<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sun, Dec 18, 2016 at 6:28 PM, Juho Laatu <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:juho.laatu@gmail.com" target="_blank">juho.laatu@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><span class=""><blockquote type="cite"><div>On 18 Dec 2016, at 20:31, Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com" target="_blank">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:</div></blockquote><div><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><span><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><br><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></span></div></div></blockquote><div>At CIVS (Condorcet Internet Voting-Service) I've never noticed a top-cycle for 1st place. But for lower-place, later-finishers, there are often cycles, when there are lots of candidates, probably because of short rankings, or people guessing about their lower choices.<br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Ok, no sincere top cycles, nor strategic ones. Only the possibility that someone might have sometimes voted strategically (without achieving anything). What are we worried about? </div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>We have no reason to worry about offensive strategy in CIVS polls.<br><br>And so MAM is the best choice for CIVS polls. MAM is one of the rank-counts that CIVS supports.<br><br></div><div>But sometimes I poll a forum about the subject that the forum debates, and about which the members have strong favorites. That's where<br></div><div>P(MAM, Smith,MMPO) comes in.<br><br> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div><br></div><span class=""><div><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><br><div>When offensive strategy is used against the CWs, s/he'll be in the voted Smith-set. That's a good reason to elect from the voted Smith-set, so that the CWs can maybe be rescued.<br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>In theory that might save the CWs in some very rare cases. </div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I can't say why it's important to guarantee that the winner is in the voted Smith-set, other than that it confers compliance with various criteria, including Mutual-Majority. <br><br></div><div>But, because one member of the voted Smith set will be the CWs, if truncation or burial is being attempted against it (neuter gender because I'm talking about poll-alternatives) then that means that disqualifying non-members of the voted Smith-set narrows the field in a way favorable to the CWs.<br><br></div><div>But the important reason why Smith,MMPO needs the Smith set is to avoid MMPO's Hitler-with-2-votes problem, without losing its full truncation-proofness.<br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div>Note that electing outside the Smith set may sometimes also help us, e.g. by making strategic plans void by not electing the (possibly strongly top-looped) favourite of the strategists.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Maybe, but, by pairwise-count standards, electing from the Smith set keeps the winner among the pairwise publicly-favored candidates.<br><br></div><div>Of course, in an election, when Approval elects the candidate approved, considered satisfactory by the most people, is probably more important than electing the CWs or from the sincere Smith-set.<br><br></div><div>...as long as people accept not electing the CWs, and we don't have an angry majority. But Approval's emphasis on satisfactory-ness should help that acceptance.<br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div><br></div><div>If you accept the claim that the best winner (when there is no CWs) can sometimes be found outside the Smith set, then use of Smith set means that sometimes one does not elect the best winner with sincere votes. </div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sure, in elections, where the candidate satisfactory to the most people isn't in the sincere Smith-set.<br><br></div><div>But, in polls, I'm just trying to find the CWs if there is one.<br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div>That is also not very common, but it would be nice to always elect the best candidate. One should aim at that, unless there is a strong need to modify the system (= make it worse from sincere votes point of view) in order to defend the system against strategic voting (that is expected to lead to even worse consequences than not electing the best candidate with sincere votes).</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Sure, there's a trade-off between electing the best candidate under sincere-voting, vs thwarting &/or deterring offensive strategy.<br><br></div><div>MAM, by itself would surely, it seems to me, be the best way to find the CWs, for sincere voters. Smith,MMPO surely departs from MAM's ideal best-ness in that regard. The use of P(MAM, Smith,MMPO) means a conscious choice for adding good chicken-dilemma protection, at the cost of ideal best-ness, when it's desired to find the CWs.<br><br><br><br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><span class=""><div><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div><br></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Well, the feeling to want to do burial might be natural. Likewise truncation, which might not even be strategically-intended. Llikewise chicken-dilemma defection. People at EM would be the most familiar with those strategies, but anyone could feel the incentive for them.<br><br></div><div>Most especially if you're polling, on some topic, a group of people who have strongly-preferred favorites among the alternatives<br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div>Now we are talking about irrational strategies and uneducated voters. The best defence against that might be trustworthy neutral experts that tell people that their interests are best served by voting sincerely, or at least not by using any clearly irrational strategies.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Well, the person starting the poll, when using a rank-count that thwarts & sometimes penalizes offensive strategy, should advise voters that offensive strategy probably won't work, and could backfire.<br><br></div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div> I'm sure there will always be some irrational behaviour, but that might be just general noise, and would not influence the election. If some large grouping will use some irrational strategy, and as a result will make the outcome of the election worse from their point of view, maybe they will learn and will vote rationally (sincerely or strategically) in the next election.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If the CWs is in your strong bottom-set, then burial, even when it risks electing a worse member of your strong bottom-set, isn't irrational, if there's _any_ chance of successfully changing the winner to someone in your strong top-set.<br><br></div><div>If we were using Condorcet, and if the expected CWs were a Repugnocrat, I'd routinely use burial strategy, every time, in hopes of electing a progressive. That's good strategy.<br><br></div><div>I'd also top-rank all the progressives. <br><br></div><div>[Replying farther down] :<br> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div><br></div><div>One more observation on how I would approach the problem of finding a Condorcet method that is sufficiently strategy proof. I would pick first the Condorcet method that produces best possible results with sincere votes. Then I'd let EM members watch one episode of some soap opera, and then vote on who was the best actor. That would be the first poll. Then they would watch another episode, and vote again in the second poll. Then they would watch one more episode, and cast their final vote. People would be allowed to discuss about their preferences, so that similar minded people would find each others, and they could plan strategies for the final election (and why not also for the polls). People would also be encouraged to publish strategic advice to others. People could also attach information on how they voted strategically in their ballot (note, not after the election but only in the ballot when voting). This whole process would be repeated few times.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>But people would then be using counterstrategy agains the declared offensive strategy, and that would make it unrealistic, because in real elections, the voters might not be as adept at counterstrategy.<br><br></div><div>Why not just, instead, work out hypothetical results out on paper, instead of using actual voting?<br><br></div><div>But, ever since EM started, I've always felt that poll are super useful & valuable, as the only way to find out what it's like to use the various voting-systems. You probably know that I started lots of polls at EM. They've fallen out of fashion, and I consider that regrettable, because you can't fully evaluate & compare voting-systems without actually trying them. Voting in polls, and counting polls. <br></div><div><br></div><div>So yes, I'm in favor of polls at EM. Regrettably no one else is.<br><br></div><div>Many-party presidential polls. Polls on voting-systems.<br><br></div><div>And, if there isn't agreement on what method or count-rule should be used, then use "Voter's Choice", in which a voter can designate a rank-count such that his Approval ballot will automatically approve down to the winner by his designated voting-system. When we used Voter's Choice, there was a "manual" option, by which the voter could opt for his Approval ballot to be used, instead of that automatic approval-cutoff placement.<br> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div> I have great trust on the skills of people on this mailing list, but so far I have not seen any good strategic guidance for voters or parties in real life Condorcet elections. </div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Well, I mentioned, above, that I'd routinely use burial strategy when the expected CWs is in my strong bottom-set, in an official Condorcet election.<br><br></div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div>Maybe there are reasons for that. Maybe people don't have any good advices to give :-). Maybe already basic Condorcet methods are strategy proof enough for typical large scale competitive elections and polls. </div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>As others have pointed out, that might be so. No one knows. Maybe no problem. Maybe the perpetual burial fiasco. ...if I'm typical :^)<br><br></div><div>But, to clarify, I doubt that the expected CWs will be in my strong bottom-set. I have more confidence in the public's judgment.<br><br></div><div>For example, in most Internet presidential polls, the CWv is a Green or other progressive like Bernie or Nader. Jill Stein is the CWv in my 23-candidate, 17-party 2016 Presidential poll.<br>.<br></div><div>Michael Ossipoff<br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><br><div><br></div><div><br></div></div><br>----<br>
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