet deserve to<br clear="none">>> win special legislative seats for the purpose of compensating for<br clear="none">>> unfair district boundaries, making it possible to elect legislators<br clear="none">>> from "third" political parties (especially when the main political<br clear="none">>> parties fail to fully represent their political priorities. Without<br clear="none">>> this adjustment the balance of power among political parties in the<br clear="none">>> legislature can easily fail to match the voters' preferences for<br clear="none">>> political parties. Here is a link to details about VoteFair<br clear="none">>> partial-proportional ranking.<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> ........ end quote ..........<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> For details about any part of VoteFair ranking, please go to the<br clear="none">>> webpage and click the appropriate link.<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> Thanks for your interest in learning how voting should be done!<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> If you have questions, just ask.<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> Richard Fobes<br clear="none">>> Author of "The Creative Problem Solver's Toolbox" which has been<br clear="none">>> published around the world in 10 languages<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>><br clear="none">>> On 2/20/2017 11:57 PM, Armando wrote:<br clear="none">>>> Hello,<br clear="none">>>> I am a new subscriber, and I am not an expert.<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> I am looking for multi-winner election with fair proportional<br clear="none">>>> representation.<br clear="none">>>> I would like to find a method allowing voters to vote “transversally”<br clear="none">>>> through parties: it could decrease conflicts.<br clear="none">>>> I would very appreciate if you can help me giving “guidelines”,<br clear="none">>>> explaining pros and cons, advising further readings. I thank you very<br clear="none">>>> much in advance.<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> I would like to open two issue:<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> *1. Best multi-winner ranked method for a PROPORTIONAL ASSEMBLY*<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> I read of CIVS<br clear="none">>>> <<a href="http://civs.cs.cornell.edu/proportional.html" target="_blank" shape="rect">http://civs.cs.cornell.edu/proportional.html</a>> and Schulze-STV<br clear="none">>>> <<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_STV" target="_blank" shape="rect">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_STV</a>>, and I thought they where<br clear="none">>>> the best for my case.<br clear="none">>>> They seems better then “traditional” STV since they satisfy more<br clear="none">>>> criteria, with less strategic vote risk.<br clear="none">>>> However I don’t understand differences among various condorcet’s<br clear="none">>>> multi-winner systems.<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> I knew also De Borda-based multiwinner systems:<br clear="none">>>> _http://www.deborda.org/faq/_<br clear="none">>>> It seems De Borda got popular in the spanish party of Podemos recently:<br clear="none">>>> but they used a non-proportional De Borda to elect their national<br clear="none">>>> assembly (with DesBorda<br clear="none">>>> <<a href="https://vistalegre2.podemos.info/la-asamblea/#Sistema_de_votacion" target="_blank" shape="rect">https://vistalegre2.podemos.info/la-asamblea/#Sistema_de_votacion</a>> by<br clear="none">>>> Echenique).<br clear="none">>>> Others in the same party proposed (failing) the Dowdall variant<br clear="none">>>> <<a href="https://forms.podemos.info/wp-content/uploads/gravity_forms/247-6edda8669dd26a992ea894158e3e3d91/2016/12/PropuestaPodemosEnMovimiento.pdf" target="_blank" shape="rect">https://forms.podemos.info/wp-content/uploads/gravity_forms/247-6edda8669dd26a992ea894158e3e3d91/2016/12/PropuestaPodemosEnMovimiento.pdf</a>><br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> of De Borda (it is used in Nauru’s elections too). It seems it would<br clear="none">>>> have been more proportional (here a simulation<br clear="none">>>> <<a href="http://www.eldiario.es/politica/datos-cocina-votaciones-Podemos_0_612089572.html?utm_content=buffer93f9f&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer" target="_blank" shape="rect">http://www.eldiario.es/politica/datos-cocina-votaciones-Podemos_0_612089572.html?utm_content=buffer93f9f&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer</a>>,<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> 3rd figure, compare /Sistema utilizado (/DesBorda) with /Propuesta de<br clear="none">>>> Anticapitalista/ (Dowdall-Borda)).<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> However De Borda Institute recommends Quota Borda<br clear="none">>>> System<br clear="none">>>> <a href="http://www.deborda.org/faq/voting-systems/what-is-the-quota-borda-system-qbs.html" target="_blank" shape="rect">http://www.deborda.org/faq/voting-systems/what-is-the-quota-borda-system-qbs.html</a><br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> Actually I think there are few differences, for voters, between a<br clear="none">>>> condorcet and a borda ballot (always numbering candidates). Is it?<br clear="none">>>> But what are the difference in /results, /considering the proportional<br clear="none">>>> variants?<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> Do you think PR-open list system helps more the more “conflictual”<br clear="none">>>> candidates (as could be the leader of each party, since they are<br clear="none">>>> overexposed to party electors “love” and to opposers “hate”)?<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> *2*. *Best multi-winner ranked method for a PROPORTIONAL MIXED-PARTIES<br clear="none">>>> GOVERNMENT*<br clear="none">>>> I was fascinated by De Borda Institute’s idea: a system to elect<br clear="none">>>> directly a mixed government, where voters choose candidates AND best<br clear="none">>>> offices for them.<br clear="none">>>> They call it Matrix<br clear="none">>>> Vote<br clear="none">>>> <a href="http://www.deborda.org/faq/voting-systems/what-is-the-matrix-vote.html" target="_blank" shape="rect">http://www.deborda.org/faq/voting-systems/what-is-the-matrix-vote.html</a><br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> Could be possible to reach this purpose also with other systems, for<br clear="none">>>> example Schulze-stv?<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> Best regards,<br clear="none">>>> Thank you in advance<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> Armando Pitocco<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>>> ----<br clear="none">>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank" shape="rect">http://electorama.com/em </a>for list<br clear="none">>>> info<br clear="none">>>><br clear="none">>> ----<br clear="none">>> Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank" shape="rect">http://electorama.com/em </a>for list<br clear="none">>> info<br clear="none">>><br clear="none">><br clear="none">><br clear="none">----<br clear="none">Election-Methods mailing list - see <a href="http://electorama.com/em" target="_blank" shape="rect">http://electorama.com/em </a>for list info</div><br><br></div> </div> </div> </div></div></body></html>